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John W. Duvall v. Dan Reynolds
Citations: 131 F.3d 907; 1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 19; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34497; 1997 WL 758810Docket: 96-6329, 96-6299
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; December 10, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
John Wayne Duvall, an Oklahoma death row inmate, appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with the Tenth Circuit affirming the district court's decision. Duvall had previously confessed to killing his wife, Karla, on September 15, 1986, after a series of marital conflicts, including a dispute over her drug prescription. After waiting outside her home, he forcibly entered, assaulted her, and ultimately suffocated her after a violent altercation. Subsequently, the State charged him with first-degree murder and sought the death penalty based on prior felony convictions involving violence and the heinous nature of the crime. The jury convicted Duvall and recommended the death sentence, which was imposed by the trial judge on May 20, 1987. His conviction was upheld by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in 1991, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1992. On December 4, 1992, Mr. Duvall filed an "Application for Post-Conviction Relief" in the Stephens County district court, which was denied on June 8, 1993. Following this, he filed a "Notice of Intent to Appeal" on June 17, 1993, but the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal on February 10, 1994, due to Mr. Duvall's failure to submit a Petition in Error and a copy of the district court's order. The Court scheduled Mr. Duvall's execution for April 8, 1994, and denied a motion for reconsideration on March 28, 1994. Subsequently, on March 23, 1994, Mr. Duvall filed an "Application to Stay Execution" in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, the Tenth Circuit granted a stay on April 4, 1994, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On November 14, 1994, Mr. Duvall filed a habeas corpus petition in the same district court, asserting fourteen grounds for error, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. An evidentiary hearing was held on November 27, 1995, to evaluate his claims regarding the penalty phase. On July 10, 1996, the district court rejected the ineffective assistance claim for the penalty phase and subsequently dismissed all remaining claims on August 22, 1996. A certificate of appealability was granted on September 26, 1996. In his appeal, Mr. Duvall contends that: (1) his counsel failed to present mitigating evidence; (2) the State did not disclose exculpatory evidence; (3) jury instructions on lesser offenses were inadequate; (4) prior bad acts were improperly admitted; (5) evidence of the decedent's prior drug conviction was excluded; (6) jurors were not informed they could impose a life sentence despite finding an aggravating circumstance; (7) jury instructions confused the responsibility to weigh mitigating circumstances; (8) the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague; (9) the prosecutor made improper statements during closing arguments; and (10) the State failed to provide adequate notice of witnesses and evidence for the penalty phase. The applicability of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) is critical to Mr. Duvall's habeas claims. The AEDPA introduced significant procedural and substantive changes to habeas corpus law, particularly affecting petitions filed after its enactment on April 24, 1996. It also established Chapter 154, which provides special procedures for capital cases, applicable to cases pending at the time of the Act's enactment, contingent upon states ensuring competent legal representation for indigent capital defendants. Oklahoma has not claimed qualification under these new procedures and has previously acknowledged its non-qualifying status in case law. Consequently, Mr. Duvall's habeas petition will be reviewed under pre-AEDPA standards. In his first claim, he contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that his trial attorney, Robert Prince, failed to investigate or present mitigating evidence during sentencing. To succeed on this claim, Mr. Duvall must demonstrate that his counsel made significant errors that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, overcoming the presumption that counsel's actions were part of sound trial strategy. The review of effectiveness must be made from the perspective of the attorney at the time of trial, without hindsight bias, focusing solely on what the Constitution requires. Additionally, the reasonableness of counsel's performance can be influenced by the defendant's own statements or conduct. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Duvall must first prove that his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient. He must then show a "reasonable probability" that the trial's outcome would have differed if those errors had not occurred, particularly during the penalty phase of a capital trial. This involves assessing whether, without the alleged errors, the sentencer would have viewed the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently. An attorney has a fundamental duty to investigate, prepare, and present potential mitigating evidence, which is essential for the adversarial process to function effectively. While the duty to investigate is critical, it is also bounded; attorneys are not required to pursue every possible lead as long as their decisions are reasonable given the circumstances. In capital cases, this duty is strictly enforced, and failure to investigate potential mitigating evidence can be deemed unreasonable. Furthermore, attorneys