Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; May 13, 1986; Alabama; State Appellate Court
David Matthew Thomas, also known as Larry Wells, was found guilty of first-degree robbery, specifically for stealing $80 from Denise Lynn Daniel using force while armed with a knife, violating Section 13A-8-41 of the Alabama Criminal Code. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment and denied his motion for a new trial. The primary eyewitness, the victim, testified that on August 1, 1983, while parked in a parking deck, she was confronted by a young black male who threatened her with a knife. She identified Thomas as her assailant. During her testimony, she described the incident in detail, stating she felt the assailant's hand over her mouth and a knife at her stomach while he demanded her money, assuring her he wouldn't hurt her if she complied.
The witness, Ms. Daniel, testified regarding an incident where she was robbed at knifepoint. She stated she had approximately $80 in U.S. currency, which she handed to the robber after he threatened her with a knife at her throat. During the encounter, she experienced a minor cut on her neck from the knife and was visibly distressed, screaming for help. When a car approached the parking deck, the robber fled upon realizing he had been seen. Ms. Daniel then reported the incident, leading to a call for police assistance. She received medical treatment later that day, including a tetanus shot for cuts on her hands.
In cross-examination, it was clarified that the robber did not take her purse and that she was not physically held during the money exchange, though the threat of the knife was present. The testimony also addressed the admissibility of her in-court identification of the defendant, David Matthew Thomas, which was not objected to during the direct examination. The court noted that the identification process did not violate the defendant’s rights as claimed.
Appellee's counsel asserts that the appellant did not object to Ms. Daniel's in-court identification during trial, only raising the issue after Officer Strunk's testimony, making the objection untimely and failing to preserve it for appeal. A suppression hearing, which could have addressed the admissibility of the identification, was not conducted by the appellant. Consequently, the first issue raised by the appellant is deemed unmeritorious.
The second issue concerns whether the trial judge erred in allowing the in-court identification of appellant by victim Denise Lynn Daniel, arguing it was tainted by a suggestive preindictment lineup, infringing on the appellant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The appellant's motion to suppress the identification, referencing the suggestiveness of the pretrial lineup and prior viewing of photographs, was made after significant time had passed since the evidence was admitted. Testimony revealed that the victim had multiple opportunities to view photographs, but did not make any positive identifications from them or the lineup, which occurred approximately eleven days after the robbery.
During redirect examination, a witness confirmed that Mrs. Daniel did not identify the suspect from a set of pictures that excluded his image but noted that she recognized a resemblance when shown a second set that included his picture, stating he had similar characteristics without making a positive identification. The appellant's second issue was deemed unfavorable to him. Mr. Phillip Foster, who was not an eyewitness to the robbery but chased the suspect, testified that he believed the defendant was the individual he pursued based on his observations during a five or six-minute chase.
Additionally, the appellant raised a legal issue regarding the trial judge's admission of fingerprint evidence under the business record exception to hearsay, despite objections regarding improper predicate. Ms. Marietta Prevo, a fingerprint expert, testified that she received fourteen latent fingerprints from Lt. Strunk, of which three were identifiable as belonging to David Matthew Thomas, confirming that no other individual's fingerprints were present. Prevo stated these prints contained sufficient detail for identification, asserting there were at least nine points of comparison with Thomas's known prints. The prosecution sought to introduce the fingerprint evidence, which the defense objected to on grounds of improper predicate, specifically contesting the receipt of one of the exhibits.
David Matthew Thomas's known fingerprint cards were received and compared with latent prints. Deputy Sheriff Bernard Mays, from the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department's Fingerprint Department, confirmed his role as custodian of these fingerprint records. He indicated that the fingerprint records are primarily maintained at the department's headquarters in Fairfield, Alabama, and that they only remain in his custody for one day after being checked before being sent to Fairfield. Mays acknowledged familiarity with the records in question, confirming they appeared to be Thomas's. During cross-examination, Mays clarified that while he maintains custody temporarily, he does not initial the cards and cannot confirm if he has seen Thomas's specific cards before. Numbers indicating their origin from the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department were present. Mays confirmed that once sent to Fairfield, he no longer has control over them. On redirect examination, Mays identified Deputy Mark Lawley as the individual who took the prints and confirmed Lawley's position within the Sheriff's Department.
The witness confirmed he would have been working on August 14th but could not determine the exact date the fingerprints were taken from the card, which only indicated a month and year (8/83) as required by the State. He acknowledged the presence of the suspect on August 15th but clarified that the card did not specify that this was the day the prints were taken. He admitted uncertainty about whether he was working on the day the prints were taken. During the redirect examination, he recognized the fingerprint card as routine for the Sheriff’s Department and confirmed that individuals are typically fingerprinted on their arrest day. He also stated that these cards fall under his custody and control. On recross examination, he admitted he did not see Mr. Lawley sign the card and could not confirm that Lawley took the prints, only recognizing his signature. The witness described knowing Lawley's signature and characteristics used to authenticate prints, asserting his familiarity with them as he regularly checked fingerprint cards.
The witness indicates that different shifts use distinct codes for documenting fingerprints, with specific personnel assigned to each shift. Day shift has one operator, the night shift has Mr. Lawley, and the afternoon shift has Mrs. Frazier. The witness confirms that the coding corresponds to the individual's signature, implying that any errors in fingerprinting would require correction. When asked about specific fingerprint cards, the witness repeatedly states he does not remember them.
Objections are raised regarding the admission of State’s Exhibit No. Two, citing concerns over the authenticity of signatures and hearsay, as the witness did not recall if he had custody of the records. The court overrules these objections, and the exhibit is admitted into evidence.
The State argues that the absence of testimony from the individual who took the fingerprints does not undermine the chain of custody, asserting that the purpose of this chain is to ensure evidence integrity. The court references previous cases to support this view and concludes that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed, with all judges concurring except for one who concurs in result only.
