99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 326, 99 Daily Journal D.A.R. 403 Panchita Hodgers-Durgin, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated Antonio v. Lopez, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Gustavo De La Vina, in His Official Capacity Ronald E. Sanders, in His Official Capacity Stephen Norman, in His Official Capacity

Citation: 165 F.3d 667Docket: 97-16449

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 11, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

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Panchita Hodgers-Durgin and Antonio V. Lopez, along with a proposed class, filed a lawsuit against three officials of the United States Border Patrol, alleging routine stops of Arizona motorists without reasonable suspicion, violating the Fourth Amendment. The case, appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, challenges the denial of class certification and a summary judgment favoring the defendants. The Ninth Circuit Court, led by Judge Rhoades, found that the routine stops by Border Patrol agents constitute 'seizures' under the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs described incidents where they were stopped and questioned by Border Patrol agents without any indication of illegal activity. Hodgers-Durgin, an American citizen, was stopped after experiencing mechanical issues while driving, while Lopez, of Hispanic descent, was stopped after a Border Patrol unit maneuvered in a way that forced him to slow down. The record highlights a pattern of frequent stops of Hispanic individuals by Border Patrol agents, often without evidence of wrongdoing. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's rulings and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Numerous Border Patrol reports document the reasons for stopping Hispanic motorists and others at night, revealing a lack of adequate factual basis for such stops, contrary to Fourth Amendment requirements. Some reports, particularly I-44s, fail to establish reasonable suspicion, with certain reports appearing identical except for minor details like time and vehicle color. The authors of these reports have faced skepticism regarding their credibility, as noted in previous case law highlighting concerns over repetitive and formulaic descriptions used by agents. Following these stops, Lopez and Hodgers-Durgin initiated a lawsuit against three Border Patrol supervisory officials, alleging a systemic practice of stopping Hispanic individuals without reasonable suspicion and similarly targeting motorists of any ethnicity at night, where identity verification is challenging. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and a proposed class comprising all drivers on southern Arizona highways at night and Hispanic motorists at any time. The Defendants opposed class certification and filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming the Plaintiffs lacked standing. The district court ruled that class standing must be assessed overall rather than individually and ultimately denied class certification, determining that the commonality and typicality criteria of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) were unmet. Consequently, only Lopez and Hodgers-Durgin remained as Plaintiffs, who were found to lack standing. The district court then granted summary judgment for Defendants, which the Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court will review the standing determination and summary judgment de novo, affirming only if the Plaintiffs fail to present any evidence that could establish standing, while considering all evidence favorably towards the Plaintiffs.

The court must evaluate whether the named plaintiffs possess standing, as their individual standing is a prerequisite for class certification. Citing case law, it emphasizes that standing should focus on the class's ability to seek equitable relief only after class certification, which has not yet occurred here. The district court concluded that the named plaintiffs lack standing because they failed to demonstrate a credible threat of future harm from the Border Patrol, noting that although they had driven extensively in southern Arizona, they had only been stopped once. The court clarifies that past exposure to harm is not sufficient; instead, plaintiffs must show a credible threat of future injury, which requires evidence of a pattern or practice of unlawful stops by the Border Patrol. Without such evidence, the plaintiffs cannot establish a credible threat of future harm, rendering their standing questionable.

Standing is established when a systematic pattern of behavior poses a credible threat of future injury. In Gonzales v. City of Peoria, the court found that plaintiffs had standing to seek equitable and declaratory relief by demonstrating that city police regularly violated the constitutional rights of residents of Mexican descent as part of a city policy. The plaintiffs' claims indicated a consistent application of this policy during traffic stops, suggesting a sufficient risk of future violations.

The court noted that standing cannot be based on speculative contingencies dependent on the plaintiffs’ behavior, as seen in cases like Lyons and O'Shea, where the likelihood of future injury was deemed too uncertain. Instead, the analysis must incorporate qualitative assessments, requiring an individualized inquiry into the specific circumstances that may lead to future harm.

