Jo-Anne E. Coleman v. Katrina Reed, Sued as Katrina R. Reed, as an Individual and in Her Official Capacity Betty J. Webb, as an Individual and in Her Official Capacity Daniel Loewenson, as an Individual and in His Official Capacity

Citation: 147 F.3d 751Docket: 97-2331

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 30, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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Three government officials, including Katrina Reed and Betty Webb, appealed a district court's denial of their qualified immunity claim in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Jo-Anne Coleman, a former principal of Lincoln Elementary School. The Eighth Circuit Court reviewed the appeal, focusing on whether the officials violated a clearly established constitutional right. The court found that the lawsuit did not adequately allege such a violation and reversed the district court's decision.

In December 1992, Coleman was hired by the Minneapolis Public School District. After five months, allegations surfaced regarding her past felony convictions for Medicaid fraud. An investigation confirmed these allegations, as Coleman had failed to disclose her criminal record on her employment application. On June 7, 1993, the human resources director, Daniel Loewenson, requested a meeting with Coleman, during which Reed confronted her about her convictions. Coleman was offered the chance to resign but opted instead for a formal hearing, which Reed denied. Coleman was subsequently informed that she would be terminated if she did not resign before the school board meeting that evening.

At the board meeting, evidence of Coleman's felony was presented, leading to her discharge effective July 12, 1993. Coleman appealed her termination to the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court, both of which denied her petitions. Following her discharge, the Lincoln community reacted strongly, prompting the school district to issue a statement clarifying the reason for her termination, which was approved by Webb and the Human Resources Department.

Coleman filed a lawsuit against Webb, Reed, and Loewenson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming they violated her property and liberty interests without due process. The administrators sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court denied, leading to their appeal. The administrators argue they are entitled to qualified immunity and question whether Coleman has alleged a constitutional violation. Coleman contends she was entitled to a pre-termination hearing due to her property interest in continued employment, asserting she was wrongfully discharged without due process. The administrators counter that she was a probationary employee, which raises a state law question. 

Assuming Coleman had a property interest, the court found she had not demonstrated a constitutional violation because she received adequate pre-termination process. The Supreme Court precedent requires a hearing before termination, emphasizing notice and an opportunity to respond. The court determined that the pre-termination procedure provided to Coleman, including face-to-face notification of charges and representation by an attorney, met these due process requirements. Coleman had the chance to rebut the charges but chose to admit to them. The court clarified that no mandated delay existed between notice and response, and Coleman did not identify any additional information she could have used in her defense.

Coleman had two opportunities to respond to charges against her, first in a meeting with Reed and later during a Board session. Despite having legal counsel present and hearing public comments regarding her proposed termination, Coleman chose not to speak at the Board session. Consequently, the administrators cannot be held responsible for her failure to utilize these opportunities, and she has not demonstrated a violation of her procedural due process rights, leading to the administrators' entitlement to summary judgment on her property interest claim.

Regarding her liberty interest claim, Coleman contends that the administrators deprived her of this interest without due process, which can occur if a governmental employer makes damaging statements about an employee. To establish a claim under section 1983 for violation of due process related to a liberty interest, Coleman must prove three elements: (1) her discharge was stigmatizing, (2) the reasons for her discharge were made public, and (3) she denied the charges leading to her termination. The district court found she met the first two elements, but Coleman failed to deny the substantive truth of the charges against her, which included having a felony record and not informing the school district of this fact.

Although the court recognizes the Pollock ruling, which suggests that proving the falsity of charges is not necessary for a name-clearing hearing, it also notes that Coleman must at least deny the substantial truth of the charges. Since Coleman did not contest the charges, she was not entitled to a hearing. Furthermore, even if she were entitled to one, procedural due process was satisfied because she had two chances to address the allegations. Thus, Coleman has not alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right, and the administrators are entitled to summary judgment on her liberty interest claim.

The district court's decision is reversed, granting summary judgment to the administrators on the claims presented. The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this ruling. Circuit Judge Heaney dissents, arguing that the district court appropriately denied the administrators' summary judgment motion, emphasizing the need to highlight the administrators' bad faith. 

Coleman was convicted of Medicaid fraud in 1985 but received approval from the Minnesota Board of Teaching to return to teaching while serving her prison sentence. During her sentence, she worked satisfactorily for five years with the Shakopee School District. In 1990, she was hired as an assistant principal intern by the Minneapolis School District, with no record of inquiry into her felony conviction. She performed satisfactorily and subsequently became an assistant secondary principal in the Osseo Public Schools. 

