S.P., a Citizen of Takoma Park, Maryland v. The City of Takoma Park, Maryland Robert Phillips, in His Official Capacity as Chief of the Takoma Park Police Department Brian Rich, Individually and in His Capacity as an Officer of the Takoma Park Police Department Unknown and Unidentified Police Officers of the Takoma Police Department Who Were Present at and Involved in the Incidents Complained of Herein, Individually and in Their Capacity as Officers of the Takoma Park Police Department Washington Adventist Hospital Cyril Hardy James Buxbaum Paul O'Brien Carla Cunningham Marlene Wesley, American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, Inc., Amicus Curiae, Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger, L.L.P., Movant

Citations: 134 F.3d 260; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 554Docket: 97-1218

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; January 14, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves Susan Peller, a citizen of Takoma Park, Maryland, who filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, claiming her civil rights were violated due to her involuntary detention for an emergency psychiatric evaluation conducted by the Takoma Park police and Washington Adventist Hospital (WAH) personnel. The defendants included the City of Takoma Park, Police Chief Robert Phillips, Officer Brian Rich, and various unnamed police officers, as well as WAH and its staff.

The district court granted qualified immunity to Officer Rich and the other police officers, determining that Peller failed to demonstrate a violation of clearly established law. It also dismissed the claims against WAH, ruling that the hospital and its personnel were not acting under color of state law when treating Peller. However, the court initially denied the motion to dismiss from the City of Takoma Park. Following discovery, the court ultimately granted the city's motion for summary judgment, citing a lack of causal connection between the city's involuntary commitment policy and Peller's alleged injuries.

The court's opinion, authored by Judge Williams and joined by Judges Hamilton and Butzner, affirmed the district court's rulings. The facts underlying the case include an argument between Peller and her husband on May 6, 1992, leading her husband to seek assistance from both a mental health hotline and the police department for counseling referrals.

Mr. Peller contacted a non-emergency police dispatcher seeking a marriage counselor referral, but his call was unexpectedly transferred to an emergency dispatcher. The emergency dispatcher provided a suicide hotline as the only resource and subsequently dispatched police to the Peller residence due to a report of a "possible suicidal person: Susan Peller." Upon arrival around 9:48 a.m., four officers, including Officer Rich, found Mrs. Peller visibly upset after a "painful argument" with her husband. Despite her resistance, Sergeant Bonn decided she should be taken for an emergency psychiatric evaluation, resulting in her being handcuffed for removal from her home.

At the hospital, Officer Rich prepared a petition for emergency evaluation, stating he responded due to concerns for Mrs. Peller's welfare, noting her distress and suicidal statements. Two emergency room physicians evaluated her and concluded she had a mental disorder, posed a danger to herself, and could not be voluntarily committed, thus meeting Maryland's criteria for involuntary admission.

Later, Mr. Peller contested the detention, claiming it was a grave error, but WAH staff refused to release her based on her diagnosis of "depression/suicidal." The following day, after a complete psychiatric examination by Dr. Cyril Hardy, it was determined that Mrs. Peller was neither suicidal nor suffering from a mental disorder, leading to her release on May 8, 1992.

On appeal, Peller raised three claims: (1) police officers allegedly violated established law by seizing her without probable cause, thus not qualifying for immunity; (2) WAH personnel, including Nurse Wesley and Dr. Hardy, acted under state law during her involuntary commitment, making them liable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; and (3) Takoma Park's emergency psychiatric detention policy unconstitutionally deprived her of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. Each claim will be addressed individually.

Peller contends that the district court wrongly dismissed her claims against police officers in their individual capacities, arguing she adequately claimed a violation of clearly established law due to her involuntary detention without probable cause. Upon a de novo review, it was determined that Peller did not provide sufficient facts indicating a violation of clearly established law, resulting in the officers being granted qualified immunity. Government officials performing discretionary functions are protected from civil liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights known to a reasonable person. To assess qualified immunity for law enforcement, three steps are necessary: identifying the allegedly violated right, determining if it was clearly established at the time, and evaluating if a reasonable officer would have recognized the conduct as a violation. Peller claims her Fourth Amendment right against seizure without probable cause for medical treatment was violated. However, the court concluded that the specifics of this right were not clearly established, affirming the district court's decision to grant qualified immunity and dismiss her claim. The standard for personal liability under qualified immunity hinges on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the officer's actions based on established legal rules. Although the general right against seizure without probable cause was recognized in 1992, the court emphasized that a right must be clearly established in a specific context to defeat qualified immunity. The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect officials from the burdens of trial when their actions fall within reasonable judgment, shielding them from liability for mistakes in ambiguous situations while holding them accountable for clear violations.

