Charles Desmond Tucker v. Frank Edward Fearn, Judy Fearn

Citations: 333 F.3d 1216; 2003 A.M.C. 1705; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11536; 2003 WL 21338926Docket: 02-14991

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; June 10, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

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Charles Desmond Tucker appeals a district court order that barred him from recovering loss of society damages in a wrongful death action under general maritime law following the death of his minor son, Charles Justin Tucker, in a boating collision with Frank and Judy Fearn's sailboat in Alabama's territorial waters. Tucker had sought both nonpecuniary damages under general maritime law and state law claims under Alabama's wrongful death statute. The Fearns successfully moved to strike the nonpecuniary claim, arguing Tucker was not financially dependent on his son. The district court's ruling limited Tucker's recovery to pecuniary damages and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The central question on appeal is whether a nondependent parent can recover loss of society damages under general maritime law. The court, referencing key Supreme Court cases, concluded that loss of society damages are not recoverable in Tucker's case under this legal framework, affirming the district court's decision. The Supreme Court's precedents established that while wrongful death actions under general maritime law exist for state territorial waters, Congress has not provided a statutory right for damages like loss of society, reflecting the historical role of states in such matters.

The Supreme Court's decision in Moragne addressed inconsistencies in maritime wrongful death claims between federal and state laws. It established a uniform general maritime wrongful death action applicable to all waters, including state territorial waters, motivated by the need for consistency and the protection of seamen. The Court noted that existing federal maritime law disadvantaged Jones Act seamen, who had no remedy for death due to unseaworthiness in territorial waters, while nonseamen could seek remedies under state laws. Moragne did not define the scope of remedies for wrongful death under general maritime law, leaving that for future cases.

In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court clarified that loss of society damages are not recoverable under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), as it limits recovery to pecuniary losses, which was reinforced in Higginbotham. The Court emphasized adherence to Congress's intent, stating that courts cannot expand DOHSA's provisions to include nonpecuniary damages. Similarly, in Miles, the Court ruled that loss of society damages are unavailable for seamen under both the Jones Act and general maritime law, interpreting the Jones Act as incorporating a limitation to pecuniary damages based on its legislative history. Miles reaffirmed the principles established in Moragne regarding the uniform application of maritime law.

The Supreme Court's ruling established that loss of society damages are not recoverable in wrongful death actions under general maritime law for Jones Act seamen. This decision drew from the Jones Act's limitations on damages and aimed to maintain consistency across related legal frameworks, reinforcing a uniform rule for wrongful death actions involving seamen, whether under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), the Jones Act, or general maritime law.

Applying the principles from cases like Moragne, Higginbotham, and Miles, the court determined that nondependent survivors of nonseamen, such as Tucker regarding his son, also cannot claim loss of society damages under general maritime law. The court emphasized DOHSA as a critical reference, noting its role in guiding courts regarding nonstatutory death remedies and the importance of aligning federal maritime law with Congressional enactments.

The ruling highlighted DOHSA's limitation of recoverable damages to pecuniary loss, indicating that allowing broader recovery would contradict Congress's intent. The court stressed the need for uniform application of federal maritime policies, arguing against granting additional remedies for nonseamen's deaths in territorial waters compared to the limitations under DOHSA for high seas deaths or the Jones Act for seamen. The decision also reflects the special consideration admiralty law provides to seamen, noting the inconsistency that would arise if nonseamen's survivors were allowed greater recovery than those of seamen, who are traditionally afforded protections under admiralty law. The court concluded that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court had indicated a need for special consideration of nonseamen in this context, thus denying Tucker's claim.

Plaintiff Tucker relies on the Supreme Court's decision in *Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet* to argue for the recovery of loss of society damages in a wrongful death case under general maritime law. The Supreme Court allowed such recovery for the dependent widow of a longshoreman, emphasizing the need for maritime law to reflect a humanitarian policy. However, the applicability of *Gaudet* has been limited by subsequent Supreme Court rulings, particularly in *Miles*, which restricts *Gaudet* to its specific facts and to longshoremen in territorial waters. Additionally, Tucker, as a nondependent survivor, faces challenges since several federal circuit courts have ruled that nondependent survivors cannot claim loss of society damages for nonseamen's deaths in territorial waters.

Tucker also references *Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun* as supporting loss of society damages, but this case pertains to state wrongful death statutes and not federal maritime law. In *Yamaha Motor*, the Supreme Court determined that state law governs damages for deaths in territorial waters and that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) does not displace state law in such contexts. This indicates that states retain the authority to create more generous remedies. Thus, *Yamaha Motor* does not support Tucker's claims under federal maritime law, but could potentially relate to state law claims if Alabama's wrongful death statute allows for the recovery of loss of society damages.

States can regulate maritime affairs within their territorial waters as long as such regulations align with federal maritime principles. Tucker's reliance on *American Dredging Co. v. Lambert* is incorrect; that case involved nonseamen deaths in Florida waters due to a collision and focused on the recoverability of nonpecuniary damages under Florida law, with the court allowing such recovery based on the compatibility of state wrongful death statutes with federal maritime law. However, Tucker's claims for punitive damages under Alabama’s wrongful death statute were dismissed by the district court, which ruled that such damages are not recoverable under Alabama law, referencing the precedent set in *In re Amtrack*. Consequently, the court affirms the district court's decision that Tucker, a nondependent survivor, cannot recover loss of society damages in his wrongful death claim under general maritime law for his nonseaman son's death. The court does not address the issue of punitive damages further, as it is not part of the current interlocutory appeal.