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Nolan v. Stamper Drilling Co.

Citations: 488 So. 2d 312; 1986 La. App. LEXIS 6967Docket: No. 85-386

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 14, 1986; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Laris J. Nolan, Jr. filed a worker’s compensation suit against Stamper Drilling Company and its insurer, Insurance Company of North America, seeking benefits, penalties, and attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded Nolan $514.08 in penalties and $1,000 in attorney’s fees, determining that the defendant failed to timely pay compensation. However, the court denied compensation benefits, concluding that Nolan was no longer disabled as of July 17, 1984, when his benefits were terminated. The court also allocated a portion of court costs to Nolan and allowed these costs to offset the penalties awarded. Nolan appealed, raising several issues: the correctness of the disability determination post-July 17, 1984; the assessment of court costs against him; the offsetting of these costs against penalties instead of attorney’s fees; and whether damages for a frivolous appeal should be imposed.

Nolan, a roughneck, injured his back on May 14, 1983, and continued to experience pain with a diagnosis of back strain. Treatment by Dr. Lynn Edward Foret revealed muscle spasms, and further evaluations suggested disc disruption. While the insurer initially paid compensation, there were interruptions, leading Nolan to file suit in August 1983. A videotape on June 18, 1984, showed him working on his car, and his benefits were terminated on July 17, 1984. The trial court found evidence insufficient to support ongoing disability after this date, noting a lack of objective symptoms and a medical opinion questioning the severity of Nolan's condition.

A doctor testified that he suspected the plaintiff was not exerting full effort during an examination, and when encouraged to do so, the plaintiff exhibited normal strength. Dr. Campbell, who examined the plaintiff later, noted that the plaintiff's symptoms were disproportionate to physical findings but could not confirm the plaintiff was ready to return to work. Dr. Foret believed the plaintiff was disabled but struggled to reconcile this with videotape evidence showing the plaintiff engaging in active movements, which he described as "gymnastics." Although initially swayed by the tape to think the plaintiff was not disabled, Dr. Foret later revised his opinion after being informed the plaintiff had rested during unrecorded moments and had taken two Percodans before working on his car. The trial court, however, found the plaintiff's claim about the medication to be dubious, suggesting it was a fabrication to explain the videotape's implications. The court stated that if the plaintiff had taken two Percodans, he would have been incapacitated, which was not evident during the tape. The trial court's discretion in assessing witness credibility led to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not disabled after July 17, 1984.

Regarding court costs, the trial court assigned part of the costs to the plaintiff and the remainder to the defendants, which was deemed equitable. However, the court improperly ordered the costs against the plaintiff to be offset against penalties awarded to him. The appellate court reversed this offset while affirming the trial court's other judgments and determined that the plaintiff's appeal was not frivolous. The judgment was thus reversed in part and affirmed in part, with costs assessed equally between the plaintiff and defendants.