Brent Wheeler v. Daniel C. Miller, Dr. C. Sue McCullough Dr. Texas Woman's University

Citations: 168 F.3d 241; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3610; 1999 WL 85565Docket: 98-40412

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; March 9, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Brent Wheeler, a graduate student at Texas Woman's University (TWU), filed a lawsuit against the university and two professors, Daniel C. Miller and C. Sue McCullough, after failing to obtain a Ph.D. in psychology. He sought injunctive relief and damages, claiming he was falsely accused of cheating, which led to poor grades, punitive remediation, denial of internship opportunities, and eventual dismissal from the program. Wheeler alleged violations of his state and federal due process and equal protection rights, as well as defamation, arguing he was treated as if he had cheated without a proper hearing.

The summary judgment record revealed that Wheeler was admitted to TWU’s master's program in counseling psychology in 1992 and later attempted to pursue a Ph.D. in counseling psychology but was initially denied admission. He was eventually accepted into the school psychology Ph.D. program, where McCullough and Miller were committee members. McCullough voted against his admission due to concerns about his academic performance and ethical compliance, while Miller supported him, advocating for second chances.

Evidence presented indicated that Wheeler's academic performance was poor; he received a C in a critical course taught by McCullough and showed disrespect for course rules, including testing a family member, which is an ethical violation. McCullough noted that Wheeler's testing protocols were flawed and did not adhere to required procedures. The court ultimately affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TWU, rejecting Wheeler's claims.

The committee approved Wheeler's admission, contingent on completing his master's degree, retaking a psychological assessment, and enrolling in an introductory course in school psychology, which he completed with an A. Concerns arose regarding potential fabrication of test results, with faculty members discussing these allegations. Dr. Jolly testified that McCullough's comments about Wheeler's ethical issues were attempts to sway her opinion, and Dr. Miller stated that accusations of academic dishonesty were known but not acknowledged by Dr. Vitro. A conversation revealed accusations against Wheeler regarding creating false protocols and a confrontation with Dr. Jackson about similar issues. Wheeler was informed by Miller and Jolly about rumors of his academic dishonesty.

The graduate student handbook stipulates remediation for a C grade and expulsion for two Cs. After being admitted to the Ph.D. program, Wheeler received an A in a course from Miller but a B in the accompanying pre-practicum. He then earned a second C in a pre-practicum led by Dr. Vitro, related to inadequate written logs. Although the handbook allows for dismissal after two Cs, the SPPC opted for a remediation plan involving additional coursework, a comprehensive paper, and an oral exam, delaying his internship eligibility until at least Fall 1996. Dr. Hamilton confirmed that the remediation was based solely on academic performance, not allegations of dishonesty.

Wheeler failed his oral comprehensive examination on April 28, 1995, with Miller describing his performance as exceptionally poor. Following a third C grade from Vitro, the SPPC convened in June 1995 and decided to dismiss Wheeler due to his academic performance. They met with him to communicate this decision, but the school administration instructed them to reinstate him.

Miller and Vitro maintained that the original remediation plan remained in effect and did not account for additional academic deficiencies that arose after its implementation, specifically Wheeler’s fourth C and failure of the comprehensive exam. After his readmission, Wheeler submitted a degree plan requiring a transcript from the University of North Texas, where he had transferred and subsequently received a fourth C in a graduate statistics course. In March 1996, Wheeler failed a second oral comprehensive exam administered by a committee that included Dr. Palomares, Rubin, and Hampton, all of whom attested to evaluating him in good faith without bias or knowledge of any allegations of academic dishonesty. Following this failure, Miller informed the Lewisville I.S.D. that Wheeler had not met all program requirements for an internship.

Miller then created a second remediation plan, asserting it was based solely on Wheeler's academic performance, with no consideration of any unethical conduct allegations. According to TWU's graduate catalog, students who fail any part of the comprehensive exam are entitled to remediation and reevaluation, and may face dismissal if they do not satisfactorily complete the remediation. The second plan required specific coursework and timely applications to retake comprehensive exams. During a meeting with the SPPC on March 29, 1996, Wheeler was provided the opportunity to voice concerns regarding his academic journey, and the demanding nature of the remediation plan was acknowledged.

