Ted Buckley v. Keebler Company

Citations: 153 F.3d 726; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 25776; 1998 WL 314566Docket: 97-3254

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; May 29, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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In the case of Ted Buckley v. Keebler Company, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Keebler on all claims brought by Buckley, including alleged age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), breach of implied contract, and negligence. The court determined that oral argument was unnecessary for the appeal. 

Buckley, who was employed by Keebler from May 1986 to October 1994, contended that he had an implied contract that required termination only for cause; however, the employee handbook he received lacked explicit language to this effect. He was unaware of Keebler's more detailed employment policies until after his termination. His performance evaluations had generally been satisfactory, but a May 1994 evaluation highlighted unsatisfactory performance and warned of potential disciplinary action. Following further discussions about his performance, Buckley was terminated on October 17, 1994.

In his legal claims, Buckley argued that Keebler breached an implied contract, acted negligently by not adhering to internal procedures, and discriminated against him based on age. The district court ruled that the policies in Keebler's manuals were insufficient to establish an implied contract under Kansas law and that Kansas law does not permit a negligence claim for failure to follow internal procedures. Additionally, the court found that Buckley did not present a prima facie case for age discrimination. The appellate court affirmed these decisions, upholding the lower court's judgment.

Plaintiff appeals the district court's summary judgment favoring Keebler, arguing that there were disputed material facts regarding his implied contract claim, which should have precluded summary judgment. He also claims that Keebler's breach of a duty resulted in a valid negligence claim and that the court improperly denied his request for attorney fees related to a motion to compel.

The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo, requiring the moving party to demonstrate an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims. If successful, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show a genuine issue of material fact essential to their case.

In the implied contract claim, the plaintiff contends that his termination violated an implied contract stipulating termination only for cause. Keebler argues that the plaintiff has not proven any intention to abandon its at-will employment policy and that the evidence presented is insufficient for a jury to find an implied contract under Kansas law. Kansas law follows the employment-at-will doctrine, and the existence of an implied contract typically constitutes a factual question for a jury. Summary judgment is permissible if there is no legal liability shown and no essential facts in dispute, particularly if the plaintiff's evidence reflects only unilateral expectations of continued employment. Factors determining implied contracts include the parties' negotiations, conduct, business practices, and surrounding circumstances at the employment's inception.

Plaintiff argues for the existence of an implied contract based on several factors: his application statement about leaving prior employment for Keebler, receipt of an employee handbook detailing performance policies, Keebler's written policies on performance deficiencies and involuntary termination, assurances from supervisors regarding job security with satisfactory performance, and consistently positive performance evaluations. The Kansas court's definition of an implied contract emphasizes mutual intent derived from circumstances. On July 19, 1991, after five years with Keebler, plaintiff signed a statement acknowledging receipt of the Employee Handbook and agreeing that policies could change and that his employment was terminable at will, negating any implied contract. Keebler claims this disclaimer strongly indicates a lack of intent to form an employment contract. Kansas courts have ruled that disclaimers do not always eliminate the possibility of implied contracts; however, in this case, the signed disclaimer is conclusive regarding Keebler's intent. Unlike the situation in Morriss, where the disclaimer's awareness was questioned, here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was aware of the disclaimer, which clearly indicated an intention to maintain an employment-at-will relationship. Thus, the disclaimer decisively reflects Keebler's intent against an implied contract.

Plaintiff contends that evidence exists to dispute whether Keebler intended to form an employment contract despite a disclaimer. The court disagrees, noting that the plaintiff's indication of a desire for a career with Keebler on his application does not impose a contractual obligation on Keebler regarding termination only for cause. The employee handbook provided to the plaintiff outlines reasons for termination and procedures for handling performance issues but does not limit termination to only those stated reasons or assert that employment is guaranteed only for cause. Citing case law, the court clarifies that the inclusion of disciplinary reasons does not imply a contractual right to continued employment and that the manual represents company policy rather than an intent to form a binding contract.

The plaintiff's claims about supervisors assuring job security based on satisfactory performance lack specificity and are deemed insufficient to establish a disputed fact regarding Keebler's intent to create a contractual relationship. Without detailed evidence or documentation to support these claims, the statements do not indicate a promise of termination only for good cause. Furthermore, while Kansas law recognizes that an employee manual may influence the determination of an implied contract, the policies in question were not negotiated and the plaintiff was unaware of them until after termination. Consequently, these policies cannot support the existence of an implied employment contract. Lastly, the plaintiff's reliance on satisfactory performance evaluations fails to suggest a contract that permits termination only for good cause.

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that establishes a disputed material fact. Evidence must be probative of the party's position on a material issue. The plaintiff's reliance solely on personal expectations of continued employment with Keebler is insufficient to imply an employment contract, leading to the conclusion that the district court rightly granted summary judgment to Keebler regarding the existence of such a contract.

Regarding the negligence claim, the plaintiff argued that Keebler's failure to investigate his performance deficiencies constituted a breach of duty. However, the district court found no legal basis for such a negligence claim under Kansas law, noting that an employer has no obligation to notify an at-will employee of performance issues prior to termination. Consequently, the absence of a contract negated any associated duty, resulting in the dismissal of the negligence claim.

On the matter of attorney fees, the plaintiff contended that the court erred in denying his request following a motion to compel discovery from Keebler. The district court deemed the motion untimely and the plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay. Even after the court required compliance with discovery requests, the plaintiff did not provide new evidence that would alter the summary judgment ruling. The court concluded that awarding attorney fees was not warranted and found no abuse of discretion in its decision. The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is affirmed, with the order not serving as binding precedent except in specific legal doctrines. The plaintiff did not appeal the summary judgment related to his Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim, which is considered abandoned.