Derrick Fontroy v. David S. Owens and Irene J. Pernsley and Gaetano Curione and Harry Moore, Derrick Dale Fontroy, I

Citation: 150 F.3d 239Docket: 96-2090

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; July 28, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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Derrick D. Fontroy appealed a district court decision that denied his claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for emotional distress linked to asbestos exposure while he was imprisoned, despite having no current physical injuries. The district court ruled that Pennsylvania law, as governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, precluded Fontroy from recovering damages. Fontroy's original pro se claim, filed in 1986, alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, particularly concerning asbestos present in his cell area. After being appointed counsel, he expanded his complaint to include additional defendants and detailed his exposure to asbestos, claiming it caused permanent mental and physical injuries, including mental anguish and loss of life's pleasures.

In response to a summary judgment motion from the defendants in December 1991, Fontroy argued that his case differed from prior rulings that denied relief for mere asbestos exposure, asserting that he had suffered an actual injury. Nonetheless, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in May 1991, concluding that an X-ray indicated no physical injury from the asbestos exposure, thereby establishing no genuine issue of material fact regarding Fontroy's claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.

On February 25, 1993, the district court's order was affirmed in Fontroy v. Owens, 989 F.2d 486 (3d Cir.1993). Following this, the Supreme Court ruled in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), establishing that prisoners could allege Eighth Amendment violations due to exposure to environmental tobacco smoke presenting an unreasonable health risk. In August 1993, Fontroy petitioned the Supreme Court, questioning whether the circuit's decision—that asbestos exposure alone did not constitute an Eighth Amendment claim without present injury—contradicted Helling. On January 10, 1994, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the previous judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Helling. 

The appellate court instructed the district court to evaluate whether summary judgment was still appropriate based on potential waivers or lack of evidence regarding asbestos. The court noted Fontroy's transfer from the original prison during the proceedings and highlighted the distinction in Helling regarding injunctive relief versus damages, leaving the latter for the district court's consideration.

On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants in October 1996, concluding that Fontroy had no genuine issue of material fact regarding physical injury and lacked a cause of action for emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the absence of physical injury. Fontroy's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed the ruling regarding his lack of a cause of action. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, while the appellate court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, reviewing the summary judgment grant for any genuine issues of material fact and applicable law. The primary question was whether § 1983 allowed Fontroy to claim damages for emotional distress from asbestos exposure without proof of physical injury, necessitating an analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Courts must first reference U.S. laws to enforce civil and criminal civil rights statutes. If no applicable federal rule exists, they then consider state common law, modified by the state's constitution and statutes, ensuring compatibility with federal laws. In the case at hand, the district court reached three conclusions: 1) the Supreme Court's ruling in *Fontroy v. Owens* did not establish a federal rule permitting inmates to claim damages for emotional distress without physical injury; 2) Pennsylvania law, which prohibits such claims, is applicable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and 3) this state law aligns with the U.S. Constitution and federal laws. There is agreement that Pennsylvania is the correct forum for these purposes and that it does not recognize claims for emotional distress related to asbestos exposure without proof of physical harm, as established in *Simmons v. Pacor, Inc.* 

*Fontroy* argues that the Supreme Court's decision in *Helling* allows for monetary relief claims for inmates exposed to harmful conditions without current injury; however, the Court did not address damages for future injury risks. The reasoning in *Helling* regarding injunctive relief does not apply to monetary damages for past harms. Consequently, *Helling* does not support a federal cause of action for Fontroy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fontroy further claims Pennsylvania law contradicts federal law, referencing cases involving excessive force and inmate protection failures, where damages could be awarded without serious injury.

In this legal analysis, the distinction between excessive force cases and conditions of confinement cases is emphasized, particularly regarding the nature of claims and required proof. Unlike the precedent set in Fontroy’s case, which involves conditions of confinement, other cases have shown that physical injury is a fundamental requirement for claims of emotional distress under Section 1983 when no current risk is present. The Hudson Court asserted that extreme deprivations are necessary to establish a conditions-of-confinement claim, contrasting with the lower threshold for excessive force claims, where any malicious and sadistic use of force violates societal decency standards.

Fontroy contends that Carey v. Piphus allows for damages for emotional distress without physical injury; however, the Carey decision pertains specifically to due process violations, not Eighth Amendment claims. The Carey Court noted that the right to due process is absolute and actionable for nominal damages without actual injury, unlike constitutional rights that require a different set of elements for recovery based on their context.

Ultimately, the court concluded that Fontroy's emotional distress claim, related to asbestos exposure without evidence of physical injury, does not meet the necessary criteria for action under Section 1983. Therefore, the district court’s application of Pennsylvania law in dismissing Fontroy’s claim was affirmed, reinforcing that emotional distress claims necessitate proof of physical injury under federal law. The court upheld the summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, presided over the case involving Fontroy, whose original complaint had several claims dismissed by the district court in April 1987, while allowing his asbestos-related claim to proceed. Following a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Owens in June 1987, Fontroy submitted a first amended complaint. The district court again dismissed some of Fontroy's remaining claims but continued to allow the asbestos claim. 

The parties later addressed the retroactivity of section 803(d)(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which restricts prisoners from bringing federal civil actions for mental or emotional injury without prior physical injury, effective April 26, 1996. However, since this issue was not raised in the district court, appellate review was precluded, referencing Zehner v. Trigg, where inmates waived their right to appeal similar issues due to non-response.

The defendants argued that Fontroy waived his claim for damages for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury, pointing to statements in his opposition to summary judgment. The district court disagreed, finding that Fontroy had not waived this claim and clarified that he distinguished his situation by asserting he suffered a present injury. 

Finally, section 1983 was cited, outlining the liability for individuals who, acting under state authority, deprive others of constitutional rights, while specifying limitations on injunctive relief against judicial officers acting in their official capacity.

Section 1988 grants district courts jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters to protect and vindicate the civil rights of individuals in the United States, directing that such jurisdiction be exercised in accordance with U.S. laws where applicable. In cases where federal laws are inadequate, common law, as modified by state constitution and statutes (as long as it does not conflict with U.S. laws), will govern the proceedings. An injunction for Fontroy would be ineffective as he is no longer incarcerated at Holmesburg Prison. His reference to Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority regarding emotional distress claims does not apply for the same reasons. The court concluded that it need not consider the defendants' argument regarding municipal liability against the City of Philadelphia, as Fontroy's appeal was resolved without addressing whether he proved a municipal policy or practice of deliberate indifference, essential for such a claim as established in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.