Wheeler appealed this second remediation plan to the dean, and an ad hoc committee upheld the SPPC's decision. After he failed to enroll in a required course, the SPPC formally dismissed him from the graduate program. Miller, Hamilton, and Vitro confirmed that the dismissal was solely due to Wheeler's non-compliance with academic requirements. The legal discussion emphasized that under modern summary judgment standards, a trial is warranted only if evidence exists favoring the nonmoving party; otherwise, summary judgment can be granted. The court found that no rational jury could rule in favor of Wheeler on his claims, including procedural due process, referencing Texas courts' reliance on federal case law for academic-related due process rights.

In Horowitz, a medical student was dismissed for failing to meet academic standards, following evaluations by a faculty-student council and a coordinating committee. Throughout her first year, faculty dissatisfaction with her performance led to a probationary advancement to her second year. Continued poor performance resulted in a recommendation for her dismissal, which was upheld after she appealed by taking oral and practical examinations. The council reaffirmed its position based on her rotation reports, and the dean and coordinating committee approved her dismissal, which was subsequently sustained by the provost.

The court recognized that the student had a property or liberty interest warranting procedural due process, and concluded that the school had met these requirements. The Court emphasized that the dismissal process was careful and deliberate, providing adequate notice of performance issues and a tailored remedial program. The standards applied in this case were deemed sufficient and even exceeded constitutional due process requirements.

Wheeler, another student, argued that his dismissal by TWU was influenced by false cheating allegations, which could classify the actions as disciplinary rather than academic. However, the court maintained that the actions taken by TWU were academic in nature, as Wheeler was dismissed for failing to meet course requirements outlined in a remedial plan following poor grades. The establishment of the remedial plans was a response to his academic performance, and thus the procedural standards applied in his case were consistent with those found sufficient in Horowitz.

Wheeler has not provided direct evidence linking allegations of cheating to his failure of two oral exams. The faculty members who conducted the second exam were unaware of any cheating accusations and rated Wheeler's performance very poorly. For the first exam, only two faculty members had heard rumors about academic dishonesty but did not make accusations based on their own experiences with Wheeler. Their evaluations were deemed a good faith assessment of his academic performance, which is insufficient to challenge summary judgment. Additionally, Wheeler's grades, including two C's from one faculty member and another C from a different institution, do not demonstrate knowledge of cheating allegations.

Dr. McCullough, one of the evaluators, expressed multiple concerns about Wheeler's academic ethics and performance, indicating that a rational fact-finder could not view the actions of the Student Performance and Progress Committee (SPPC) as disciplinary rather than academic. Even if TWU's decisions were disciplinary, the necessary procedures under federal law would constitute an informal hearing, allowing Wheeler to discuss his conduct, which he received during the remediation process and prior to his dismissal for failing to meet the requirements.

Wheeler's claim that TWU did not provide a hearing on cheating allegations raises the issue of procedural due process. For this claim to be actionable, there must be evidence that TWU deprived Wheeler of a property or liberty interest due to the cheating allegations. The evidence shows that his dismissal was based on his failure to meet remediation requirements, not on cheating claims. This conclusion aligns with the Supreme Court's ruling in Paul v. Davis, which established that reputation alone does not constitute a sufficient property or liberty interest to trigger due process protections.

Simple defamation by a state official does not require the government to provide procedural due process, such as a hearing, unless the defamation occurs during employment termination or significantly alters a legally recognized right or status. In this case, mere allegations of cheating against Wheeler did not lead to any actions by Texas Woman's University (TWU) that altered his status as a student, thus not necessitating a hearing.

Regarding substantive due process, the Supreme Court's ruling in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing establishes that academic decisions are subject to limited judicial review. Courts must respect faculty judgments unless there is a substantial deviation from accepted academic norms. Wheeler failed to demonstrate that TWU's decision not to award him a doctorate was unreasonable given his entire academic career. His claims that poor grades and remediation plans stemmed from false cheating allegations do not alter the characterization of TWU's actions as genuine academic decisions, consistent with the Ewing standard.

Additionally, Wheeler's potential 'stigma' due process claim based on defamation was not specifically alleged and was appropriately dismissed. The jurisprudence indicates that not every instance of defamation by a public official constitutes a due process violation under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.

