Rebecca Ratliff and Robert Ratliff v. Schiber Truck Company, Inc.

Citations: 150 F.3d 949; 49 Fed. R. Serv. 1450; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 17759; 1998 WL 440281Docket: 97-2760

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 5, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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Rebecca and Robert Ratliff, the surviving children of Jane Ratliff, appealed a jury verdict from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which found their mother 100% at fault in a fatal auto accident involving a truck owned by Schiber Truck Company and driven by Gene Baugh. The Ratliffs alleged wrongful death, claiming Baugh's negligence in stopping the truck in the right lane contributed to the accident. The jury, however, concluded that Mrs. Ratliff was solely at fault, attributing her actions, including excessive speed, as the cause of the collision.

Following the verdict, the Ratliffs sought a new trial, asserting that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and that errors occurred during the trial. The district court denied the motion, stating that the jury's determination was supported by substantial evidence and that it did not warrant a new trial to prevent injustice. The appellate court noted that a jury verdict stands if supported by evidence, and courts cannot reweigh evidence or alter verdicts based on potential alternative conclusions. The appellate court emphasized deference to the district court's ruling on new trial motions, which can only be overturned with a strong showing of abuse.

At trial, Ruth Freeman, a truck driver, testified that she witnessed a cream-colored Ford Fairmont, driven by an older woman, traveling the wrong way in the left lane while she was northbound on Highway 61. After passing the vehicle, she heard the accident and called for police and an ambulance. Robert Selim, Mrs. Ratliff's brother, corroborated this by stating that they were en route to a family reunion, that the weather was clear, and that Mrs. Ratliff had moved into the left lane to pass a truck shortly before the accident, though he could not recall her speed.

Trooper Bruce Becker from the Missouri Highway Patrol, who arrived at the accident scene, measured skid marks and testified about the accident dynamics. He noted that Mr. Baugh, the truck driver, had stopped his vehicle upon seeing the wrong-way driver and referenced Missouri statute section 304.019 regarding safe vehicle maneuvers. The speed limit in the construction zone was 40 mph.

Accident reconstruction expert Francis Oldham opined that the accident primarily resulted from Mr. Baugh's decision to stop in response to the wrong-way driver. He argued that had Mr. Baugh maintained his speed, Mrs. Ratliff would not have needed to pass the truck, potentially avoiding the accident. Oldham estimated Mrs. Ratliff's speed at the time of her skid to be between 46 and 53 mph, indicating a distance of 180 to 200 feet between her vehicle and the wrong-way driver.

On cross-examination, Oldham acknowledged that both Mr. Baugh and the wrong-way driver exhibited negligence contributing to the accident, and he confirmed that Mrs. Ratliff was speeding, which likely contributed to the incident. When questioned about Sergeant Gray's report, which was not going to be presented at trial, the Appellants' counsel objected, but the court overruled the objection as Oldham had reviewed the report while preparing his own.

Counsel for Appellees inquired whether Mr. Oldham was aware of Sergeant Gray's opinion that if Jane Ratliff had been traveling at the posted speed limit of 40 mph, she could have avoided a collision with another vehicle and a wrong-way driver. Mr. Oldham confirmed his awareness of this opinion. During the case-in-chief, the deposition of Mr. Henke, a driver behind Ms. Ratliff, was presented. Mr. Henke stated he observed Ms. Ratliff's vehicle passing him at an estimated speed of 65-70 mph and noted that she did not brake before colliding with the Schiber truck, which was stopped with its flashers on and whose driver was attempting to signal for help. Mr. Henke described the impact, indicating Ms. Ratliff's car bounced significantly upon collision. Gene Baugh, the driver of the Schiber truck, testified that he first saw the wrong-way driver in a construction zone and took steps to warn others by activating his flashers and slowing his truck to under 5 mph prior to the crash. The Appellants contend that the jury's decision to assign 100% fault to Ms. Ratliff contradicts the evidence, which indicated three factors contributing to the accident: the wrong-way vehicle, Mr. Baugh's negligence, and Ms. Ratliff's excessive speed. They argue that Mr. Baugh's actions constituted negligence per se, violating Mo.Rev.Stat. 304.019, which prohibits unsafe maneuvers without appropriate signaling.

Operators or drivers must signal when stopping or checking speed if other vehicles may be impacted, using hand signals or signal devices that are in good condition. If a vehicle's design obstructs visibility of hand signals, light signals must be used instead. A sudden stop alone does not imply negligence unless it occurs without an emergency and disregards the presence of closely following vehicles. In the case presented, evidence suggested that Mrs. Ratliff was speeding, which was argued to be the proximate cause of the accident. The jury found Mr. Baugh not negligent, supported by testimonies that he reacted appropriately to an emergency created by a wrong-way driver by slowing down, activating flashers, and signaling. The jury also determined that Mrs. Ratliff was fully negligent, noting her speed of 65-70 mph in a 40 mph zone, which was corroborated by multiple testimonies and expert analysis indicating her excessive speed contributed to the accident. Appellants contended that the district court erred by allowing cross-examination regarding Sergeant Gray's report, arguing it constituted hearsay since Gray did not testify.