In LaDuke, standing was supported by evidence that migrant workers were routinely subjected to warrantless searches without needing to instigate an encounter with law enforcement. The plaintiffs in the current case provided evidence of a pattern of unlawful traffic stops by the Border Patrol, including reports lacking reasonable suspicion and repetitive justifications for stops based on racial appearance. 

While statistical probabilities suggest that not every journey would result in a stop, the court emphasized that a "chain of speculative contingencies" is not necessary for standing. The mere act of driving and encountering a Border Patrol agent who may stop them without legitimate cause creates a credible threat of future injury. Therefore, the plaintiffs have demonstrated sufficient grounds for standing to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief, leading to the reversal of the district court's summary judgment. Additionally, the court will consider whether the district court properly refused to certify the class.

A district court's refusal to certify a class is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the court relies on an incorrect legal interpretation. To certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, plaintiffs must meet the criteria of Rule 23(a) and at least one requirement of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(a) outlines four conditions: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder is impracticable, (2) there must be common questions of law or fact, (3) the claims of representative parties must be typical of the class, and (4) the representatives must adequately protect the class's interests. The plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when the opposing party's actions affect the class as a whole, warranting injunctive or declaratory relief. The district court did not examine the numerosity or adequate representation criteria, focusing instead on commonality and typicality, finding them unsatisfied.

The commonality requirement aims to ensure that the class action can be maintained efficiently, and the district court determined there were no shared legal or factual issues, highlighting the complexity of proving injury across numerous individual cases. The court pointed to differences between the named plaintiffs’ experiences, asserting that each traffic stop involved unique circumstances. However, the appellate review found the district court erred by concluding that commonality was not met. While there are superficial differences in the traffic stops, the core allegations regarding unlawful practices are fundamentally similar. Additionally, the court improperly considered the potential unmanageability of the litigation in its commonality analysis. Case law supports the existence of a common factual question when the plaintiffs allege an unlawful pattern of conduct, even if individual circumstances differ. The analysis recognizes that while each traffic stop may differ, the overarching claims of unlawful practices unify the class.

Agents stopping motorists without reasonable suspicion is the central issue, as the reasons for the stops are irrelevant compared to the lack of specific, articulable facts suggesting illegal activity involving aliens. Plaintiffs assert that agents fail to establish reasonable suspicion, which raises common legal and factual questions among the class. The district court expressed concerns about manageability due to the potential number of witnesses and the individualized nature of claims. However, these concerns are deemed exaggerated for several reasons: Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows for the exclusion of cumulative evidence; a similar class was certified in a past case without issues; and the presence of documented records (I-44s) from traffic stops provides relevant information that could reduce the need for numerous witnesses. These records contain important details as agents are trained to document the basis for their stops. Furthermore, case law supports the notion that allegations of a common unlawful pattern of behavior serve as a common question of law or fact, particularly in cases seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

In Walters v. Reno, the plaintiffs represented themselves and other noncitizens, claiming that certain INS procedures infringed upon their procedural due process rights, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court certified a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(2), but the government contested this, arguing that the commonality requirement was unmet due to factual differences among class members’ claims. The appellate court ruled that such differences do not preclude class certification. This decision aligns with other circuits, such as in Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, where the Seventh Circuit recognized that a pattern of unconstitutional conduct creates common questions sufficient for class actions, despite individual claims. Similarly, in Baby Neal v. Casey, the Third Circuit emphasized that factual variations among claims do not defeat the commonality requirement, which can be satisfied by a single shared issue among plaintiffs. The key issue in the current case revolves around the Border Patrol's alleged pattern of unconstitutional stops, indicating that all class members experience the same harm. The district court erred in denying class certification based on superficial differences, as shared legal issues with different facts are adequate to meet the commonality standard of Rule 23(a).

The district court found that the claims of the named Plaintiffs were not typical of the class claims, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Typicality assesses whether the named plaintiffs' interests align with those of absent class members, ensuring fair representation. The court noted that the claims of Hodgers-Durgin and Lopez did typify the class; both asserted that Border Patrol agents could stop them without reasonable suspicion. Hodgers-Durgin claimed she could be stopped at night, while Lopez stated he could be stopped during the day based on his ethnicity. Consequently, the typicality requirement was satisfied, leading to a reversal of the district court's denial of class certification and remanding for consideration of additional class certification requirements.