In 1992, Coleman returned to the Minneapolis School District as principal of Lincoln Elementary School amid significant opposition, including derogatory comments about her. On June 7, 1993, Coleman was summoned to a meeting where she was informed of an anonymous tip regarding her felony conviction, which she did not dispute. Her attorney requested a hearing, but the Associate Superintendent stated Coleman had no right to one and threatened immediate termination. Later that evening, the Board voted to suspend her for thirty days with pay and to terminate her employment. The Board's agenda referenced Coleman's "release," and during the public meeting that followed, no specific reason for her termination was provided, nor were Coleman or her attorney allowed to address the Board. The Board later issued an unsigned notice explaining the reasons for her termination to the school community.

Jo Coleman, Principal of Lincoln Elementary School, was convicted of a felony prior to her employment with the Minneapolis Public Schools and served time at the Shakopee Women's Reformatory, a fact not disclosed to the District at the time of her hiring. The District suspended her with pay while reviewing the situation. There was confusion regarding a notice distributed about her suspension; a second notice clarified that the first was mistakenly sent without official letterhead. Coleman subsequently filed a lawsuit after the district court denied the administrators' motion for summary judgment on her constitutional claims. The majority opinion found that Coleman received adequate pretermination process, citing Riggins v. Board of Regents. However, dissenting opinions argue that Coleman was not informed of the allegations prior to the pretermination meeting, violating established disciplinary procedures that required seven days' notice and the opportunity to respond. Evidence suggested that the Board had already decided to terminate Coleman before the meeting, indicating bad faith on their part. Additionally, comments made by an administrator implied that Coleman had no right to a hearing. The dissent contends that a reasonable jury could find that Coleman was denied proper notice and an opportunity to present her side, justifying the district court's denial of the administrators' summary judgment motion.

A fact issue exists regarding whether the appellants deprived Coleman of her liberty interest without due process. Coleman contends that the administrators disseminated two notices about her conviction, prison term, and employment termination to over 600 families and staff without prior notice or a chance to respond, which could severely damage her reputation in the community. The majority acknowledges that the reasons for her discharge were stigmatizing and public but argues that Coleman had a duty to deny the charges. The dissenting view emphasizes that Coleman did not have an opportunity to refute the allegations before the notices were released, with the first notice disseminated shortly after her termination decision was made, indicating the administrators' lack of belief in her entitlement to due process. 

The dissent also addresses the majority's stance on qualified immunity, asserting that since the administrators violated Coleman's constitutional rights, the inquiry into their immunity should proceed. Qualified immunity is granted to government officials performing discretionary functions unless they violate clearly established rights. The dissent agrees with the district court's assessment that the administrators, familiar with due process requirements, could not credibly claim ignorance of Coleman's rights. Thus, the dissent concludes that the administrators do not qualify for immunity and that there are sufficient factual issues to warrant a trial, recommending that the district court's decision be upheld.

Coleman alleged breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but these claims are not part of the current appeal. The administrators contended they were not proper defendants in her property interest claim, asserting that the Board terminated Coleman, not them, and that they were uninvolved in the liberty interest claim. However, the court's decision does not require addressing these arguments. The case is distinguished from Winegar v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, as Coleman had the chance to confront both the administrators who recommended her termination and the Board members who made the final decision. 

It is noted that Coleman claimed her criminal record was publicly known yet argued that its publication negatively affected her job prospects in education. The Shakopee School District, which employed Coleman while she was incarcerated, was aware of her conviction. During her application for a principal position, Coleman listed Shakopee Public Schools as a reference, specifically naming Joane Block. The record does not clarify whether Minneapolis school officials contacted Block or Shakopee officials, leaving uncertainty about their knowledge of Coleman's prior incarceration.

The record shows that any disciplinary actions by the school board or administration were preceded by a seven-day written notice outlining the allegations and allowing for a response. For instance, on May 7, 1993, Coleman received a notice about her handling of a student discipline issue, which included procedural safeguards. The majority opinion cited Demming v. Housing and Redevelopment Authority to argue that Coleman was not "ambushed," but the court found this comparison misplaced. Unlike the cases referenced, there was no evidence that Coleman was aware of the reasons for the June 8 pretermination hearing.