To establish liability against the officers, Peller needed to demonstrate that the contours of probable cause were sufficiently clear at the time of her seizure, making the unlawfulness of their actions apparent to reasonable officers. The court noted the lack of clarity in laws surrounding seizures for psychological evaluations, emphasizing that no precedent defines 'dangerousness' or the necessary evidence to establish probable cause in such contexts. In the case of Gooden v. Howard County, the court previously ruled that officers were entitled to qualified immunity after they responded to reports of screams but found no evidence of harm. The officers' actions were deemed lawful as the law was not clear regarding their conduct at the time. In Peller's situation, the officers responded to a distress call from her husband and, despite her initial reluctance, had the opportunity to assess her state. Although she denied suicidal thoughts, her behavior raised concerns. The officers acted according to Maryland law allowing them to detain individuals suspected of having a mental disorder if there was imminent danger of harm. Ultimately, the court concluded that no clearly established authority existed to indicate the officers violated Peller's Fourth Amendment rights.

Reasonable officers, consistent with the decision in Gooden and other relevant circuit rulings, would have deemed the involuntary detention of Peller to be both reasonable and prudent, as they responded to an emergency call regarding a potentially dangerous situation. Despite Peller showing no signs of physical harm and denying psychiatric issues, the officers found her behavior evasive and uncooperative. They also relied on the same Maryland involuntary commitment statute previously endorsed in Gooden. Consequently, there was no clearly established authority indicating that the officers' actions were unlawful, granting them qualified immunity.

Peller argued that the district court wrongly dismissed her federal claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against WAH, Nurse Marlene Wesley, and Dr. Hardy, asserting that Maryland’s involuntary commitment statute mandated their evaluation leading to her involuntary commitment, thus categorizing them as state actors. However, the statutory scheme was found to be more permissive than mandatory, allowing private physicians significant discretion in deciding on involuntary commitments. Therefore, Peller’s § 1983 claims were dismissed as WAH and its personnel were not considered state actors.

Section 1983 applies only to individuals acting "under color" of law. The court identified three circumstances under which private conduct may qualify as state action, but determined that none were met in Peller's case. Peller focused on the second condition—state compulsion—arguing that Maryland's involuntary commitment statute coerces private medical parties to conduct evaluations and admit individuals involuntarily if statutory criteria are met. She cited several provisions indicating that a properly executed petition obliges emergency facilities to accept and evaluate individuals, stating that a physician must determine if the individual has a "mental disorder" as defined by the statute, which she argued limits physician discretion.

Peller argues for reimbursement of services under an emergency petition for individuals unable to pay and highlights that police officers are exempt from liability under state law, suggesting that WAH and its staff had no choice but to act. The court notes that the relevant provisions of the Mental Health Code do not encourage involuntary commitments and finds the Maryland statutory scheme to be permissive, granting discretion to private medical providers. Specifically, Section 10-622(a) allows for emergency evaluation petitions only if there is a belief of a mental disorder and imminent danger, but does not require that involuntary commitment proceedings be initiated solely based on the existence of these criteria. Additionally, Section 10-617(a) prohibits involuntary admission without a physician's finding that specific criteria are met, and the criteria for a 'mental disorder' is broadly defined, leaving significant discretion to physicians. The court concludes that the statutory scheme does not coerce or encourage involuntary commitments, referencing Blum v. Yaretsky, which states that the state is not liable for medical judgments made by private parties. Consequently, Peller's federal claims against WAH and its staff are dismissed. Furthermore, Peller asserts that the City of Takoma Park is liable for her injuries due to a policy allowing police to detain individuals based on a lower threshold than 'probable cause.' However, the court affirms that the police officers had probable cause to detain Peller based on undisputed facts presented during summary judgment.