In dissent, Circuit Judge Sneed emphasized that courts should only provide relief for actual or imminent harm, as stated in Lewis v. Casey. He argued that the plaintiffs, Durgin and Lopez, were attempting to represent a large class of individuals who had not suffered actual harm or faced imminent threats, thus violating the principle established in Lewis. The proposed class included all individuals traveling at night and those of Hispanic appearance on Arizona highways, which he deemed excessively broad and not compliant with legal standards for class actions.

Plaintiffs Durgin and Lopez lack standing to represent the proposed class in accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Their single encounters with Border Patrol Agents do not demonstrate a credible threat of future harm necessary for seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as established in *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*. The minimal likelihood of future injury, given that they were stopped only once despite extensive driving in the area, undermines their standing. Additionally, the proposed classes encompass individuals stopped both properly and improperly, lacking sufficient commonality and typicality as required by Rule 23(a)(2) and (3). Each stop's circumstances differ significantly, necessitating individualized analyses that prevent the establishment of a consistent legal approach applicable to the entire class. Consequently, the plaintiffs cannot claim that the opposing party acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, failing to meet Rule 23(b)(2) requirements. Even if standing were assumed, the intent of the suit focuses on altering institutional practices rather than addressing specific individual harms. The district court's refusal to certify the class and its summary judgment in favor of the defendants were therefore warranted, indicating that the proposed class is fundamentally flawed and unable to proceed.

Two individuals are seeking to represent a class of drivers in a case against the Border Patrol, aiming for the district court to reform allegedly improper practices. Their argument references the Border Patrol's "I-44s," but it is suggested that even if their claims were valid, the Judiciary's institutional limits prevent such oversight, as indicated by the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. In Lyons, the Court denied injunctive relief because the situation was deemed not capable of repetition and thus avoided review. This precedent warns against using injunctions or class actions to substantially alter police practices.

Additionally, the appellants rely on the cases of LaDuke v. Nelson and Nicacio v. United States INS to support their claims. However, the circumstances in those cases differ significantly from the current case and predate the Supreme Court's Lewis decision. In LaDuke, the court found compelling evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the INS, including warrantless searches, which is not present in the current case concerning the Border Patrol. The district court found no evidence that Border Patrol agents were authorized to use impermissible profiling, undermining the appellants' reliance on LaDuke. Unlike in LaDuke, there is no evidence of invasive searches in this case, which only involves vehicle stops. Furthermore, the LaDuke plaintiffs had a personal stake in the litigation, unlike the current class.

The district court's decision in LaDuke involved a specific finding of "likely recurrence" of a personal interest necessary under Article III, which is not present in the current case involving Durgin and Lopez. The court did not establish that they or the class face a "real and immediate threat" of illegal searches, as required by Supreme Court precedent (Lyons). The LaDuke case was distinguished from Lyons due to the involvement of state action, whereas here the alleged unconstitutional behavior is attributed to the United States. The court emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment allows federal protection against violations by both state and federal entities. 

While the case of Nicacio v. INS is cited, it is deemed insufficiently analogous to control this decision. In Nicacio, the court found that the INS unlawfully stopped individuals without reasonable suspicion, based on evidence from INS agents. However, in the current case, the district court found no evidence that Border Patrol agents were directed to use improper profiling. Moreover, unlike LaDuke and Nicacio, the alleged "pattern and practice" in this case pertains to a broader population, reducing the likelihood of future injury for individual class members compared to the more limited scope in the previous cases.

In LaDuke and Nicacio, the district court conducted a bench trial, examining the entire record and allowing INS agents to explain their stops. The court ultimately determined that the agents systematically detained individuals without reasonable suspicion. In contrast, the current district court did not reach a similar conclusion. Despite this, the majority opinion draws parallels between this case and LaDuke and Nicacio, implying that the Border Patrol's actions mirrored those findings. The majority dismissed the district court’s observation that class representatives Hodgers-Durgin and Lopez were stopped only once during extensive travel, suggesting that the Border Patrol could stop individuals without legitimate cause on any routine journey.

