Mary Big Elk Sam McClane v. Donna Kastning Dan Hivley Wes Penland Osage County Sheriff's Department, Donna Kastning, in Her Official Capacity as a Deputy Sheriff, Dan Hivley, in His Official Capacity as a Deputy Sheriff and Wes Penland in His Official Capacity as Lieutenant and Undersheriff, and (n.d.oklahoma) Osage County District Attorney, Larry D. Stuart, in His Official Capacity as District Attorney for Osage County, Oklahoma John Doe, Other Unknown Persons or Person Having Responsibility or Involvement in the Circumstances of the Violation of the Civil Rights of the Including Persons Acting in Concert and Joint Participation With Other Herein and Who Are Joined Herein for Purposes of Declaratory Relief and Damages as May Be Appropriate

Citations: 141 F.3d 1184; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14097; 1998 WL 161053Docket: 97-5012

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; March 31, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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Unpublished opinions may be cited if they hold persuasive value on material issues, provided that a copy is attached to the citing document or is furnished to the Court and parties during oral arguments. In this case, plaintiffs Mary Big Elk and Sam McClane filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several sheriff's deputies, the district attorney, the sheriff, and the Osage County Board of Commissioners, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when deputies assisted a private individual, Tina Kastning, in taking possession of their horses. The district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, citing unresolved factual disputes regarding the qualified immunity claims. The defendants appealed, but the Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment due to the existence of disputed material facts. The case stemmed from a loan dispute where Kastning, concerned about repayment from McClane, sought to take possession of horses he was boarding. Following her attorney's advice that the matter was civil and that she would not face prosecution, deputies aided Kastning in preventing the plaintiffs from moving the horses and in taking possession of them.

Tina contacted Deputy Sheriff Donna Kastning, her sister-in-law, to assist her in taking possession of horses. After two horses were moved, plaintiff Big Elk arrived, asserting ownership of the horses; Donna demanded identification and advised Tina to postpone further actions until a court order was obtained. In a subsequent incident, McClane loaded horses onto a trailer, but Tina and her husband blocked access, leading deputies to instruct McClane to leave the horses at the fairgrounds. The following day, with Deputy Dan Hivley's help, Tina loaded the horses onto a trailer and took them to Hivley's property for boarding, despite not having a court order. Tina claimed she had permission from the district attorney to move the horses. Evidence showed that the sheriff was aware of the deputies' involvement and raised no objections. Policy permitted deputies to assist in repossessions but required them to cease if the owner requested their departure. 

On appeal, the deputies claimed qualified immunity, asserting that their actions did not violate clearly established law. Orders denying qualified immunity prior to trial are immediately appealable if they address abstract legal issues. The court found sufficient factual questions regarding whether the deputies violated the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court's reliance on the precedent from Soldal v. Cook County, which involved unlawful eviction without a court order, supported its decision that the law was clearly established at the time of the incidents.

The court of appeals determined that there was no Fourth Amendment seizure due to the absence of 'public law enforcement' and a lack of privacy invasion. The Supreme Court reversed this, clarifying that a seizure constitutes a 'meaningful interference' with property interests and can occur without a privacy invasion or an accompanying search. Defendants argued their case differed from Soldal since the events occurred on public property, but the Soldal precedent established that police involvement in an illegal seizure violates constitutional rights, regardless of property status. The district court found sufficient evidence to question whether the defendants' actions contravened clearly established law from Soldal, particularly concerning the sheriff and deputies' involvement in the seizure of horses.

The appellate court faces challenges in reviewing the record due to the district court's vague identification of the conduct deemed adequately supported. The appeals court must ascertain what facts the district court likely assumed, particularly regarding allegations against the sheriff as a policy maker and the deputies' roles in the seizure. The court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment since plaintiffs presented genuine factual disputes. The defendants' appeals were dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction over the deputies' qualified immunity claims, leaving no grounds for the county commission and sheriff to assert pendent appellant jurisdiction. The order and judgment are not binding precedents but can be cited under specific conditions. The sheriff is sued in his official capacity, making the suit effectively against the county, which cannot claim qualified immunity per established legal principles.