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Kathy Allen, individually and as mother and next friend of her baby son who suffered intrauterine death at 35 weeks of gestation, whose name in this complaint will be Dakota Allen v. Kyle P. Christenberry, Dr., W. Newton Godfree, Dr., QHG of Gadsen I

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-13283

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; April 16, 2003; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the plaintiff, Kathy Allen, individually and as the mother of her deceased infant, filed a medical malpractice suit against two doctors following the intrauterine death of her baby at 35 weeks. The doctors, seeking protection under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA), removed the case from state to federal court, claiming status as federal employees. However, the appellate court found that the procedural requirements for such removal were not satisfied, as the Health and Human Services (HHS) had not recognized the doctors as employees of the Public Health Service (PHS). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) requires such recognition for the application of federal protections. The appellate court reversed the federal district court's decision, which had denied Allen's motion to remand the case to state court. It held that the removal was improper because the Attorney General had not certified the doctors' employment status within the statutory framework. Consequently, the case was ordered to be remanded to state court, emphasizing that removal statutes must be strictly construed and that the absence of federal question jurisdiction precluded removal. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory guidelines for federal removal in cases involving alleged federal employees.

Legal Issues Addressed

Federal Question Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

Application: The court ruled that the determination by HHS did not establish federal question jurisdiction, rendering the removal improper.

Reasoning: The determination by HHS the day before removal, that the doctors were not employees, did not create federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331.

Federal Tort Claims Act Coverage

Application: The case examines the requirements under the FTCA for a medical malpractice claim involving federal employees or contractors, highlighting the necessity of being recognized as a Public Health Service employee.

Reasoning: The FSHCAA establishes the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) as the exclusive remedy for medical malpractice by employees or contractors of the Public Health Service (PHS). Coverage under the FTCA requires the entity or individual to be recognized as a PHS employee.

Removal to Federal Court under 42 U.S.C. 233

Application: The appellate court reversed the federal district court's decision, emphasizing the improper removal due to failure to meet statutory criteria under 42 U.S.C. 233.

Reasoning: Ultimately, the court found that the removal statutes must be narrowly construed and determined that the circumstances necessary for removal under the FSHCAA were not met, rendering the doctors' removal improper.

Scope of Attorney General's Authority under 42 U.S.C. 233(c)

Application: The statute allows only the Attorney General to remove cases to federal court upon certifying that the defendant acted within their employment scope, which was not satisfied in this case.

Reasoning: Defendants Drs. Christenberry and Godfree were not authorized to remove the case under 42 U.S.C. 233(c), which allows only the Attorney General to do so.

Time Limit for Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)

Application: The court held that the removal was not timely under the 30-day limit from receiving the initial pleading, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

Reasoning: Section 233(l)(2) does not set a specific time limit for removal, but relies on 28 U.S.C. 1446(b), which establishes a 30-day limit from receiving the initial pleading for removal.