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Kiska Construction corporation-u.s.a. And Kajima Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Citations: 167 F.3d 608; 334 U.S. App. D.C. 371; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2505; 1999 WL 76438Docket: 98-7091

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; February 19, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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KiSKA Construction Corporation-U.S.A. and Kajima Engineering and Construction, Inc. sought access to documents from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) under the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act (DC-FOIA). The District Court denied WMATA's motion to dismiss the complaint. On appeal, WMATA argued it was immune from DC-FOIA requirements under interstate compact law and claimed it did not qualify as an "agency" according to the DC-FOIA. The Court of Appeals, led by Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, chose not to rule on WMATA's immunity. Instead, it determined that, based on District of Columbia case law, WMATA is not considered an "agency" under DC-FOIA. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the District Court's judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. The background reveals that WMATA was established in 1966 by Virginia, Maryland, and D.C. through an interstate compact, which Congress consented to, thus granting it federal law status. KiSKA-Kajima had previously been awarded a contract for subway construction and had requested documents related to that contract, but WMATA denied these requests, asserting it was not subject to DC-FOIA. The Secretary of the District of Columbia upheld WMATA’s position, stating that the DC-FOIA's disclosure policies do not apply to WMATA due to the terms of the compact.

The Secretary of the District of Columbia dismissed KiSKA-Kajima's FOIA appeal against WMATA, concluding that WMATA is not subject to DC-FOIA, thus the Mayor lacked jurisdiction for review. KiSKA-Kajima subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia to compel WMATA to produce documents, which WMATA removed to District Court. WMATA moved to dismiss the case, and the court granted this motion on June 6, 1997, ruling KiSKA-Kajima could not sue as a joint venture. KiSKA-Kajima amended its complaint to name KiSKA Construction Corporation-U.S.A. and Kajima Engineering and Construction Incorporated as plaintiffs. WMATA refiled its motion to dismiss based on its non-subjectivity to DC-FOIA. However, on March 31, 1998, the District Court denied the motion, determining WMATA is not exempt from DC-FOIA under interstate compact law and is an agency of the D.C. government. WMATA then filed an interlocutory appeal, claiming it is immune from suit under the WMATA Compact and interstate compact law, and arguing it does not qualify as a D.C. agency under the DC-FOIA. Although appellate courts typically do not review motions to dismiss, they may do so in cases involving immunity claims. The court acknowledged jurisdiction over WMATA's immunity claims and noted the potential for "pendent appellate jurisdiction" if it could expedite resolution of the case.

In Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc., the court addressed whether the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) qualifies as an "agency" under the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act (DC-FOIA). The determination of WMATA's immunity under the WMATA Compact or interstate law was deemed complex; however, the question of its status as an "agency" under D.C. law was straightforward. The DC-FOIA defines an "agency" by referencing the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act (DC-APA), which categorizes agencies into subordinate and independent types. 

The D.C. Court of Appeals' decision in Latimer v. Joint Committee on Landmarks indicated that the Joint Committee was not considered an agency of the District, citing legislative intent that the DC-APA was meant to apply only to District agencies. Testimony from one of the bill's drafters, Alfred K. Scanlan, specifically stated that the legislation was not intended to cover interstate compact agencies like WMATA. Thus, based on this precedent and legislative history, the court concluded that WMATA does not fall under the definition of an "agency" as per D.C. law, and hence, is not subject to the DC-FOIA's disclosure requirements. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's denial of WMATA's motion to dismiss and instructed the case to be dismissed.