Margaret McKinley v. Bruce Kaplan

Citations: 262 F.3d 1146; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18922; 2001 WL 958910Docket: 00-11653

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; June 6, 2001; Federal Appellate Court

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Margaret McKinley appeals a summary judgment from the Southern District of Florida favoring Miami-Dade County, claiming her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was dismissed from her position on a County advisory board. She argues that her termination was a result of a public statement opposing a County policy regarding contracts with firms linked to Cuba. The district court found that the First Amendment did not guarantee her the right to continued employment, leading to the appeal. The Eleventh Circuit, reviewing the summary judgment de novo, concurs with the district court's conclusion that McKinley's First Amendment rights were not infringed and affirms the judgment. 

McKinley served as a voluntary member of the Miami-Dade County Film, Print, and Broadcast Advisory Board, initially appointed by Commissioner Mary Collins and later reappointed by Commissioner Bruce Kaplan, who had a known anti-Castro stance. In 1996, Kaplan sponsored a resolution prohibiting County contracts with firms doing business with Cuba, which the County Commission adopted unanimously. Following the announcement of a Latin music conference by the Midem Organization, which involved Cuban artists, McKinley publicly stated that the loss of the conference would negatively impact Miami's entertainment sector and criticized the resolution for reflecting only the views of the Cuban-American community. Her comments were reported in the Miami Herald, where she emphasized the need for broader community interests over those of a specific political group. Additionally, she signed a resolution advocating for the conference to remain in Miami, despite the County's policy.

Commissioner Kaplan determined that Appellant was advocating a departure from County policy and decided to remove her as his appointee to the Film Board, citing her comments as inappropriate and insulting to the Hispanic community he represented. Following this, he requested the County Commission to formalize her removal, which was approved by an 11-1 vote. Appellant subsequently filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both the County and Commissioner Kaplan, claiming her removal violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the County, asserting that her removal was permissible as her role required alignment with County policies, a duty she failed to uphold. After Kaplan resigned, Appellant’s term would have ended per County Code, rendering her reinstatement claim moot. The district court denied her motion to amend the complaint to include a damages claim, but this decision was reversed, allowing her to proceed with the amended complaint.

Despite the County Code allowing Kaplan to request Appellant's removal "at any time, with or without cause," it is established that public employees cannot be removed solely for exercising constitutional rights. The right to free speech for public employees is not absolute, as the State has a vested interest in regulating employee speech to maintain public service efficiency. Courts balance the interests of public employees speaking on matters of public concern against the State's interests. The process involves a four-part test based on the Supreme Court's Pickering decision, which assesses whether the speech is of public concern, balances the interests, checks if the speech was a substantial factor in the removal, and determines if the government would have made the same decision regardless of the protected speech.

The County acknowledges that Appellant's statement was a matter of public concern and that her removal from the Film Board was directly tied to her statement. The focus is on balancing interests under the Pickering test. Appellant's interest lies in expressing her opinion on a controversial county resolution, while the County and Commissioner Kaplan emphasize the need for loyalty, discipline, and good relationships with appointed employees.

Several factors favor the County's position. Governments have a strong interest in trusting their employees, particularly those in advisory or policy-making roles, such as Appellant on the Film Board, which advised on policy matters affecting the entertainment industry. Appellant's duties required her to provide input on policy issues, enhancing the County's justification for her removal based on her speech. The County Code outlines Film Board members' responsibilities to serve as a liaison and point of reference for the entertainment industry, indicating public contact that further supports the County's interests.

Significantly, Appellant, as an appointed representative of the County, did not align with the interests of Commissioner Kaplan. The Fifth Circuit's case, Rash-Aldridge v. Ramirez, is referenced, illustrating that appointed officials who fail to represent the interests of their appointing body can be removed without infringing on First Amendment rights, contrasting with the protections afforded to elected officials.

Appellant, an appointed member of the Film Board rather than an elected official, was designated by Commissioner Kaplan, who retained the authority to remove her at any time with Commission approval. Despite Appellant's claims of not representing either party, she occupied a position specifically allocated to Kaplan's designee. By publicly opposing a policy supported by both Kaplan and the County Commission, Appellant effectively distanced herself from representing their interests. The First Amendment does not obligate Kaplan or the Commission to retain her as an appointee, especially since she was an at-will appointee removable without cause. Although the potential for arbitrary removal of public employees raises concerns, the specific circumstances of Appellant's role justify the Commission's decision. The advisory board, which engaged in public matters and disseminated information, was closely tied to the County's interests. Consequently, Appellant's removal was deemed appropriate and did not infringe upon her free speech rights, as it pertained to her appointed role rather than her expression of dissent. The decision to remove her was affirmed.