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Vaughan v. Progressive American Insurance Co.

Citations: 435 So. 2d 889; 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 19852Docket: No. AO-442

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; July 13, 1983; Florida; State Appellate Court

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Appellant Vaughan appeals the denial of her request for attorney's fees against Progressive American Insurance Company under Section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes. The court affirms the denial based on procedural grounds, determining that no 'judgment or decree' has been rendered in Vaughan's favor, which is a prerequisite for an attorney's fee award under the statute. However, the court allows Vaughan to seek a final judgment in her favor and renew her request for attorney’s fees.

The dispute arose from Progressive's declaratory action to determine coverage related to an accident involving Vaughan, who was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Jon T. Taylor, the insured party under Progressive's policy. After Vaughan filed suit against Taylor and the other driver, Progressive initiated a declaratory judgment action and subsequently dismissed Vaughan from the suit. Vaughan later intervened in the action, where she successfully moved for a directed verdict against Progressive. 

Despite this, the trial court denied her attorney's fees request. A final judgment was issued in favor of Taylor, affirming that Progressive's policy covered him but did not mention Vaughan. Vaughan contends she qualifies as an 'insured' entitled to attorney's fees under the statute. The trial court's order references Roberts v. Carter, establishing that only the contracting insured, their estate, specifically named beneficiaries, and third parties with assignments from the insured are eligible for fees. The order also cites other cases that distinguish the facts from Roberts v. Carter concerning the definition of an 'insured' for fee recovery.

The trial court's denial of attorney's fees to the appellant is challenged based on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in *Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company v. Prygrocki*. The Supreme Court clarified that the term "contracting insured" does not prevent other insureds from recovering attorney’s fees under the statute. The appellate court agrees that the trial court may have relied on an outdated interpretation of case law prior to *Prygrocki*. However, since the trial judge issued the ruling before the *Prygrocki* decision was available, the appellate court affirms the denial of fees as premature rather than addressing the merits of the trial judge's decision.

The appellate court notes that to align with *Prygrocki*, it must first establish whether the appellant qualifies as an "omnibus insured" under the Progressive policy and whether her entitlement to fees depends on her status as an insured or if it extends to third-party beneficiary claims. These determinations were not adequately addressed in the trial court, and the record lacks necessary documentation to resolve these issues on appeal. The appellate court emphasizes that these matters should be considered by the trial court upon further proceedings.

Additionally, the appellee's cross-appeal regarding costs is addressed, specifically contesting the $185.00 awarded for a deposition not connected to the current litigation. The appellate court cannot evaluate the appropriateness of this cost but reverses the award and remands for the trial court to reassess this cost issue. The order is thus affirmed in part and reversed in part, with instructions for the trial court to conduct further proceedings, including a final judgment on the rights and obligations of the parties, especially concerning the appellant's claim for attorney’s fees.

The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the appellant's claim for attorney's fees based on the absence of a 'justiciable issue' under Section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes, referencing precedent cases. The appellant's assertion that the final judgment favored Vaughan by designating her as an 'omnibus insured' was dismissed; the judgment did not specifically address Vaughan's status or the rights and obligations between Progressive and the appellant, focusing solely on Progressive's obligation to Taylor. Although the judgment established Progressive's potential liability linked to Taylor's coverage, the trial court had not determined Vaughan's status as an 'omnibus insured' due to other relevant factors or policy provisions. The appellant's claim for attorney's fees hinged on whether Progressive's declaratory judgment implicated her status as an insured under any policy provisions. The declaratory complaint filed by Progressive questioned its coverage for Taylor and sought a determination regarding liability, medical payments, and personal injury protection related to Taylor. No requests for a final judgment or motions for rehearing were noted from the appellant following the trial court's determination.