United States v. Vincent Lloyd Campbell, AKA Elijah Wilson

Citations: 167 F.3d 94; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1171; 1999 WL 35153Docket: 98-1309

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; January 28, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Vincent Lloyd Campbell, a Jamaican citizen, appealed his conviction for illegal post-deportation reentry into the United States, following a guilty plea under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He was sentenced to 41 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Campbell contended that the district court improperly increased his offense level by 16 steps based on a prior aggravated felony conviction, arguing that the enhancement was erroneous because the conviction had been vacated. The court found no merit in his arguments. 

Campbell legally entered the U.S. in 1977 but overstayed his visa. He was convicted for criminal possession of cocaine in New York in 1987, leading to deportation proceedings, and was ultimately deported on October 24, 1989. While his deportation was pending, he accrued additional convictions, including a felony for possession of a controlled substance in Texas on October 4, 1989. Although this conviction was later vacated in 1994 due to successful completion of probation, Campbell had reentered the U.S. illegally in the early 1990s. He was subsequently arrested on state charges and, after being screened by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in a correctional facility, was indicted for reentry after deportation due to the prior felony. He pleaded guilty to the charges. The appeal was ultimately denied, affirming the lower court's decision.

Under Guidelines 2L1.2(a), Campbell's base offense level was set at 8. The government sought a 16-level increase under 2L1.2(b)(2) due to Campbell's prior deportation following a conviction for an aggravated felony, specifically related to illicit narcotics trafficking. Campbell contested the enhancement, arguing that his 1989 Texas conviction had been vacated and thus should not be considered. The district judge denied this objection, stating that the term 'conviction' is defined by federal law, and since the Texas conviction was vacated only because Campbell completed his probation, it did not indicate legal insufficiency. The court found no provisions in the Guidelines or statutory law that would prevent considering a prior conviction vacated solely due to probation completion. Consequently, the court upheld the 16-step enhancement and sentenced Campbell accordingly.

On appeal, Campbell maintained that his vacated conviction could not serve as a basis for the enhancement and invoked the rule of lenity. However, both arguments were rejected. The law under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) prohibits reentry into the U.S. after deportation, with penalties escalating based on criminal history. A defendant deported after an aggravated felony conviction may face up to 20 years in prison. The appeal focused on whether a state court conviction later vacated counts as a 'conviction' under federal law. The principle established is that federal statutes are not dependent on state law regarding definitions of conviction, emphasizing that the determination of conviction status is a federal question, despite the underlying offense being defined by state law.

In Dickerson, the Supreme Court examined 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and (h), which restrict the transport or receipt of firearms by individuals convicted of crimes punishable by over one year of imprisonment. The case involved an Iowa state court officer who had pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed handgun, an offense punishable by up to five years. After pleading guilty, the court deferred judgment and placed him on probation, which, upon completion, led to the expunction of his record. The Court ruled that this expunction did not nullify the conviction for federal firearms law purposes, as it did not change the historical fact of the conviction. The ruling clarified that expunction does not imply innocence and merely limits the conviction's effects under state law.

Subsequently, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20) to incorporate state-law definitions of "conviction" for firearms regulations, allowing states to determine what constitutes a conviction. This amendment aimed to counter the federalization of state felon status established in Dickerson. Unlike firearms laws, immigration statutes do not reference state law definitions. The immigration statute defines "conviction" as either a formal judgment of guilt or a judge's order imposing punishment, without any provision allowing for state law to influence this definition. Consequently, a vacated conviction remains classified as a conviction under immigration law.

Guidelines provision 2L1.2 does not exclude the consideration of a conviction that was vacated solely due to the defendant completing their sentence. The term "conviction" is not explicitly defined in the Guidelines, but it often borrows definitions from 4A1.2, which states that convictions vacated for reasons unrelated to guilt or procedural flaws should not be disregarded. Specifically, 'convicted of an offense' is defined as having established guilt through various means, such as a guilty plea or trial.

Convictions reversed due to legal errors or exonerating evidence are not counted, while unexpunged convictions set aside for reasons unrelated to innocence are counted. The determination of whether a vacated conviction counts for immigration purposes, including under 1326(b) and Guidelines 2L1.2, is a matter of federal law. The consistent interpretation of "conviction" across circuit courts reinforces that it remains defined federally, rather than subject to state law.

In Campbell's case, his 1989 Texas conviction was vacated because his probation had expired, without any assertion of innocence or improper obtaining of the conviction. Therefore, the vacatur did not change the relevance of his conviction for immigration offenses. Under federal law, Campbell's conviction for the aggravated felony remains significant in calculating his federal sentence. The rule of lenity, which applies to statutory ambiguities, does not apply here, as no ambiguity exists regarding the definition of "conviction." Campbell's appeal is consequently affirmed.