Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; September 12, 1985; Florida; State Appellate Court
Brown appeals his three-year prison sentence for two counts of DUI/manslaughter, raising multiple points for reversal. The court affirms the trial court’s rulings while addressing three primary issues.
First, Brown challenges the qualification of Charlie Johnson, a store owner with a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice, as an expert witness on alcohol's effects. The court finds this argument meritless, noting Johnson's extensive background as a 27-year highway patrol trooper and current instructor in breathalyzer operations, which qualifies him under Florida Evidence Code Section 90.702. Despite Brown's claim that Johnson's scientific tests lacked general acceptance, the court acknowledges that Johnson's opinion on the effects of a .10 percent blood alcohol level was supported not only by tests but also by his education and research. Even if there was an error in allowing the testimony, it was deemed harmless due to compelling evidence of Brown's intoxication, including a .18 percent blood alcohol level, officer observations, and a videotape of his condition post-accident.
Second, Brown contends that the trial court improperly allowed Trooper Lynch to opine on the speed of Brown's vehicle before the collision. Lynch based his assessment on the damage to the vehicles and their subsequent movement, but he admitted to being a homicide investigator rather than a specialized accident reconstructionist. The court’s analysis of these points led to the overall affirmation of the trial court's decisions.
The state argued that Trooper Lynch had sufficient qualifications to testify as an expert due to his three years of experience as a homicide investigator and extensive training at the Florida Highway Patrol Academy. However, the court focused on the flawed basis of his opinion regarding the speed of the appellant's vehicle. The court agreed that allowing Trooper Lynch to testify about the vehicle's speed was an error but deemed it harmless since speed is not a critical element of the offense of driving under the influence, as per Section 316.1931 of Florida Statutes. The evidence of the appellant's intoxication was overwhelming.
Additionally, the appellant contended that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Richardson inquiry before excluding the testimony of a rebuttal witness. The court noted that the request to present this witness came after both parties had rested their cases. Although the limited questioning by the court did not meet the standards set by Richardson, the case does not warrant automatic reversal, as the refusal to reopen was reviewed for potential abuse of discretion. The court acknowledged that reopening a case may be permitted under certain conditions, such as inadvertence, and must be considered if it serves the interests of justice.
Determining whether the trial court's failure to conduct a proper Richardson inquiry before excluding a witness constitutes reversible error is not the focus; instead, the key issue is whether denying the reopening of the appellant’s case to call a rebuttal witness constitutes an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion. The record did not indicate that the proposed rebuttal witness had been sequestered, and the testimony sought was intended to counter a state witness's claim of witnessing the appellant in an intoxicated state prior to the incident. The rebuttal testimony would have revealed that this state witness was a heavy drinker, potentially affecting his credibility. However, the court denied the admission of this testimony because the witness's name was included on the appellant's witness list, providing the appellant with an opportunity to prepare for his testimony before the trial. The court noted that had the appellant exercised due diligence, he could have given timely notice of any rebuttal witness. The trial court's careful consideration of what the evidence would reveal indicated that the information could have been discovered prior to trial. The court found no error in the refusal to reopen the case and deemed the other points raised by the appellant to be without merit, affirming the lower court's decision. Justices Shivers and Joanos concurred.