Furthermore, Durgin and Lopez lack the standing to represent the proposed class, failing to demonstrate common legal or factual questions or typical claims as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and (3). The district court correctly denied class certification. The I-44 form, which documents contraband discoveries from stops, was not prepared for Durgin and Lopez, undermining their claim to represent those affected by such stops. Their only grievances were minor inconveniences, which do not justify a class action. The case Kolender v. Lawson is referenced, where standing was based on a credible threat of repeated unlawful stops, contrasting the situation of Durgin and Lopez, who faced only one stop. Consequently, Durgin and Lopez do not represent those whose stops resulted in contraband seizures, as their claims and defenses are not typical of the larger class.

De La Vina, et al. cannot represent Durgin and Lopez due to a lack of shared interests with the class they intend to represent, as their concerns are not aligned with the interests of those facing prosecution. The proposed class lacks manageability because it encompasses a vast and diverse population of Hispanic-appearing individuals across southern Arizona, where many are U.S. citizens, complicating the identification and representation of class members. Unlike previous cases involving Hispanic workers in confined agricultural areas, this situation involves a broader demographic and geographic spread, affecting approximately three million people. The bifurcated class, including both legal and illegal Hispanic individuals and all drivers at night, poses significant challenges for compliance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly in terms of notifying class members and managing testimonies. The U.S. Department of Justice would likely counter with statistical support for Border Patrol practices, making the proposed class action appear unmanageable and unrealistic for achieving its intended purpose.

Agents and officials from the Border Patrol may be called to provide testimony regarding their practices, which could be challenged using incomplete I-44 forms. This legal situation is complex and cannot be easily classified as a class action, as the I-44 forms do not provide comprehensive or reliably accurate information. The assertion that the class is so large that joining all members is impractical is flawed, stemming from the misconception that examining I-44s alone can demonstrate the Border Patrol's failure to follow constitutionally mandated procedures during vehicle stops. 

I-44 forms are prepared by an official who was not involved in the specific stop, potentially leading to incomplete and unreliable records. The difficulty in obtaining accurate details from arresting officers is acknowledged, partly due to their varying proficiency in English writing, even though they may excel in identifying smuggling activities. The primary function of I-44s is to inform other agencies, such as the INS and DEA, about a stop and its related information, rather than to document all circumstances surrounding the stop comprehensively. 

These forms do not serve as legal briefs nor are they intended to demonstrate reasonable suspicion in court. They provide brief descriptions of stops that resulted in contraband seizures and may include common observations that experienced agents recognize as indicators of smuggling. Such observations are informed by patterns of behavior that agents have learned to identify over time, similar to how sports officials or experienced drivers perceive situations based on contextual cues. This phenomenon is rooted in "gestalt psychology," where multiple stimuli create a distinct impression that informs an observer's response.

Dissecting a Border Patrol stop on I-44 does not inherently lead to the conclusion that reasonable articulable suspicion is absent, as observer perception does not function that way. The observer must remember certain experiences, but judges should consider the principles of gestalt psychology. The action aims to investigate Border Patrol practices by private parties, raising the question of whether such a class action is appropriate for the Judiciary. It is argued that the case is less deserving than the one rejected in Lewis v. Casey, emphasizing that the Executive and Legislative branches should manage Border Patrol activities rather than the Judiciary. Granting injunctive relief would infringe upon the Separation of Powers, as the Executive is responsible for border protection and Congress for oversight. The named plaintiffs are seeking investigation and reform rather than personal relief, which challenges the Judiciary's role.

In response to criticisms of the dissent, it is noted that the majority fails to adequately respect the Lyons opinion regarding standing. Durgin and Lopez, having encountered the Border Patrol only once, did not demonstrate a realistic threat of repeated stops without reasonable suspicion, failing to meet the requirements for an injunction. Additionally, the majority's claims about the inadequacy of the record are dismissed; Durgin and Lopez had opportunities to develop their case but did not do so, and the court must base its decision on the existing record, regardless of counsel's performance.

