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Melvin I. Urofsky Paul Smith Brian J. Delaney Dana Heller Bernard H. Levin Terry L. Meyers v. James S. Gilmore, Iii, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, American Association of University Professors the Author's Guild the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, Amici Curiae

Citations: 167 F.3d 191; 14 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1386; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1937Docket: 98-1481

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; February 9, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves a challenge by six professors from Virginia's public institutions against a state law restricting access to sexually explicit materials on state-owned computers, arguing it violates their First Amendment rights. The law, codified in Va. Code Ann. 2.1-804 to -806, permits access only with written approval for legitimate research activities. The district court initially sided with the professors, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the law does not fully prohibit access as it allows regulated use. Central to the case is the balance between public employees' freedom of expression and the state's interest in maintaining an efficient workplace. The court emphasized that speech in an employee capacity, particularly when not addressing matters of public concern, is subject to greater restriction. The court rejected the contention that the statute was overbroad or vague, finding it sufficiently clear and limited in scope, and it did not infringe upon academic freedom. Consequently, the court upheld the law, affirming its constitutionality, thereby allowing the state to impose reasonable restrictions on employee speech related to their official duties, without infringing First Amendment protections.

Legal Issues Addressed

Academic Freedom and the First Amendment

Application: The court dismissed the claim that the restriction violated academic freedom, referencing precedent that limits First Amendment protections in the context of public employment.

Reasoning: Additionally, the assertion that the Act violates academic freedom is rejected based on precedent.

Balancing Employee Speech and Workplace Efficiency

Application: The court evaluated the restriction on accessing sexually explicit materials by balancing the plaintiffs' interest in free speech against the state's interest in maintaining efficient operations, concluding that the restriction was justified.

Reasoning: To assess if a restriction violates the First Amendment, a balance is needed between the employee's interest in free speech and the state's interest in maintaining workplace efficiency. This involves determining whether the speech in question relates to matters of public concern.

Definition of Sexually Explicit Content under Virginia Law

Application: The court upheld the Virginia law's definition and regulation of sexually explicit content, finding it did not encompass a substantial amount of protected speech and was not unconstitutionally vague.

Reasoning: The Commonwealth argues that the Act only regulates obscene material, which lacks First Amendment protection according to Miller v. California. However, it is contended that the Act also governs broader categories of speech, including academic research on sexual themes and professional discussions on sexual health, thus impacting more than just obscene content.

First Amendment Rights of Public Employees

Application: The court determined that state employees' access to sexually explicit materials on state-owned computers, in their capacity as employees, does not constitute a protected First Amendment right.

Reasoning: Plaintiffs assert a First Amendment right to access and disseminate sexually explicit materials on Commonwealth-owned computers, claiming this access is essential for their duties as educators. However, since their actions occur in the capacity of state employees, the court determines their speech is classified as employee speech under the precedent set in Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., thus lacking First Amendment protection.