Lesa L. Donnelly and Ginelle O'connor, for Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Daniel Glickman, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture and G. Lynn Sprague, Regional Forester for Region 5, U.S. Forest Service v. William P. Levis, William D. Spyrison, Alan Doerr, and Donald Will, for Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated
Docket: 97-16648
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 22, 1998; Federal Appellate Court
Two female employees filed a class action lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Forest Service, alleging gender-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The lawsuit follows a history of similar actions, including a 1973 case where female employees claimed discrimination in hiring and promotions, leading to a consent decree approved in 1981. After allegations of non-compliance, this decree was extended and later replaced by a new settlement in 1992.
In the current case, the male employees sought to intervene in the female employees' suit, but their motions were denied by the district court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this denial and dismissed the appeal concerning the permissive intervention. The plaintiffs' complaint, filed in December 1995, initially claimed a hostile work environment and discrimination in various employment aspects, although they later amended the complaint to remove some class claims related to hiring, promotions, and training.
On February 24, 1997, the district court certified a plaintiff class of all past and current non-supervisory female employees of the U.S. Forest Service Region 5 who experienced a sexually hostile work environment since February 1, 1994, seeking equitable relief. The court noted that the plaintiffs had dropped claims regarding discrimination in hiring, promotions, and training but retained a request for affirmative action remedies related to these areas. Specifically, plaintiffs sought an injunction to eliminate sex discrimination and harassment, requiring the establishment of an affirmative action plan with measurable goals.
On May 14, 1997, four male Forest Service employees sought to intervene in the case, claiming they had their own gender-based discrimination claims and that any remedies for the plaintiffs would impact them. The district court denied their motions for both intervention as of right and permissive intervention.
During oral arguments, the plaintiffs waived their right to affirmative action remedies concerning hiring and promotions, focusing instead on remedial actions to address the hostile work environment. They requested specific measures, including funding for settlement implementation, removal or demotion of non-compliant managers, adherence to Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) guidelines, a prompt harassment investigation process, EEO training for all employees, and resolution of existing EEO cases related to discrimination and harassment.
The denial of a motion for intervention as of right is an appealable final decision, allowing for review under 28 U.S.C. 1291, with a de novo standard of review except for timeliness issues, which are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Intervention as of right under Fed R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) allows a timely applicant to join an action if they have a significant protectable interest related to the property or transaction in question, and if the outcome may impair their ability to protect that interest, provided that their interests are not adequately represented by existing parties. To qualify, the applicant must demonstrate: 1) a significant protectable interest, 2) potential impairment of that interest, 3) a timely application, and 4) inadequate representation by current parties.
In a recent case, intervention was denied during the liability phase of a class action because the proposed intervenors failed to show a significant protectable interest. Although their claims of gender-based discrimination fall under Title VII, they were found unrelated to the plaintiffs' specific claims of hostile work environment discrimination against female employees. The court clarified that a significant protectable interest requires a direct relationship between the applicant’s interests and the plaintiff's claims, which was not present in this instance. Consequently, the proposed intervenors did not meet the criteria for intervention, as the resolution of the plaintiffs' claims would not impact their claims against the Forest Service regarding male employees.
Proposed intervenors lack an interest in the liability phase of the plaintiffs' action but could theoretically intervene during the remedial phase, as established in Churchill County v. Babbitt. The district court correctly limited intervention to this phase, given the applicants' absence of interest in liability. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), they can intervene regarding injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs, despite lacking a claim related to the defendant's liability. The court denied intervention based on the motion being premature and the possibility that plaintiffs might not achieve any remedy affecting the intervenors. However, the affirmation was based on the lack of a 'significant protectable interest' in the plaintiffs' remedies, referencing Herring v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
The proposed intervenors claimed a significant protectable interest in the plaintiffs’ request for affirmative action regarding hiring and promotions, which was waived by the plaintiffs at oral argument, effectively removing those remedies from consideration. This waiver ensures there are no remedies that could implicate the intervenors' interests. Unlike Forest Conservation Council, where potential modifications left uncertainties, the waiver here is definitive and eliminates any potential impact on the proposed intervenors' interests. The proposed intervenors failed to demonstrate that the other remedial requests—focused on improving the Forest Service's response to harassment complaints and related training—implicate significant protectable interests, providing reasons for intervention that were unconvincing to the court.
The proposed intervenors claim that the remedies sought could inadvertently discriminate against male employees; however, this concern is not inherent in the remedies themselves. Their interest is deemed too tenuous to warrant intervention as a matter of right, as established in related case law. Additionally, the mere desire for similar remedies does not justify intervention. The proposed intervenors also assert an interest in specific remedial requests related to work assignments and promotions but lack a legally protectable interest in positions resulting from discriminatory decisions, as outlined in prior cases. The district court's decision to deny the motion to intervene as of right is upheld.
Regarding permissive intervention, jurisdiction is limited to cases where the district court abused its discretion in denying such a motion. The reviewing court must first assess if there was an abuse of discretion to retain jurisdiction. Fed R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2) governs permissive intervention, allowing it if the applicant shares a common question of law or fact with the main action, the motion is timely, and there is an independent jurisdictional basis. Even if these requirements are met, the district court retains discretion to deny intervention based on potential delays or prejudices to the existing parties, as established in precedent.
The proposed intervenors sought permissive intervention in the liability phase of the plaintiffs' action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2), which allows intervention when there is a common question of law or fact. The district court denied this request based on three main factors:
1. There was no shared factual proof between the proposed intervenors' claims and those of the plaintiffs, as established in Spangler and Deus cases. The intervention rule aims to prevent the creation of new lawsuits by intervenors.
2. The interests of the plaintiffs and proposed intervenors were directly opposed, potentially causing prejudice to the existing parties and harming the plaintiffs if required to litigate alongside the intervenors.
3. Allowing intervention would lead to undue delay in the main action, undermining the efficiency of the litigation process.
Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention, and the appellate court affirmed this denial, dismissing the appeal regarding permissive intervention. The plaintiffs, Donnelly and O'Connor, also raised individual discrimination claims against the Forest Service. The proposed intervenors did not argue their right to intervene based on these individual claims. Additionally, while previous case law suggested limitations on intervention during remedial phases, this has been clarified in later decisions. The statute, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(n), maintains the intervention standards under Rule 24 even in the context of Title VII remedial orders.