The majority opinion is criticized for endorsing a broad investigation into the Border Patrol based solely on two individual stops, which the dissent argues violates the principle of Separation of Powers. The dissent acknowledges that in high-crime areas, innocent individuals may be wrongly suspected, implying that the majority's approach could lead to disorder. It explains that the use of gestalt psychology does not replace the requirement for reasonable suspicion, and notes that the I-44 forms do not capture the complete context of stops, merely serving to inform other agencies. The dissent contends that the statistical relevance in establishing standing is questionable and criticizes the majority for presuming a pattern of misconduct without sufficient evidence. The record only shows that the two named plaintiffs were each stopped once, which does not support claims of a systematic issue. The dissent also points out that the plaintiffs had the chance to strengthen their case but failed to do so, highlighting that mere suspicion is insufficient to warrant extensive discovery or a trial, as established in previous cases.

At the summary judgment stage, it is inappropriate to accept plaintiffs' claims based on the expectation that missing evidence will emerge at trial, as this undermines the summary judgment process. Full discovery and appropriate amendments to the complaint are essential prior to seeking summary judgment. The plaintiffs' failure to articulate a valid cause of action warrants summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 

The argument that "stops of cars and trucks" lack Fourth Amendment protection is rejected; the Fourth Amendment provides greater protection for homes than for vehicles. Additionally, the distinction between state and federal law enforcement in prior cases does not solely determine case outcomes. The plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of recurring injury, a standard pattern of officer behavior, or a sufficient personal stake in the litigation, rendering their claims insubstantial.

The majority opinion is criticized for disregarding relevant Supreme Court precedent, particularly Lewis v. Casey, emphasizing that courts should not reshape governmental institutions but rather provide relief to claimants suffering actual harm. Durgin and Lopez failed to demonstrate adequate harm to justify judicial intervention against the Border Patrol, resulting in the dismissal of their action. 

The plaintiffs have not shown a pattern of unlawful practices by the Border Patrol, and merely suggesting the possibility of establishing a claim at trial is insufficient to survive summary judgment. The precedent set in Lyons applies, requiring a realistic threat of repetition in the plaintiffs' experiences. Durgin and Lopez's failure to demonstrate a likelihood of future stops by the Border Patrol is a critical flaw in their case, which cannot be rectified merely by alleging a pattern of unconstitutional stops; concrete evidence is necessary to substantiate such claims.

The plaintiffs face significant challenges in their legal pleading, highlighting the relevance of the case Lewis v. Casey. The majority suggests that Durgin and Lopez can place the Border Patrol under judicial receivership based solely on their individual stops, which Lewis prohibits. Even if Durgin and Lopez have established standing through "actual injury," Lewis mandates an inquiry into whether there is a systemwide deficiency justifying federal intervention and comprehensive relief. 

The record clarifies the nature of I-44 forms, which are utilized by the Border Patrol for reporting to other agencies and are not appropriate for prosecutorial purposes. The plaintiffs cannot rely on I-44s as no forms were prepared relevant to their specific stops, which only occur when contraband is found, thus failing to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 criteria. 

The assertion that a surveillance system can prevent innocent stops is criticized, emphasizing that the system is inherently designed to enforce the law. The plaintiffs improperly seek to use this class action to challenge the Border Patrol's actions, which is a function reserved for governmental branches, absent a clear basis for remedial action. Courts lack the authority to address unproven harm. 

The defendants acknowledge the facts of the incident but characterize Lopez's driving behavior as evasive. Legal precedent dictates that immigration agents can only stop vehicles if there is reasonable suspicion based on specific facts, a standard the dissent appears to undermine by suggesting reliance on subjective feelings rather than established legal requirements.

The dissent argues that the standing of Durgin and Lopez is compromised because the I-44 forms used by the Border Patrol are generated only when contraband is discovered, and since no contraband was found during their stop, their standing is undermined. It incorrectly asserts that only individuals possessing contraband can contest the constitutionality of the Border Patrol's actions. The dissent emphasizes that the evaluation of constitutional issues should not be influenced by the current social or crime conditions but should focus solely on constitutional violations. Additionally, the dissent mischaracterizes the I-44 forms, suggesting they contain only frequent statements, whereas many forms are nearly identical except for minor details. 

