In a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, John Wayne Lumley, the plaintiff, seeks damages for his treatment by law enforcement during his arrest for serious crimes, including attempted murder and armed robbery. The district court denied the defendants' claim of qualified immunity, asserting that their actions violated established constitutional rights. The defendants, including members of the Dade City Police Department, appealed this decision.
The case details a violent incident on January 3, 1995, where Lumley shot a security guard during a robbery at a Dade City store, subsequently engaging in a shootout and carjacking. After evading law enforcement, he was apprehended on January 10, 1995, in Georgia, where officers noted his severe injuries from the gunfire. Upon his arrest, he was taken to a hospital, but the attending physician could not assess the bullet lodged in his jaw due to a lack of available qualified medical personnel.
The appellate court, upon review, determined that the officers did not violate Lumley’s constitutional rights and reversed the district court's ruling, instructing that judgment be granted in favor of the officers.
Lumley was taken to Appling County Jail for extradition to Florida after his medical condition stabilized. On January 11, Lieutenant Wilkes and Detective White interviewed him, but Lumley requested a lawyer, which was not granted, leading the officers to leave the jail. Later that day, Lumley waived extradition and was transported to Florida by Pasco County Sheriff's deputies, who diverted him to East Pasco Medical Center (EPMC) for evaluation due to gunshot wounds. The Sheriff's office, considering Lumley extremely dangerous due to previous armed robbery convictions and escape attempts, restrained him in the hospital, preventing all visitors.
Upon admission to EPMC at 8:42 p.m., Lumley was closely guarded by deputies, including teams of two working eight-hour shifts. He was evaluated by Dr. Tew Sak the next day, who found a bullet lodged in Lumley’s facial area, causing significant pain and a minimally displaced fracture of the right zygomatic bone. Dr. Sak recommended surgical removal of the bullet, which Lumley consented to in writing. The surgery occurred on January 13 and lasted thirty minutes, after which the bullet was handed to Sergeant Register. Lumley received post-operative care for two days, with regular checks by medical staff, and was authorized for release by Dr. Sak on January 15.
Lumley was taken into custody by Pasco County Sheriff’s deputies and transported to the Pasco County Detention Center. On January 16, he was appointed a public defender and later tried on charges from Pasco County and the Middle District of Florida, resulting in convictions for two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of armed robbery, carjacking, possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, and using a firearm in relation to a federal crime. He is currently incarcerated in federal prison.
Lumley filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple defendants, including the Pasco County Sheriff’s Department, former Sheriff Lee Cannon, current Sheriff Bob White, various sheriff’s deputies, and Dade City police officers, among others. He sued the current sheriff in his official capacity and the former sheriff in both capacities, along with the deputies and officers in their individual capacities.
The complaint, described as a 'shotgun' pleading, contains four counts. Count I alleges that deputies and police officers violated Lumley’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him access to legal counsel, infringing on his privacy and due process, using excessive force, and failing to provide proper medical care. Count II, against three Dade City police officers, incorporates Count I's allegations and adds claims of restraint and lack of information regarding charges. Count III repeats these allegations against six Pasco County sheriff’s deputies. Count IV alleges a conspiracy among all defendants to infringe Lumley’s constitutional rights.
Defendants claimed qualified immunity as an affirmative defense and sought summary judgment on Lumley’s claims regarding his right to counsel. Lumley voluntarily dismissed several defendants before the court ruled, denying the qualified immunity defense but granting summary judgment on the Sixth Amendment claims. The defendants are now appealing the denial of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Lumley seeks interlocutory review of the court's decision regarding his Sixth Amendment claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. To qualify for this immunity, officials must demonstrate that they acted within the scope of their discretionary authority. If this is established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity does not apply.
The Supreme Court has outlined a two-part analysis for qualified immunity: first, determining if the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, indicate a constitutional violation; second, assessing whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Lumley alleges that the defendants violated his rights by: denying him access to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment while hospitalized; violating his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment through improper restraint; infringing on his right to privacy when a doctor removed a bullet from his jaw; and failing to address his medical needs, also in violation of substantive due process.
The court will review Lumley’s Sixth Amendment claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and the other claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, which the Supreme Court clarifies begins only after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel typically arises only after the government formally commits to prosecute, which solidifies the adversarial positions of the government and the defendant. The mere filing of a complaint or issuance of an arrest warrant does not constitute such a commitment. The right to counsel is recognized at trial and certain critical pretrial proceedings, where substantial rights of the accused may be affected, particularly when the absence of counsel could undermine the accused's right to a fair trial. Notably, the Supreme Court has affirmed the right to counsel at preliminary hearings and specific pretrial identification processes. In this case, the district court determined that formal criminal proceedings had not commenced at the time of Lumley’s detention, effectively negating his claim to a right to counsel. Lumley argues his right to counsel should attach due to his arrest and status as the sole suspect, referencing *Escobedo v. Illinois*. However, *Escobedo* is factually distinct, as it involved police interrogation and denial of access to counsel, whereas in Lumley’s situation, there was no interrogation and only an arrest, meaning his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not been triggered.
The appellants are entitled to qualified immunity regarding Lumley's remaining claims after the dismissal of his appeal. Lumley alleges that the appellants violated his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by using excessive force to strap him to a hospital bed, constituting cruel and unusual punishment. However, claims concerning the treatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment. To establish a substantive due process violation, conduct must "shock the conscience," and mere negligence is insufficient. Given Lumley's violent criminal background and escape history, his claim is deemed unsubstantiated.
Lumley also claims a violation of his privacy rights when Dr. Sak removed a bullet from his face. However, since Lumley dismissed his claims against Dr. Sak, who acted independently, the appellants cannot be held vicariously liable for his actions. Thus, they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well.
Lastly, Lumley asserts that the appellants violated his substantive due process rights by failing to address his medical needs related to a facial fracture. The court applies the same reasoning as with the bullet removal claim, granting the appellants qualified immunity here too.
Consequently, the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Lumley’s Sixth Amendment claims is affirmed, while the denial of qualified immunity is reversed. The court will issue an order for summary judgment favoring the appellants in their individual capacities.
