Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; October 10, 1985; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Douglas McDaniel appeals a jury verdict in favor of Sharp Electric, Inc. in a personal injury case stemming from an incident on October 20, 1980, while he was working as a carpenter. McDaniel claims to have experienced an electrical shock while using a rotary saw on a scaffold, resulting in chest pains and other symptoms that led to a hospital stay. After the trial, the jury found Sharp Electric not liable, prompting McDaniel's appeal on two grounds: (1) the verdict was manifestly erroneous due to the jury's failure to find per se negligence, and (2) the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of Sharp’s electrical expert regarding possible causes of the accident.
The court affirms the jury’s decision, stating that it did not find manifest error in the jury's factual determinations, which included whether McDaniel was injured, if Sharp violated a statutory duty, and whether that violation was causally related to the injury. A negative response to any of these questions would absolve Sharp of liability. The jury's finding was based on a preponderance of the evidence, and the test for per se negligence includes causation and resulting injury, which the jury adequately assessed.
Sharp violated a statutory duty intended to protect McDaniel from specific risks of harm. The focus is now on the injury and causation factors, as the jury was tasked with determining whether Sharp's negligence was a legal cause of McDaniel's damage. It remains unclear if the jury ruled in Sharp's favor on both or just one question. There is sufficient evidence for the jury to potentially conclude negatively on either or both factors.
McDaniel reported being shocked, with co-workers corroborating that he exhibited signs of shock and distress, including slumping down and complaining of coldness. At the hospital, he experienced chest pain and heart flutter, leading to various tests. Dr. M.L. Winkler, his treating physician, indicated that while the initial EKG and CPK enzyme studies were normal, there was evidence of pulmonary edema on the chest X-ray, which she believed aligned with McDaniel's symptoms. After his discharge, McDaniel continued to experience soreness and coldness in his left arm, prompting further consultation with Dr. Glen Hebert. Although initial EKGs were normal, later evaluations suggested irregularities that could indicate heart muscle scarring, and Dr. Hebert diagnosed him with post-electrical shock syndrome.
In June 1981, McDaniel sought the opinion of Dr. Walter G. Robinson, a neuropsychiatrist, who diagnosed him with post-traumatic electrical shock syndrome, attributing symptoms like severe depression and fatigue to this condition. Dr. Robinson noted complications in McDaniel's recovery due to personal issues, including his marital problems and the ongoing lawsuit, which required repeated medical evaluations. Additionally, Dr. Laxman Kervalramaini conducted thermographic studies revealing a temperature differential in McDaniel's body. The defense countered with Dr. Luke Glancy, a cardiologist, who found all EKGs normal and no evidence of fibrosis, challenging the findings of McDaniel's other doctors.
A heart specialist, after reviewing chest x-rays, found no signs of edema and noted that rales are no longer a reliable indicator of lung fluid. He conducted a temperature test on McDaniel's left arm, which showed no variation, concluding that he found nothing wrong. Dr. Gregory Ferris, a neurologist, testified that EEG tests were normal and did not indicate any brain abnormalities, explaining that electricity passing through the body does not significantly affect the brain unless the person is grounded. Psychiatrist Dr. Robert L. Newman examined McDaniel and assessed his medical records and symptom diary, concluding there was strong evidence of malingering. This opinion was based on the absence of objective evidence of heart or nerve injury, the detailed nature of McDaniel's symptom diary despite his claims of concentration issues, and the short duration of reported depressive episodes. Newman also observed McDaniel's obsessive preoccupation with his health and his expectation of compensation from the lawsuit. Pathologist Dr. Monroe Samuels testified that if electrical shock had caused heart damage, elevated CPK enzyme levels would be expected, but the records showed normal levels. There was conflicting evidence regarding the occurrence of the alleged shock. It was established that Sharp's temporary electrical system was defective, violating National Electric Code standards due to the disconnection of ground fault circuit interrupters (G.F.C.I.s) following complaints about nuisance tripping. Experts confirmed that G.F.C.I.s monitor electrical current flow and shut off the circuit if a discrepancy is detected, indicating a failure in safety measures.
The saw was equipped with a three-prong plug connected to an extension cord, which was owned by Pittman. However, the ground pin of the extension cord was missing, resulting in no protective grounding for the saw. McDaniel claimed per se negligence based on the National Electric Code's requirement for Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters (G.F.C.I.s), which serve as an additional safety measure when primary grounding is deficient. Evidence was presented showing that ground pins on extension cords are often damaged, and had G.F.C.I.s been utilized, the duration of any shock McDaniel might have received would have been significantly reduced, potentially preventing injury.
Despite agreeing that the regulation aims to protect against such injuries, conflicting evidence arose regarding whether McDaniel actually experienced a shock. Rockwell's expert, James Hrivnak, conducted tests and concluded that no electricity entered the saw casing, based on the absence of arcing signs. He suggested that while moisture could allow current entry without evidence, the conditions for a shock were unlikely, as skin resistance typically prevents injury without burns.
Conversely, Dr. Frederick Brown, an expert for the plaintiff, argued that the lack of arcing did not rule out the possibility of the saw casing being energized. He proposed three potential scenarios for how the casing could have become energized: a moisture path from wet sawdust, the extension cord being in water, or damaged insulation allowing current to flow through bare wires.
Actual proof of the alleged electrical shock was insufficient as only an undamaged portion of the extension cord was available at trial. Dr. Brown asserted that a properly installed Ground Fault Circuit Interrupter (G.F.C.I.) would have prevented the shock. In contrast, Dr. Leonard Adams, an electrical engineer for Sharp, argued against Dr. Brown's hypothesis that moisture on a broken plug could cause current flow, stating it was physically impossible for enough current to reach the saw case to trigger a G.F.C.I. or be felt by a worker. Adams conducted a videotaped experiment that showed no current flowed up the green wire when the broken plug was wet. He noted the extension cord in evidence appeared to be lightly used and characterized the possibility of a damaged extension causing a connection between the black and green wires as "very low probability."
The jury faced conflicting evidence regarding whether the plaintiff was shocked at all and ultimately found the defense witnesses more credible. The case was close, but the appellate court determined that the jury's verdict was not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed reversible error due to the trial judge excluding cross-examination of Dr. Adams regarding hypothetical damage to the extension cord. The judge sustained the defense's objection, citing the lack of evidence for a damaged cord. The court found that the possibility of current passing from the black to the green wire had been sufficiently addressed by other experts, rendering further cross-examination of Dr. Adams redundant. Thus, the judgment in favor of Sharp Electric, Inc. was affirmed.