do not have an absolute obligation to present all available mitigating evidence. If an attorney chooses not to present such evidence, the focus shifts to the reason behind this decision. If the choice is based on a reasonable strategic decision, it is generally upheld. However, if the decision lacks a tactical basis and is thus deficient, the first prong of the Strickland test is met. The determination of whether an attorney's decision was informed and reasonable depends on whether they investigated the defendant's background before making such choices; simply claiming "strategy" does not exempt an attorney's actions from scrutiny. Strategic decisions made after incomplete investigations may be deemed reasonable if supported by professional judgment. The focus shifts to whether Mr. Prince's choice to forgo presenting mitigating witnesses was a tactical decision informed by adequate investigation efforts. Mr. Prince detailed his preparation for Mr. Duvall's trial at the evidentiary hearing, indicating he communicated with police officers, a jailer, and previous attorneys for Mr. Duvall. He also consulted various doctors regarding Mr. Duvall's mental state and competency, conducting three psychological evaluations, one of which he initiated. Although he had limited discussions with family members, he invested "several hundred hours" speaking with Mr. Duvall. Mr. Prince's trial strategy evolved as the proceedings progressed. He initially believed Mr. Duvall should testify at both trial phases and had prepared to present mitigating witnesses, including Dr. Mynatt, Virginia Hoover, and potentially family members. However, after three days of trial, Mr. Duvall opted not to testify, leading Mr. Prince to alter his strategy. Subsequently, an in camera hearing was held at Mr. Prince's request to discuss the implications of Mr. Duvall's decision on the defense strategy, highlighting the challenges faced in adapting to the defendant's choices. Prior discussions between the defendant and counsel addressed the decision to testify in both stages of the proceedings. The defendant acknowledged understanding the potential for cross-examination and the introduction of additional evidence if he chose to testify in the second stage. After evaluating the pros and cons, the defendant opted not to testify, agreeing that it was not in his best interest and that he did so knowingly and voluntarily. He consented to not call other witnesses regarding his mental condition and expressed no complaints about the trial process. The trial judge instructed the jury on mitigating circumstances, which included the defendant's surrender, cooperation with law enforcement, remorse, and being under the influence of substances during the incident. Despite the defense's efforts to highlight these mitigating factors, the jury ultimately recommended the death penalty, finding aggravating circumstances. The defendant later expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney's decision not to introduce additional mitigating evidence related to his family history, alcohol abuse, church activity, remorse, and the victim's drug abuse. The review of these contentions indicated that the reasonableness of the attorney's actions could be influenced by the defendant's own choices, with the ultimate decision on introducing mitigating evidence resting with the counsel. Mr. Duvall contends that Mr. Prince failed to conduct thorough interviews with family members and to call several of them as witnesses to highlight mitigating factors regarding his background. Evidence revealed that Duvall, born on May 21, 1951, into a poor family as the youngest of twelve children, faced significant hardships, including the death of his father at age ten and reliance on his mother for support. By his early teens, he struggled with alcohol and drug addiction, exhibiting violent behavior while under the influence. He dropped out of school after the ninth grade and left home around age sixteen, working primarily as a laborer in oil refineries. Duvall’s personal life included two failed marriages and a long-term relationship with Karla, who was also addicted to narcotics. Their drug use fluctuated, but resumed heavily following the birth of their son in 1982. In 1985, he started working part-time for Joe Howard, who encouraged him to attend church and seek sobriety for his son's sake. However, Karla obtained a restraining order against him shortly before her murder, and Duvall made attempts to stop her from getting drugs. Duvall's history includes numerous run-ins with law enforcement leading to convictions for violent felonies, including several assaults. During the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Prince acknowledged he could have called mitigating witnesses but feared their testimonies might introduce more negative aspects of Duvall’s life, outweighing any potential positive impact. He was also concerned about the prosecution potentially countering this testimony with statements from Karla's family. Mr. Prince's choice not to present mitigating evidence regarding Mr. Duvall's family history was deemed reasonable following a sufficient constitutional investigation. Mr. Prince was familiar with Mr. Duvall's background and determined that introducing family history testimony would not benefit his client. The record indicates no inadequacy in Mr. Prince's investigation, and he justified his reluctance by noting that while Mr. Duvall's life history was tragic, it did not necessarily mitigate the jury's findings of aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court's perspective is conveyed, suggesting that a jury could have mixed reactions to such evidence, potentially leading to a perception of Mr. Duvall as responsible for his violent actions despite