The complaint was amended thrice, with Lopez being included in the Third Amended Complaint, which defines the class as individuals traveling at night in certain Arizona counties, particularly those of Latin, Hispanic, or Mexican appearance. The district court appropriately treated the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment due to reliance on external information. The dissent also relies on statistical probabilities, claiming that Durgin and Lopez’s single stop in a high-traffic area negates their standing. Furthermore, it misinterprets the majority's opinion as indicating that the Border Patrol engages in unlawful practices, while the majority merely concludes that the evidence, viewed favorably to the Plaintiffs, suggests the existence of such practices. Lastly, the dissent attempts to differentiate the case from LaDuke, arguing that the officially sanctioned behavior in that case increases the likelihood of future injury, a point it believes undermines the current Plaintiffs' standing.

A passively tolerated or officially discouraged pattern of conduct can infringe on an individual's rights just as an officially sanctioned pattern can. The key issue is whether there is evidence in the record to support the existence of such a pattern, not whether Border Patrol supervisors condoned it. The dissent's comparison to the LaDuke case is flawed, as the district court in the present case has not had an opportunity to make similar findings due to the procedural differences—LaDuke involved a bench trial, while the current case is at the summary judgment stage. At this stage, plaintiffs only need to raise a triable issue of fact regarding standing, not conclusively establish it, which the dissent fails to recognize. The dissent also incorrectly suggests that Fourth Amendment violations involving motorists are unworthy of judicial review. Furthermore, the dissent overlooks relevant Ninth Circuit precedent regarding federal agents' actions. Despite dissenting claims, the evidence supports that the plaintiffs may have been harmed or threatened, a determination that cannot be made without a trial. The dissent’s reference to City of Los Angeles v. Lyons is misapplied, as it involved a single incident rather than a pattern of illegal stops, which is central to the current case. Lyons' situation was contingent on speculative circumstances that do not parallel the present allegations of ongoing misconduct.

The plaintiff's claim is based on allegations of a pattern of unconstitutional stops, which are considered injuries in themselves, differing fundamentally from the speculative contingencies in Lyons' case. The court emphasizes that its role is to provide relief to individuals who have suffered or will imminently suffer actual harm, but it disagrees with the dissent's interpretation of legal precedents, particularly Lewis v. Casey. Unlike the inmate's situation in Lewis, where inadequate library access did not constitute actual injury, the plaintiffs here assert a direct violation of their Fourth Amendment rights through unconstitutional stops, which does not require additional proof of injury.

The plaintiffs claim that the Border Patrol conducts stops based on race and other irrelevant factors, such as lack of eye contact. Previous rulings have condemned these practices, emphasizing that such factors cannot justify stops. The court references the Nicacio case, which certified a class of individuals based on race and appearance, affirming the need to protect against arbitrary stops, although it did not address class certification issues in that case. The dissent's view that the I-44s are not designed to show reasonable suspicion is also challenged.

The dissent critiques the majority’s reliance on I-44 forms, arguing they are only generated post-arrest or seizure, thus not applicable to individuals who were neither arrested nor had property seized. However, the dissent’s viewpoint is dismissed, positing that Border Patrol agents likely stop both criminals and innocent individuals without reasonable suspicion, and if they comply with constitutional standards when stopping criminals, they presumably do the same for innocent motorists. 

The Supreme Court's decision in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon is referenced, indicating that a named plaintiff's specific complaint (like failure to promote) cannot represent a class with different complaints (like failure to hire) even under a common discriminatory policy. The dissent suggests that Rochford may no longer be valid law if class members assert differing practices. Nonetheless, Falcon allows for a broader class if a general policy of discrimination impacts members similarly, which aligns with the current case where all class members assert the same type of injury, thus validating Rochford's guidance.

Additional context includes references to a class of individuals characterized by Mexican, Latin, or Hispanic appearance traveling in Washington, as well as the demographic implications from the 1990 census, indicating nearly three million residents in the relevant counties. The excerpt also notes pertinent legal standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), which outlines requirements for class action representation.