Frank Humphrey v. Norbert Staszak

Citation: 148 F.3d 719Docket: 97-2163

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 23, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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Frank Humphrey filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, alleging constitutional violations related to his arrest. The jury awarded Humphrey $50,000 against Officer Norbert Staszak for false arrest. Staszak's post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial were denied by the district court. On appeal, Staszak claimed he was shielded by qualified immunity and argued for a new trial due to allegedly improper jury instructions.

The incident occurred on September 12, 1992, when Officer Pajowski observed a suspect, Willie Kelly, evade a subway fare by jumping a turnstile. Pajowski pursued Kelly with the other officers, eventually apprehending him after a struggle. Meanwhile, Humphrey, who had parked nearby, witnessed the arrest and approached the officers, questioning their actions. 

Accounts diverged regarding Humphrey's behavior. Staszak claimed Humphrey shouted demands for the officers' names and badge numbers and refused to move aside when instructed. Officers testified that Humphrey continued to engage with them aggressively, prompting Officer Dimitro to warn him of potential arrest for disorderly conduct. Ultimately, Humphrey was arrested by Officer Dimitro.

Humphrey testified that during his attempt to obtain names and badge numbers from Officer Staszak, he faced escalating anger and profanity from Staszak, who became belligerent and abusive. Humphrey was arrested before reaching the subway entrance, with Staszak being the only officer involved in the arrest for disorderly conduct, despite claims that officers Dimitro and Neuffer were not present. Following the arrest, Humphrey was detained at the CTA station for 20 to 30 minutes before being transported to the First District police station, where he was charged with disorderly conduct and later released. At a court appearance on November 2, 1992, an additional charge of obstructing a police officer was added; however, all charges were eventually dropped without prosecution.

On September 9, 1994, Humphrey filed a lawsuit against four police officers and the City of Chicago, alleging state law violations and federal civil rights violations, claiming excessive force was used against Kelly before his intervention. He sought $30,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages for his own arrest. The case was moved to district court, where Humphrey amended his complaint to include claims of malicious prosecution, unconstitutional search and seizure, and conspiracy. The City of Chicago was dismissed as a defendant.

The district court granted summary judgment for Officer Pajowski and partially for other officers but denied it on the false arrest claim due to unresolved factual issues. During the trial, after evidence presentation, the officers sought judgment as a matter of law on the false arrest claim, which the court denied. When the jury inquired about the implications of a defendant escalating the situation, the judge provided an entrapment instruction, allowing additional closing arguments on this issue. The jury ultimately awarded $50,000 to Humphrey against Officer Staszak. Staszak's subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of law were denied, leading to the current appeal, where he argues that the entrapment instruction was improperly introduced and prejudicial.

Jury instructions are evaluated collectively to ensure they accurately inform the jury of the applicable law. Instructions will not be overturned unless they mislead the jury to the detriment of the complaining party. A two-part analysis is applied in reviewing jury instructions: first, determining if the instruction misstates or inadequately states the law, and second, assessing whether any such error has prejudiced the complaining party. If prejudice is established, a new trial is warranted.

In this case, the jury inquired whether it could find for Humphrey if a defendant provoked the situation. The judge instructed the jury on the entrapment defense under Illinois law, indicating that entrapment negates criminality if a defendant was induced to commit an offense. However, the judge's instruction was contested by Staszak's counsel, who argued that entrapment was not relevant since the situation did not meet the criteria for such a defense. The judge ultimately offered the instruction and allowed additional closing arguments.

Despite the instruction aligning with Illinois law, it was deemed improper and misleading due to its late introduction and lack of supporting evidence. The instruction was irrelevant to the § 1983 inquiry and constituted reversible error, as it could have misled the jury and affected the trial's outcome.

Under Illinois law, entrapment serves as an affirmative defense, meaning a person is not guilty of a crime if their actions were incited by a public official for the purpose of gathering evidence for prosecution. For entrapment to apply, four criteria must be met: 1) the idea to commit the crime originates with the state or its agent; 2) the agent actively encourages the defendant to commit the crime; 3) the encouragement is aimed at obtaining evidence for prosecution; and 4) the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime. A defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction only if minimal evidence supports each element.

In this case, Humphrey did not raise an entrapment claim during the proceedings, nor did he allege that law enforcement induced him to approach them during Kelly's arrest, which could have affected the probable cause determination. Jury instructions that are unrelated to the trial's issues are generally deemed improper, as their primary purpose is to clarify relevant issues for the jury.

Furthermore, entrapment is not relevant in a § 1983 analysis when the plaintiff has been arrested but not previously prosecuted for a crime. The assessment of probable cause to arrest is based on the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer, while entrapment is an affirmative defense available to a criminal defendant. Even if Humphrey had asserted entrapment successfully in his criminal case, it would not automatically negate the existence of probable cause for his arrest.