his upbringing. Presenting family testimony was fraught with risks, as it could highlight Mr. Duvall's violent past, which might provoke sympathy from the jury, but could also reinforce negative perceptions. The jury remained unaware of the specifics behind Mr. Duvall’s prior assault convictions and his uncharged violent conduct. Mr. Prince recognized that family members could inadvertently disclose damaging information, particularly concerning Mr. Duvall's violent history with a victim named Karla. Consequently, the decision to omit family history evidence was a prudent tactical choice. Additionally, Mr. Duvall contended that evidence of his alcohol abuse should have been introduced as mitigating evidence. He argued that his troubled relationship with alcohol and his drinking on the day of the murder would have resonated with the jury as significant mitigating factors. Testimony from Mr. Duvall's brother, Jerry, highlighted the available evidence regarding Mr. Duvall's substance abuse. Johnny exhibited a drastic personality change when under the influence of alcohol and drugs, becoming sarcastic and belligerent, and was prone to violence. Despite potential mitigating testimony regarding his substance abuse, Mr. Prince's choice not to introduce such evidence was justified for two reasons. First, although Mr. Duvall claimed to have been drinking on the day of the murder, witnesses indicated he appeared calm and in control, suggesting alcohol was not a factor in his actions. Second, presenting testimony about Mr. Duvall's substance abuse would have necessitated revealing his prior convictions and violent behavior, which could be perceived by the jury as aggravating rather than mitigating. Additionally, Mr. Duvall argued that evidence of his recent church attendance and attempts to reform should have been presented. The Howards testified that he had been attending church regularly in the months before the murder, yet Mr. Prince did not investigate this further due to the timing of a prior assault on his wife, undermining the credibility of Mr. Duvall's claims of reform. Mr. Prince concluded that pursuing this line of defense would likely lead to damaging evidence regarding Mr. Duvall's history of substance abuse and violence, which would outweigh any potential mitigating impact. Thus, Mr. Prince's strategic decisions were deemed reasonable given the circumstances. Mr. Duvall claims that his attorney, Mr. Prince, failed to adequately present evidence of his remorse, particularly regarding his depression and suicidal thoughts following the murder. However, the jury was aware of Mr. Duvall's remorse, having witnessed his emotional confessions, and Instruction No. 8 required them to consider it as a mitigating factor. Mr. Prince effectively highlighted Mr. Duvall's remorse during closing arguments, asserting that Mr. Duvall expressed regret for his actions. Additionally, Mr. Duvall argues that Mr. Prince should have investigated and presented evidence of the victim, Karla Duvall's, drug use and that he had encouraged her to stop. After investigation, Mr. Prince found insufficient evidence to support this claim. Potential witnesses denied knowledge of her drug use, and Mr. Duvall himself admitted to exaggerating her drug problems. The medical examiner confirmed that Karla had no drugs in her system at the time of death, and a neighbor testified that she did not appear to be under the influence on the night she died. Given the lack of credible evidence regarding Karla's drug use, Mr. Prince's decision not to pursue this line of defense was deemed a reasonable strategic choice. Overall, the review of the record indicates that Mr. Duvall's trial counsel was adequately prepared and did not fail in their investigation for the penalty phase of the trial. Mr. Duvall's trial counsel, Mr. Prince, exercised reasonable professional judgment by not pursuing further investigation and by making strategic decisions regarding evidence presentation, including aspects of Duvall's family history and substance abuse. Duvall's choice not to testify complicated the trial dynamics, but the representation met the Sixth Amendment standard for effective legal assistance. The court found no reasonable probability that additional evidence would have altered the jury's assessment of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that led to a death sentence, especially given the strength of the prosecution's case against Duvall, which included his prior violent felonies and the brutal nature of the murder. In a second claim, Duvall argued that the prosecution violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence. Despite his attorney's request for evidence that could negate guilt or mitigate punishment, the prosecution stated that all exculpatory evidence had been disclosed. However, Duvall alleged that a conversation with a former neighbor, Lynn Howard, which indicated that the victim had a history of drug use, was not revealed. The court referenced Brady v. Maryland, noting that the suppression of favorable evidence violates due process if it is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecution's intent. The materiality requirement for evidence is satisfied if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have altered the trial's outcome, as established in United States v. Bagley and Kyles v. Whitley. In this case, Mr. Duvall acknowledges that Ms. Howard's statement would not have changed the guilt phase verdict but argues it could have affected the penalty phase by supporting his claim that he sought to prevent his wife's drug use. However, the court disagrees, noting that the jury was already aware of Duvall's drug use claims, and no objective evidence supported them, such as testimony from the state's medical examiner and