Poole v. State

Citations: 497 So. 2d 530; 1985 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 5694Docket: 8 Div. 241

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; July 23, 1985; Alabama; State Appellate Court

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Bennie Steve Poole, a Morgan County Sheriff’s Deputy, was indicted on two counts of manslaughter under Alabama Code 13A-6-3(a)(1) after a fatal collision on August 15, 1982. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to three years in prison. Evidence presented showed that Poole was driving his patrol car with lights and siren activated when he entered the intersection of Highway 31 and Highway 67, colliding with a Pontiac that had a red traffic signal. Witnesses determined that Poole was speeding, approaching the intersection at about 70 m.p.h., while the Pontiac was traveling approximately 40 m.p.h. Howard Anderson, a passenger in the Pontiac, testified that they had not seen the patrol car until the collision occurred. The incident followed a radio alert about an armed robbery, prompting Poole to respond with urgency, during which he passed several red lights. Despite his claim that traffic was yielding, Poole was unable to avoid the collision. The trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal was based on the assertion that there was sufficient evidence of recklessness leading to the deaths of the Pontiac's driver and passenger.

A determination of the appellant's contention involves assessing whether he acted “recklessly” as defined under Alabama law. According to Section 13A-2-2(3) of the Code of Alabama 1975, a person acts recklessly if he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or a circumstance exists, with such disregard being a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would observe. Manslaughter, defined in Section 13A-6-3(a)(1), occurs when an individual recklessly causes another's death, while criminally negligent homicide, as outlined in Section 13A-6-4, occurs when someone causes a death through criminal negligence, failing to perceive a substantial risk. The key difference between the two offenses lies in the offender's awareness of the risk: a reckless individual is aware and disregards the risk, whereas a negligent individual is unaware and fails to perceive it. Legal commentary highlights that negligence involves an inadvertent creation of risk, contrasting with the purposeful, knowing, or reckless actions that imply awareness. The situation is further complicated by Alabama law, which grants police vehicles certain exemptions from standard road rules under Section 32-5A-7, allowing emergency vehicle drivers to exercise specific privileges when responding to emergencies or pursuing law violators, subject to outlined conditions.

An authorized emergency vehicle may proceed past red or stop signals and exceed speed limits, provided it does not endanger lives or property, and only when using required audible and visual signals. However, operators are still obligated to drive safely and are not protected from consequences arising from reckless disregard for safety. There is a public policy concern that holding emergency vehicle operators criminally liable may deter swift responses to emergencies. In this case, the appellant operated his emergency vehicle without due regard for safety, as evidenced by insufficient slowing at an intersection leading to a collision. The court found the appellant's actions to be a gross deviation from reasonable care, supported by substantial evidence. 

The appellant also raised an issue regarding two jurors who did not respond to questions during voir dire, claiming this limited his ability to utilize jury strikes effectively, thereby prejudicing his case. During the new trial hearing, the trial judge considered the jurors' testimony and ultimately denied the motion for a new trial, affirming that any potential bias did not warrant a retrial.

The court addressed the defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial on October 12, 1984. The Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was argued but ultimately overruled after careful consideration. The Motion for New Trial was also examined, with the defendant claiming that jurors Betty Johnson and Marty K. Russell did not fully disclose relevant information during voir dire, which he argued was prejudicial. 

Juror Betty Johnson had a prior conviction for selling prohibited liquor in 1982, with an appeal pending at the time she was selected. The court noted that the appeal's status rendered her conviction ineffective for disqualification purposes. During voir dire, she did not disclose her conviction, asserting she interpreted the inquiry as not including arrests. Additionally, she did not mention her ex-husband's prior convictions, claiming she did not consider him a close relative after their divorce. The court determined that Johnson was qualified to serve and found no evidence that her undisclosed information influenced her deliberation or the verdict.

Juror Marty K. Russell reported two prior convictions for issuing worthless checks, both resulting from guilty pleas. He failed to disclose these convictions during voir dire, particularly regarding questions related to moral turpitude and voting rights loss. The court found no indication that Russell’s undisclosed convictions affected his ability to serve as a juror or the trial's outcome.

A recent Federal Court ruling and an Attorney General's opinion have created uncertainty regarding whether a conviction for issuing a worthless check results in the loss of voting rights. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has previously determined that such a conviction involves moral turpitude, as it requires an intent to defraud. However, the determination of voting rights loss is independent of this moral turpitude finding. The relevant statute, 12-16-60.4, disqualifies jurors who have lost the right to vote due to a conviction involving moral turpitude. Although the juror in question has a conviction that clearly involves moral turpitude, there is insufficient evidence to confirm whether the juror has lost voting rights, meaning he is not disqualified from serving.

Furthermore, even if the juror's conviction could be grounds for challenge, the defendant did not demonstrate a lack of prior knowledge about the juror’s conviction. Without evidence of prejudice affecting the juror's judgment, the court found no basis for a new trial. The appellant cited previous cases where new trials were granted due to juror issues during voir dire, emphasizing that the potential for prejudice, rather than actual prejudice, is the standard for determining the need for a new trial. However, the court ultimately ruled against the motion for a new trial.

Freeman established the standard for reviewing trial court decisions regarding motions for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct during voir dire. The court must assess whether improper juror responses resulted in probable prejudice to the moving party. This assessment is primarily at the discretion of the trial court, which is best positioned to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the jurors’ answers. The trial court's application of the probable prejudice test is subject to review only for abuse of discretion. While acknowledging the importance of truthful jury disclosures, the court recognizes the potential for unintentional errors or lapses in memory by jurors. Thus, a juror's failure to respond correctly does not automatically warrant a new trial. After reviewing the evidence related to the motion for a new trial, the court concluded that the lack of juror response did not result in probable prejudice to the appellant and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, with all judges concurring.