A misstatement or insufficient instruction of the law requires assessing whether it misled the jury to the detriment of the complaining party. In this case, the jury may have found the evidence inadequate to support Humphrey's § 1983 claim against the officers, yet still ruled in his favor due to an inappropriate entrapment defense instruction given during deliberations. This instruction likely led the jury to overemphasize entrapment, potentially concluding it negated probable cause. The failure to integrate this instruction with the original jury instructions increased its adverse impact. There is no legal basis for allowing an affirmative defense to disrupt the established probable-cause analysis for a § 1983 claim, especially since the plaintiff had not asserted this defense previously.

Judges face challenges when responding to jury inquiries post-deliberation, often opting to affirm that prior instructions suffice. In this instance, Officer Staszak was prejudiced by a misled jury, warranting a new trial under normal circumstances, but the focus will shift to the qualified immunity issue he raised. 

Staszak contends he should be shielded from § 1983 liability based on qualified immunity, which is reviewed de novo by the appellate court. The review of probable cause, involving mixed questions of law and fact, is independent on appeal. The right to be free from arrest without probable cause was well-established by 1992, but the qualified immunity doctrine for police officers has also been long recognized. Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally immune from civil damages unless they violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would know.

In a § 1983 action alleging unlawful arrest, the court evaluates qualified immunity by determining whether the officer had actual probable cause or, if not, whether a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed probable cause existed—termed 'arguable' probable cause. Courts have established that arguable probable cause exists if a reasonable officer, under similar circumstances and with the same knowledge, could have believed probable cause existed based on well-established law. Officers are entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if their actions were objectively reasonable at the time. The inquiry focuses on whether the officer acted reasonably under settled law at the time of the incident, rather than assessing alternative interpretations years later.

Humphrey's argument referencing Frazell v. Flanigan, which suggests a jury verdict precludes qualified immunity, is rejected. In Frazell, the court noted that a plaintiff could overcome the immunity defense either by citing a closely analogous case or demonstrating that the force used was plainly excessive. The court concluded that the jury's finding of excessive force overcame immunity based on the latter criterion. Humphrey seeks to apply this rationale to cases where a jury finds a lack of probable cause for arrest, which the district court appears to have accepted. However, the jury made no specific findings regarding credibility, and the favorable verdict may result from an erroneous jury instruction. The court emphasizes the need for independent review of probable cause questions on appeal, and clarifies that Frazell's ruling should not be broadly applied, particularly given the district court's misinstruction regarding entrapment.

Probable cause is assessed using a reasonableness standard and is an objective test based on everyday factual considerations. An officer's subjective belief in the existence of probable cause does not negate immunity if that belief is deemed objectively reasonable, even if probable cause is later found to be lacking. In this case, Staszak claimed probable cause to arrest Humphrey for disorderly conduct, defined under Illinois law as engaging in acts that unreasonably alarm or disturb others and provoke a breach of peace. Previous cases established that arguing with a police officer can qualify as disorderly conduct, but context is crucial in determining culpability. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld probable cause for disorderly conduct in cases where an argument escalated tensions, but simply arguing with an officer is not sufficient for a disorderly conduct charge without additional context. The statute's vague language allows police discretion in assessing circumstances beyond mere argument that may establish probable cause. Thus, under the doctrine of qualified immunity, officers are protected from lawsuits if they reasonably assess the context of the situation along with the argument when determining probable cause for disorderly conduct arrests.

Qualified immunity aims to protect government officials from liability unless they are "plainly incompetent" or knowingly violate the law. This doctrine allows for reasonable errors, as officials should not feel compelled to act cautiously out of fear of lawsuits. The Supreme Court has established that law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly believe they have probable cause are entitled to immunity. Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion, but does not necessitate evidence sufficient for a conviction or a higher likelihood of truth than falsehood. In the context of arrests, police officers are protected from liability under § 1983 if a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest to be lawful based on the established law and the information available at the time. In this case, Humphrey was warned multiple times not to interfere with the arrest of Kelly but chose to do so. The Supreme Court has emphasized resolving immunity questions early in litigation, suggesting that if there is any reasonable basis to conclude probable cause existed, the case should not proceed to trial.

Staszak's assessment of probable cause justified the arrest of Humphrey, who attempted to intervene during Kelly's arrest by questioning the officers and demanding their identification. Although Humphrey claimed to be a 'Good Samaritan,' his actions could be seen as interference, as he was not in a genuine emergency situation and could have pursued his concerns after the arrest. Despite Humphrey's argument that mere disagreement with police does not constitute a breach of the peace, his conduct during the arrest provided sufficient basis for considering it a breach. An officer need not wait for trouble to escalate before acting to prevent it. While Staszak's demeanor toward Humphrey was inappropriate, it did not negate the qualified immunity he was entitled to, as Illinois law at the time did not clearly state that a third party could not be arrested under similar circumstances. The dismissal of charges against Humphrey does not imply a lack of probable cause, aligning with precedents that establish acquittal or dismissal does not negate objective reasonableness. Public officers require qualified immunity to prevent undue interference in their duties, and the evidence suggested that, while Staszak may not have had actual probable cause, he possessed 'arguable' probable cause to arrest Humphrey for disorderly conduct. Consequently, the court ruled that Staszak did not violate established law, granting him qualified immunity and directing the district court to vacate the monetary judgment against him and dismiss the case with prejudice.