Kenneth David Bradley Cecile Bradley, a Minor Child, by Her Next Friend and Father Kenneth Bradley the Estate of Sharon Bradley, Deceased, by and Through Kenneth Bradley, as Personal Representative v. United States v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Incorporated, D/B/A Synergon, Third Party

Citations: 161 F.3d 777; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30445Docket: 96-2569

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; November 29, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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Kenneth Bradley, representing the estate of his deceased wife Sharon Bradley, along with their minor daughter, filed a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States, claiming that Sharon's death resulted from medical malpractice by military personnel. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, ruling that her injuries were related to military service, invoking the Feres doctrine which bars claims under these circumstances. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

Sharon Bradley, a Navy medical laboratory technician, suffered a severe Staphylococcus Aureus infection after being accidentally punctured while on active duty, leading to significant disability and ultimately her death. After being flown for a medical appointment at the National Naval Medical Center, she exhibited symptoms of severe illness but received inadequate medical attention until it was too late. An autopsy revealed she died from a Staph A infection affecting her heart.

Initially filed in Texas, the lawsuit was transferred to Maryland due to pending litigation and witness availability. The United States moved to dismiss the case based on the Feres doctrine.

The district court treated the case as a summary judgment motion based on evidence from both parties and ruled in favor of the United States. It determined there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bradley's medical condition was linked to her previous Staph A infection. The court posited that if Bradley's infection were an independent medical issue arising post-active duty, the key question would be whether her condition was "incident to service." Citing Fifth Circuit precedent, the court acknowledged that a servicemember on the Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) could still pursue an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) despite the Feres doctrine, which generally protects the government from liability for injuries related to military service. However, the court ultimately aligned with Fourth Circuit precedent from Kendrick v. United States, leading to a decision that differed from the Fifth Circuit's interpretation. The Estate argued that the district court misapplied the Feres doctrine, which necessitates an understanding of its evolution. The Supreme Court's decisions in Brooks and Feres clarify that servicemen can sue under the FTCA for injuries not incident to military service. The case of United States v. Brown further established that injuries occurring after discharge, while in a civilian status, may be actionable under the FTCA, contrasting with the circumstances in Feres. Kendrick involved a serviceman on TDRL suffering from effects of a medication prescribed while on active duty, raising questions about the applicability of the Feres doctrine in FTCA cases involving servicemembers.

Kendrick filed a lawsuit claiming that the failure of doctors to monitor his blood levels after his transition from active duty constituted malpractice, arguing that this was not barred by the Feres doctrine. The court disagreed, stating that the Feres doctrine is concerned with the circumstances of the negligent act, which in Kendrick's case began while he was still on active duty and under military care. Unlike the plaintiff in Brown, who was a civilian at the time of the alleged negligence, Kendrick remained subject to military discipline throughout his treatment. The court also distinguished the case from Cortez v. United States, where the Feres doctrine did not bar a malpractice suit for an isolated act (suicide) occurring post-service. In contrast, Kendrick's claim was linked to ongoing medical treatment initiated during his service. The court concluded that the Feres doctrine does bar malpractice claims by individuals on Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) status if the negligent acts occurred while they were on active duty. The Government argued that damages suffered by Bradley, who was also on TDRL, were a continuation of treatment related to her service-related accident. However, it did not assert that her death was due to a recurrence of her previous Staph A infection, and there was sufficient evidence to suggest that her fatal condition was distinct from the prior infection. This distinction is crucial for the summary judgment analysis, which favors the nonmoving party regarding material facts.

The case distinguishes itself from Kendrick by emphasizing that the plaintiff, Bradley, was not receiving post-service treatment for a condition that arose from military service. Even if her Staph A infection was a recurrence related to her service, the circumstances differ as the alleged negligence occurred after she was placed on Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) status. Unlike Kendrick, where negligent medical malpractice occurred during active duty, Bradley's treatment began post-service. The Government argues that Bradley's visit to Bethesda was a follow-up for a service-related injury, but this positioning does not align with the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown, which allowed for negligence claims by discharged veterans receiving treatment for service-related injuries. The Government further contends that Bradley's status as TDRL is a significant difference from Brown, noting that she was entitled to retirement pay and not on active duty. While she remained under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, her TDRL status meant that failure to report for examinations would only affect her pay and not her active duty status.

The Government argues that Bradley's medical treatment at a military hospital was service-related due to her status on the Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL), which subjected her to military discipline. Courts have differing opinions regarding the applicability of the Feres doctrine, which generally bars military medical malpractice claims, to individuals on TDRL status. The Fifth Circuit's Cortez case allowed such claims, while the Eleventh Circuit's Ricks case ruled that injuries related to TDRL benefits are considered service-related. However, precedent suggests that the Feres doctrine may not apply to independent torts occurring post-service. The court finds Bradley's TDRL status comparable to a permanent retirement status, which does not prevent an FTCA claim under the Feres doctrine. As a result, the court reverses the district court's summary judgment for the United States, asserting that Bradley's injuries are not incident to service and that her Estate's action is not barred. 

Additionally, the Estate contends that the law of the Fifth Circuit should apply due to the case's transfer, arguing that the Government acted improperly in seeking transfer for a perceived legal advantage. The court disagrees, stating there is no evidence of improper motive and that federal law is consistently applied regardless of jurisdictional transfer.

The court concludes by affirming the applicability of Fourth Circuit law in this case, which aligns with their decision regarding the Feres doctrine.