John Oberkramer v. Ibew-Neca Service Center, Inc. Floyd Davis
Docket: 97-2774
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 20, 1998; Federal Appellate Court
John Oberkramer appealed the dismissal of his complaint against IBEW-NECA Service Center, Inc. and Floyd Davis, arguing that his state law contract and tort claims due to his employment termination were not preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Oberkramer, who was employed as a claims processor from October 1994 until his layoff in June 1996, alleged that Davis harassed him and terminated him because of his sexual orientation, despite the collective bargaining agreement governing his employment, which included provisions for grievance arbitration, seniority, and nondiscrimination.
The union filed two grievances on Oberkramer's behalf related to his termination, one citing discrimination based on sexual orientation and another regarding seniority. Despite these grievances being pending, Oberkramer filed a lawsuit in the St. Louis City Circuit Court, claiming breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other allegations. The case was removed to federal court, where the defendants argued his claims were preempted by the LMRA since resolving them required interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. Oberkramer later amended his complaint and sought to remand the case to state court, but the defendants maintained their preemption argument. The court ultimately affirmed the dismissal of Oberkramer's claims.
On April 9, 1997, the district court denied Oberkramer's motion to remand to state court and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss his amended complaint without prejudice, allowing Oberkramer the opportunity to file under Section 301 of the LMRA. Following this, Oberkramer filed a motion for a 'new trial' on April 21, 1997, which the court interpreted as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The court denied this motion on May 30, 1997, leading to Oberkramer's appeal.
Oberkramer argues that his state law claims are independent of the collective bargaining agreement and thus not preempted by Section 301, contending that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint and failing to remand the case. Before addressing the appeal's merits, IBEW and Davis challenge the court's jurisdiction, asserting that Oberkramer's notice of appeal only references the May 30 order and not the April 9 order, which limits the review to the denial of the 'new trial' motion under an abuse of discretion standard.
Despite this, Oberkramer's motion referenced the earlier dismissal and requested remand, prompting a review of whether the court erred in ruling that his state law claims are preempted by Section 301. The court acknowledges that an abuse of discretion occurs if there is an error of law, thereby necessitating an examination of the preemption ruling.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) allows for lawsuits regarding violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations to be filed in any U.S. district court with jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has determined that this section preempts state law claims that allege violations of collective bargaining agreements, requiring such claims to be resolved through the grievance and arbitration processes outlined in those agreements or under Section 301 itself. Claims that are significantly dependent on or intertwined with collective bargaining agreement terms are also preempted. Conversely, state law claims that do not require interpreting a collective bargaining agreement are not preempted.
The purpose of Section 301 is to ensure that relationships defined by collective bargaining agreements are governed by a consistent federal common law, preventing variations that could disrupt negotiations and administration of these agreements. Furthermore, preemption is essential to uphold the arbitration process in labor relations.
In analyzing Oberkramer's claims, the court found that his contract and tortious interference claims (Counts I and IV) were clearly preempted, as both involved allegations related to the collective bargaining agreement. Count I, alleging that IBEW breached the agreement by terminating him due to his sexual orientation, was dismissed appropriately. Count IV, which claimed that Davis caused IBEW to breach the agreement, was also dismissed because it was inextricably linked to the collective agreement's terms.
Oberkramer's emotional distress claims (Counts II and III) were also examined. Count II alleged that Davis intentionally inflicted emotional distress due to his sexual orientation and violated a local ordinance against discrimination. Count III claimed that IBEW inflicted emotional distress through actions taken by Davis as its agent. These claims require further examination to determine their preemption status.
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the workplace may avoid preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) if the employer's conduct is deemed outrageous and violates a societal duty, not just an obligation to employees under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). To assess preemption, the entire factual context must be analyzed alongside the state tort claim to see if the CBA provisions are implicated. State law claims based on rights from CBAs are preempted by Section 301.
Oberkramer acknowledged that the St. Louis city ordinance lacks a private cause of action and that Missouri's antidiscrimination statutes do not include protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation. He has not identified any Missouri case law supporting a common law cause of action for employment discrimination on these grounds. The rights he claims stem from the nondiscrimination clause in the CBA, and he has not demonstrated any independent state law affirming his claims. Furthermore, Oberkramer did not show that the actions of Davis or the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) breached a duty owed to society at large. His claims hinge on whether Davis’s or IBEW's behavior violated the CBA, indicating they are significantly dependent on the CBA's terms, leading to preemption by Section 301.