A trial court possesses broad discretion in regulating cross-examination, and such discretion is only reversed upon demonstration of abuse. Once expert testimony is admitted, opposing counsel bears the responsibility to scrutinize the facts and assumptions underlying that testimony. In this case, the district court permitted cross-examination of Mr. Oldham regarding Sergeant Gray's report, which Mr. Oldham had reviewed before preparing his report. The Appellee referenced Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., where the court upheld the trial court's decision to allow cross-examination concerning a non-testifying expert's opinion that had been reviewed and rejected by the testifying expert. The Appellants argued that Sergeant Gray was not an expert and that Mr. Oldham did not rely on or reject Gray's opinions, but this distinction was deemed unpersuasive. The relevant issue was whether Sergeant Gray’s report was of a type reasonably relied upon by accident reconstructionists, which it was, as Mr. Oldham had reviewed it. Mr. Oldham implicitly rejected Gray's conclusion regarding negligence, and he was allowed the opportunity to clarify his stance during re-direct. The court concluded that allowing the cross-examination was appropriate since Mr. Oldham had accessed the report involved.

Additionally, the Appellants contended they deserved a new trial due to the district court's limitation of voir dire to twenty minutes, claiming it hindered their ability to effectively exercise peremptory challenges and challenges for cause. The court initially conducted voir dire, querying the panel about prior knowledge of parties, potential witnesses, jury service, litigation experience, fairness, prejudice, and objections. Following this, counsel for both parties was allotted twenty minutes each for further questioning.

Courts possess broad discretion in formulating questions for voir dire, which must nonetheless safeguard the parties' right to an impartial jury. In the absence of objections to the voir dire process, a reviewing court will apply a plain error standard, only reversing if the limitations imposed resulted in significant prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. In this case, the district court did not err in its voir dire questioning.

At trial, the district court barred Mr. Oldham from testifying that Mr. Baugh was negligent for not leaving the roadway. The Appellants argued that Missouri law imposes a duty on drivers to take evasive action, citing Missouri model instruction 17.04, which states that a motorist must swerve if time permits to avoid an accident. Missouri case law supports that a driver has a duty to act when aware of a reasonable likelihood of collision.

The Appellee conceded that under certain conditions a driver may have a duty to swerve but contended that the relevant issue was whether Mr. Baugh should have moved off the highway onto the shoulder to prevent a collision, arguing that such action does not equate to "swerving."

"Swerve" is defined as an abrupt change from a direct course, as per Webster's dictionary. Missouri case law on the duty to swerve emphasizes situations where a party must make a quick evasive maneuver to avoid an accident. In *Hollis*, an eastbound driver swerved into westbound traffic, leading to a collision when the two vehicles were about four car lengths apart. The trial considered whether the westbound driver could have swerved to avoid the accident, indicating the need for rapid action to prevent a collision. Similarly, in *Morgan v. Toomey*, the defendant hit a plaintiff standing by a car, with only two feet between them when the danger became apparent; the plaintiff argued the defendant was negligent for failing to swerve.

Both cases establish that the duty to swerve arises only when a driver believes swerving will help avoid a collision, not for the benefit of another party. In the current case regarding Mr. Baugh, the argument that he should have moved his truck to avoid a collision with a wrong-way driver was rejected, affirming that the duty to swerve was not applicable. The district court properly excluded testimony claiming Mr. Baugh had a duty to drive onto the shoulder to avoid an accident.

The Appellants also requested a new trial, alleging that the Appellee's counsel improperly expressed personal opinions during closing arguments, raised insurance issues concerning the unidentified wrong-way driver, and suggested that the Appellants had a financial motive for their lawsuit. The court noted that trial courts have broad discretion in managing closing arguments and will reverse only if there is an abuse of that discretion. The contested closing argument indicated that both the wrong-way driver and another driver were negligent, while Mr. Baugh was portrayed as blameless. The implication was that the Appellants sued Mr. Baugh because they could not pursue the unidentified driver, which the court deemed acceptable argumentation.

Counsel for the Appellants argued that references to an unidentified driver were improper and not supported by the case instructions. The court overruled this objection, emphasizing that counsel has wide latitude to argue inferences from evidence presented. However, arguments must remain within the scope of the evidence and issues defined by the instructions. Since the Appellants did not object to the counsel's opinion regarding Mr. Baugh's negligence during the trial, the matter could only be reviewed for plain error. The evidence indicated that Mr. Baugh was not negligent, and thus no plain error was found in the counsel's statement. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to allow arguments regarding the inability to sue an unidentified driver, noting that although counsel's statements were not entirely accurate, they were supported by the record and did not prejudice the Appellants. The Appellants’ own expert had indicated that Mr. Baugh was the only negligent party, while acknowledging the negligence of another driver as "self-evident." Furthermore, the court found no abuse of discretion in allowing arguments suggesting that financial motives influenced the lawsuit against Schiber, as objections raised by the Appellants mitigated potential prejudice.

The district court's order denying the Appellants' motion for a new trial is upheld. The case involves Judge Michael J. Davis from Minnesota and Judge E. Richard Webber from Missouri. A key issue is the factual dispute regarding whether Mr. Baugh had stopped his truck at the accident's time or whether it was still moving at a slow speed of 5 m.p.h. The Appellants claim they have sought uninsured motorist coverage, countering the assertion that recovery from an unidentified driver is impossible. While the Appellants' counsel made statements that were not entirely accurate, these arguments were supported by the record and did not prejudice the Appellants' case. An expert for the Appellants testified that only Mr. Baugh was negligent, although on cross-examination acknowledged that the negligence of the unidentified driver was "self-evident." The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the Appellee's counsel to argue that financial motive was present in suing Schiber, as any improper statements were addressed by the Appellants during rebuttal, mitigating potential prejudice.