A plaintiff's defamation claim against defendants does not constitute a viable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment when considered independently. The court found that there was no evidence that the defendants' actions endangered the plaintiff's student status due to the alleged cheating allegations. Defamation alone is insufficient for a legal claim unless it infringes on another interest. While government defamation can be actionable, it requires public disclosure of the defamatory statements. The only relevant document, an April 2, 1996 letter, indicated that the plaintiff did not meet program requirements, but this was deemed not sufficiently stigmatizing to support a stigma due process claim. To succeed on such a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defamatory statements were false, yet Wheeler failed to provide concrete evidence to refute the allegations. Testimonies indicated possible misconduct by Wheeler, including inappropriate testing practices and rule violations, further weakening his case. Regarding equal protection, Wheeler’s claims of discrimination lacked specificity regarding class membership, as he essentially argued that he was unfairly treated as an individual rather than as part of a distinct group, leaving the applicability of equal protection rights in such circumstances unclear.

Equal protection rights under state law align with federal law, requiring that similarly situated individuals be treated equitably. To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate differential treatment of similarly situated individuals, typically invoking the rational basis test unless a suspect class or fundamental right is involved. The conduct of the appellees withstands rational basis scrutiny, similar to the substantive due process analysis. Academic decisions are afforded deference; thus, claims of unequal treatment based on faculty evaluations are scrutinized accordingly. Wheeler failed to identify any peers with comparable academic deficiencies who were granted doctorates, underscoring the unique nature of his case. The court referenced a precedent indicating that promotion decisions are not easily subjected to rigorous review.

Regarding defamation claims, Texas law recognizes a qualified privilege for statements made among individuals with a shared interest. Faculty communications regarding Wheeler's academic progress were protected under this privilege, as they pertained to a mutual interest in his qualifications. A specific letter to the Lewisville I.S.D. about Wheeler's internship eligibility also falls under this privilege due to the shared interest between the school district and Texas Woman's University (TWU). For a defamation claim to succeed, proof of actual malice must be demonstrated, defined as knowledge of a statement's falsity or reckless disregard for its truth. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find malice on the part of TWU or its faculty.

Drs. McCullough and Jackson accused Wheeler of academic dishonesty, but Wheeler failed to provide sufficient sworn evidence to prove these accusations false, or to demonstrate that they were made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Additionally, he did not prove the falsity of statements made in an April 2, 1996 letter. Wheeler's lawsuit, initially filed in Texas state court and later moved to federal court, included claims of gender and disability discrimination, though his petition did not adequately assert these claims. Instead, he alleged discrimination in the doctoral program, claiming he faced higher standards and unfair treatment compared to other students, and was subjected to slanderous accusations from faculty members. The case also involved issues of immunity under federal and state law, but the court concluded that Wheeler's claims lacked substantive merit, making it unnecessary to address immunity. The Texas Supreme Court emphasized that procedural due process for graduate student expulsions requires more than informal procedures, citing a case where a rational trier of fact could not find Wheeler was dismissed for disciplinary reasons. Procedural due process protections apply when there is a deprivation of liberty or property interests, necessitating some form of hearing when such interests are involved.

The referenced legal excerpts contain citations from various cases concerning issues of due process and equal protection under the law. Key points include:

1. **Case Citations**: Several cases are referenced to underline legal principles, including *Paul v. Davis* (424 U.S. 693, 1976) and *Ewing v. California* (474 U.S. 214, 1985), highlighting specific pages and footnotes that elaborate on legal doctrines.

2. **Due Process Claims**: The excerpts indicate that for a stigma due process claim to be valid, more than mere opinions or letters stating qualifications is required. Cited cases such as *Connelly v. Comptroller of Currency* demonstrate the insufficiency of vague statements in supporting such claims.

3. **Equal Protection Clause**: The Equal Protection Clause aims to abolish caste-based and discriminatory legislation. It prohibits selective enforcement based on arbitrary classifications like race and religion, as evidenced by cases like *Oyler v. Boles*.

4. **Arbitrary Classifications**: The clause also prevents states from making unreasonable classifications, ensuring fair treatment under the law, as articulated in cases like *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center*.

5. **Qualified Privilege**: Several cases discuss the concept of qualified privilege concerning statements made in professional evaluations, particularly within educational contexts, as seen in *Baldwin v. University of Texas Med. Branch* and other cited cases.

6. **Legal Precedents**: The excerpts reference multiple precedential cases that reinforce the established legal standards regarding due process, equal protection, and the implications of privileged communications in professional settings.

These points collectively reflect a framework of legal principles relevant to the constitutional rights of individuals, specifically in the context of employment, discrimination, and due process considerations.