The district court correctly dismissed counts II and III. The court also granted IBEW and Davis's motion to supplement the record with an arbitration award from October 20, 1997, which found that Oberkramer was not discriminated against based on sexual orientation and that IBEW did not breach seniority provisions when terminating him. Oberkramer’s lawsuit, filed on January 31, 1997, included counts alleging breach of contract by IBEW and intentional infliction of emotional distress by both Davis and IBEW, as well as violations of the city ordinance regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation.
On February 11, 1997, IBEW and Davis removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. They filed a motion to dismiss on February 24, arguing that Oberkramer's claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) because resolving those claims required interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. Oberkramer amended his complaint on March 7, removing Davis from the breach of contract claim and adding a tortious interference claim against Davis. On March 18, IBEW and Davis moved to dismiss the amended complaint, reiterating their preemption argument. The district court denied Oberkramer's remand motion and granted the defendants' dismissal motion on April 9, dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice to future LMRA claims.
Oberkramer filed a motion for a new trial on April 21, which the court treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment. This motion was denied on May 30, prompting Oberkramer to appeal. He contends that his state law claims do not require interpreting the collective bargaining agreement and are thus not preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA, arguing that the court erred in dismissing his amended complaint and failing to remand the case.
Before addressing the appeal merits, IBEW and Davis raised a jurisdictional issue, claiming that Oberkramer's notice of appeal only referenced the May 30 order and not the earlier order dismissing the amended complaint, implying limited jurisdiction to review only the denial of the new trial. However, Oberkramer's new trial motion explicitly referenced the dismissal and sought remand, suggesting that the appeal could encompass the earlier rulings. The court noted that even if jurisdiction were limited to reviewing the denial of the new trial, that review would inherently involve assessing whether the district court erred in its preemption ruling, as a district court abuses its discretion by making legal errors.
The determination centers on whether the district court erred in ruling that Oberkramer's state law claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185a. This section allows lawsuits for contract violations between employers and labor organizations to be filed in any U.S. district court with jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has established that Section 301 preempts state law claims alleging violations of collective bargaining agreements, which must instead be addressed through the grievance and arbitration procedures outlined in those agreements.
Claims that significantly depend on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement are also preempted, while independent state law claims that do not require interpreting such agreements are not preempted. The underlying principle for this preemption is to maintain a consistent federal common law that governs relationships defined by collective bargaining agreements, thereby avoiding disruptions in negotiations and administration.
Oberkramer's claims are analyzed for preemption under Section 301. His breach of contract claim in count I alleges that IBEW terminated his employment due to his sexual orientation, with the employment contract being the collective bargaining agreement. This claim is preempted, and the district court correctly dismissed it. Similarly, count IV claims that Davis induced IBEW to breach the employment contract, which also relies on the collective bargaining agreement and necessitates evaluating its terms, thus rendering it preempted and properly dismissed by the district court. Further analysis will continue with Oberkramer's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Oberkramer asserts in his amended complaint that Davis intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him due to his sexual orientation and violated a St. Louis city ordinance against discrimination based on sexual orientation. In a separate count, he claims that IBEW is liable for emotional distress because Davis acted as its agent. A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the workplace can avoid preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) if the employer’s conduct violates a societal duty beyond the collective bargaining agreement. Evaluating whether such claims are preempted requires a review of the entire factual background against the state tort claim, considering the collective bargaining agreement's provisions.
Oberkramer acknowledges that the St. Louis ordinance lacks a private cause of action, and Missouri's antidiscrimination laws do not cover sexual orientation discrimination. Furthermore, he has not identified any Missouri common law cases supporting a cause of action for employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. His right to be free from the alleged acts stems from the nondiscrimination clause in the collective bargaining agreement, and he has not demonstrated that Davis's or IBEW's actions violated a general societal duty. The resolution of Oberkramer's claims would necessitate an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement, indicating that they are substantially dependent on it and therefore preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. The district court's dismissal of counts II and III was appropriate, and the judgment is affirmed. Additionally, an arbitration ruling that denied Oberkramer's grievances was included in the record but did not influence the appeal's analysis. The arbitrator found no discrimination based on sexual orientation and upheld the termination's compliance with the collective bargaining agreement's seniority provisions.