Takoma Park's involuntary detention policy, even if deemed unconstitutional, did not cause Peller's injuries, precluding her recovery against the municipality. The court affirms the summary judgment favoring Takoma Park, noting that Peller does not challenge the policy's facial validity but argues it is unconstitutionally applied due to inadequate officer training. A municipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for constitutional violations stemming from failure to train. The court assumes Takoma Park inadequately trained its officers on the standard for detaining individuals for psychiatric evaluations, which should align with the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. However, since the officers had probable cause to detain Peller, Takoma Park cannot be held liable. The court highlights the unclear nature of probable cause in mental health situations compared to criminal contexts, emphasizing that reasonableness is assessed based on the totality of circumstances known to the officers at the time of detention. The court concludes that while the determination of probable cause is inherently fact-specific, the absence of genuine issues of material fact allows for a legal examination of the situation. Ultimately, the standards for mental health evaluations lack the clarity present in criminal law, complicating the application of probable cause. The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard remains the central measure for evaluating such detentions.

Determining the reasonableness of a seizure involves balancing governmental interests against the intrusion on individual rights. For involuntary commitment, the assessment hinges on whether the potential harm and its likelihood outweigh the confinement's costs. Maryland's commitment procedures, which Takoma Park follows, mandate that an emergency evaluee be assessed by a physician within six hours of arrival at a medical facility. The evaluee must be released promptly unless they are voluntarily admitted or deemed suitable for involuntary admission.

In this case, Peller's transport and detention for a psychiatric evaluation were justified as a limited and reasonable intrusion, given the circumstances. Officers acted on reports that Peller was suicidal and her own alarming statements indicating a desire to harm herself. The law holds that the officers had probable cause to believe she was at imminent risk of self-harm due to her mental state. This aligns with precedents affirming that probable cause can support mental health evaluations based on threats or erratic behavior, even in the absence of visible signs of danger at the time of intervention. Consequently, no constitutional violation occurred, absolving Takoma Park of liability for any claims related to Peller’s detention.

The district court's summary judgment in favor of Takoma Park is affirmed, including the dismissal of Peller's federal claims against individual police officers, who are granted qualified immunity due to their actions not violating clearly established law. WAH and its personnel are found not to be acting under color of law when they involuntarily detained Peller, thus not liable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The court holds that the officers had probable cause to believe Peller was mentally disturbed and a danger to herself, resulting in no violation of her constitutional rights, which absolves Takoma Park of liability. The court also dismissed claims against Chief Phillips for lack of fair notice and redundancy, as the City of Takoma Park was already a defendant. Several state law claims were dismissed due to Peller's failure to meet Maryland's notice requirements, and the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over her state law claims against WAH and its staff, dismissing them without prejudice. Additionally, Peller's conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 was deemed insufficient. The court found that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances, aligning with previous circuit court rulings that supported their qualified immunity.

Officers were granted qualified immunity in several cases involving the detention of individuals for emergency mental evaluations based on various circumstances, including family statements about irrational behavior, prior threats, and disturbances at police stations. Notable cases include *Chathas v. Smith*, where officers acted on a family's concerns; *McKinney v. George*, where prior violent behavior was a factor; and *Harris v. Pirch*, involving a disturbed individual who had previously been hospitalized. The court emphasized that officers' subjective beliefs regarding the need for "probable cause" are irrelevant in assessing the reasonableness of their actions, as established in *Anderson v. Creighton* and *Rowland v. Perry*. 

The Maryland involuntary commitment statute sets out specific criteria for admission to facilities, including the presence of a mental disorder and the danger posed by the individual. The court found that Peller did not meet the necessary legal tests to challenge the officers' actions, as there was no evidence of conspiracy or joint action with private physicians. Additionally, the court clarified that while the statute uses "shall" regarding the treatment of individuals, it could be interpreted more flexibly, referencing *Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno*.

The provisions in question do not compel private medical parties to involuntarily detain individuals; rather, they serve the legislative intent of protecting individuals and the public. This aligns with the ruling in Janicsko v. Pellman, which interpreted similar Pennsylvania statutes as protective. The American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland supports Peller, arguing that Takoma Park's emergency psychiatric detention policy violates the Fourth Amendment by permitting police to detain individuals without probable cause. Takoma Park has adopted the Maryland involuntary commitment statute verbatim. Peller provided depositions from police officers, indicating they believed the standard for lawful detention was lower than probable cause. Peller also contested the accuracy of statements attributed to her, asserting they were misrepresented. However, her earlier deposition indicated she expressed a desire to leave, which undermines her later denial of the statements. It is established that conflicting testimonies do not create a genuine issue of material fact, especially when one testimony contradicts prior sworn statements. Thus, Peller's denial does not establish a genuine material fact dispute.