Robert LAUER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellant
Docket: 98-2773
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; March 2, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case of Robert Lauer against Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security. The case, No. 98-2773, was argued on January 26, 1999, and decided on March 2, 1999. The district court had granted Lauer's motion under Rule 59(e) while denying the Commissioner's similar motion in a disability insurance benefits matter. Initially, the district court affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision that Lauer was not disabled from 1991 to 1993. However, the court later accepted Lauer's argument that a 1996 Social Security Ruling required a finding of disability. Despite acknowledging flaws in Lauer's argument, the district court did not restore the judgment in favor of the Commissioner. The appellate court vacated the district court's decision, finding it inconsistent with the ruling's language and improperly adjudicating an issue reserved for the Commissioner. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to refer it back to the Commissioner.
Lauer, aged 47, had a chronic history of back pain stemming from a work injury in 1983. He worked as an assistant manager at a car wash until September 1991 when a back injury forced him to quit. Medical evaluations revealed a herniated disk and subsequent spinal surgery in December 1991 provided temporary pain relief, which was short-lived. Lauer's post-surgery evaluations indicated complications, including spinal canal stenosis and epidural lipomatosis. Despite reporting some improvement during a vacation in Mexico in August 1992, his condition continued to deteriorate. A work capacity evaluation in September 1992 showed that, despite experiencing back spasms, he could perform light work, albeit with limitations. Throughout September and October 1992, Lauer underwent several lumbar epidural steroid injections with limited effectiveness, and his physician noted ongoing significant pain and functional difficulties.
In May and June 1993, Lauer participated in a rehabilitation program and subsequently began working full-time as a security guard in July 1993, marking his first job since 1991, which involved significant walking. He later transitioned to a less physically demanding security position that allowed for more sitting. At an administrative hearing in August 1994, the ALJ determined that Lauer was only eligible for benefits between September 1991 and July 1993, concluding that although he had a severe condition, he did not meet the impairment criteria in the regulations. The ALJ found that after August 1992, Lauer could perform a full range of sedentary work with certain restrictions, and noted the availability of jobs in the Chicago area that he could undertake, leading to a finding of no disability.
Lauer sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. 405, and the district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner. Lauer subsequently filed a Rule 59(e) motion, arguing that SSR 96-9p requires a disability finding for those who cannot stoop. The court agreed, determining that Lauer was entitled to benefits for the entire period he was out of work. The Commissioner contested this interpretation, arguing that the district court misapplied SSR 96-9p, which states that disability findings 'usually' apply in such circumstances. The court upheld its decision, acknowledging that Lauer fit the 'usually' category supported by his medical records. The Commissioner appealed the rulings concerning the Rule 59 motions.
The appellate court noted that it typically reviews Rule 59 motions for abuse of discretion but may also review the merits of the underlying actions. In Social Security disability cases, the court generally applies a de novo standard for district court decisions while ensuring the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence. The court recognized SSRs as interpretive rules that guide agency adjudicators, affirming their application to Lauer’s case despite the SSR being issued after his hearing. The district court found that SSR 96-9p mandates a disability finding for claimants with sedentary work limitations who cannot stoop, regardless of vocational expert testimony.
An ability to stoop occasionally, defined as up to one-third of the time, is generally necessary for unskilled sedentary occupations. A complete inability to stoop would typically indicate disability; however, a restriction to occasional stooping has minimal impact on the occupational base. Consultation with vocational experts is recommended for individuals limited to less than occasional stooping. Lauer contends that this guidance indicates automatic disability for claimants unable to stoop, but this is not supported by the language of the ruling, which does not mandate disability findings. The reference to the erosion of the occupational base does not imply an automatic finding of disability, as established in Abbott v. Sullivan.
The district court's ruling that Lauer's case is 'usual' under the SSR was seen as an overreach, as the assessment of whether a case is usual or unusual is a factual determination for the Commissioner. The court misinterpreted the SSR's implications and should have allowed the ALJ to reassess Lauer's case in light of the SSR's guidance. Additionally, Lauer argues that the ALJ's decision lacks substantial evidence, raising five issues, none of which support affirming the district court's ruling. However, it is noted that the ALJ failed to consider the entire record when evaluating Lauer's disability status, warranting a remand for further review.
The ALJ concluded that Lauer had the capacity for sedentary work as of August 1992, based on a report from September 8, 1992, indicating he could perform light work, and Lauer's account of a trip to Mexico in August during which he felt well. This date is pivotal since Lauer stopped working on September 26, 1991, and must demonstrate a 12-month incapacity to qualify for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1)(A). A slight delay in determining his functional capacity could allow him to meet the required period for disability.
On September 8, 1992, Lauer's evaluation confirmed his ability for light work but noted significant back spasms during activities. A physical therapist on September 23, 1992, reported that Lauer could not remain in one position for more than 20-30 minutes due to pain and was unable to drive, indicating that standing would likely exacerbate his condition. The Commissioner dismissed this report as non-medical, despite regulations acknowledging non-physician insights as valuable for assessing functional capacity.
Additionally, a treating physician's report from September 25 recognized Lauer's need for physical therapy and prescribed epidural steroid injections, which Lauer received in late September and early October. By October 10, a physician noted Lauer was symptomatic and dysfunctional, unable to maintain a standard level of function.
Lauer's situation in September and October implies difficulties in sustaining full-time work, despite some capabilities in August. The ALJ must consider all evidence, including those contradicting her ruling, as established in case law (Diaz v. Chater and Green v. Shalala). The district court incorrectly ruled Lauer disabled, and the case is remanded for further evaluation of the SSR's impact and Lauer's ongoing impairment post-September 8, 1992. The ruling is vacated and remanded with specific instructions.