a neighbor indicating that the victim showed no signs of drug use. Consequently, the court concludes that the penalty phase outcome would not have differed with Ms. Howard’s statement disclosed, denying Duvall's habeas relief claim on this basis. Additionally, Duvall argues a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights due to the jury being instructed only on first-degree murder, without options for lesser-included offenses like second-degree murder or manslaughter. The Supreme Court in Beck v. Alabama mandates that a jury must have the option to convict on lesser included noncapital offenses when evidence supports such a conviction, to avoid forcing jurors into a binary choice between a capital conviction and acquittal. However, states are not obligated to create a noncapital murder offense for every possible factual scenario. A trial court is required to instruct a jury on a noncapital offense only if evidence supports such a verdict. In the case of Mr. Duvall, who argued for jury instructions on second degree murder or first degree manslaughter, the court found insufficient evidence to warrant this. Mr. Duvall confessed to law enforcement that after receiving an anger-inducing phone call from his wife, he waited several hours before violently attacking her, ultimately suffocating her after she asked for help. The court determined that the time elapsed between the call and the murder allowed for any emotional provocation to subside, and Mr. Duvall’s actions indicated premeditation, disqualifying him from those lesser charges. Consequently, his request for habeas relief was denied. Additionally, Mr. Duvall claimed a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the introduction of evidence regarding his prior bad acts during the trial. However, the court noted that state court decisions on evidence admissibility are not typically reviewable in federal habeas proceedings unless they fundamentally undermine the fairness of the trial. The court emphasized that it would only disturb the admission of prior crimes if their prejudicial impact significantly outweighed their probative value, thus maintaining Mr. Duvall's due process rights were not violated. The prosecution presented evidence of Mr. Duvall's prior violent behavior towards his wife, Karla, to counter his defense of provocation. Neighbor Ms. McKinney testified that Karla sought refuge in her apartment, expressing fear that Mr. Duvall would kill her if arrested. Upon Mr. Duvall's arrival, he threatened both women. Additionally, Mr. Bobbett, Karla's brother, recounted a phone call in which Karla disclosed her fear of being killed by Mr. Duvall if she left him. The trial court clarified that this testimony was not for the truth of the matter asserted but to illustrate Karla's state of mind regarding provocation. However, the judge later instructed the jury to disregard this testimony, stating it was irrelevant to the issues at hand. The court noted that while the admission of prior acts could affect trial fairness, subsequent jury instructions to disregard such evidence often rectify any potential error. The judge's directive to ignore the statements from Ms. McKinney and Mr. Bobbett was deemed sufficient to mitigate any influence their testimony might have had on the jury's decision. The court determined that the instruction given to the jury was adhered to, concluding that no trial error occurred. Even if the prior acts testimony was found to be constitutionally erroneous, the court deemed any potential error harmless, as federal courts only grant habeas relief for trial errors that substantially impact the jury's verdict. The evidence, particularly Mr. Duvall's confession, strongly supports the guilty verdict, making any possible error inconsequential. Regarding Mr. Duvall's claim that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to the exclusion of evidence about his wife's felony drug charge, the court noted that the trial judge ruled against introducing this evidence based on character evidence statutes. The judge allowed general reputation evidence but excluded details about the drug charge, deeming it inadmissible since it was not a formal conviction. On habeas review, the court clarified that it does not assess the appropriateness of the trial court's evidentiary ruling, but rather whether the exclusion rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, which Mr. Duvall failed to prove. Thus, he is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground. The court evaluated the materiality of evidence excluded from Mr. Duvall's trial, specifically a drug charge against the victim. It concluded that the exclusion did not render the trial fundamentally unfair and therefore denied Mr. Duvall's request for habeas relief. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the victim's death occurred about seven hours after a relevant telephone call, indicating that the drug evidence, while somewhat relevant to Duvall's provocation defense, was ultimately immaterial. The court found no basis for a manslaughter or second-degree murder instruction due to a lack of supporting evidence and the seven-hour cooling-off period. Additionally, Duvall claimed violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to inadequate jury instructions regarding the imposition of a life sentence against aggravating circumstances. The court upheld the trial court's Instruction No. 6, which allowed the jury to consider a life sentence even if aggravating circumstances were found. The instruction clarified that the jury was authorized to impose a death sentence only if they unanimously found aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The court distinguished this case from Moore v. Kemp, where conflicting jury instructions created confusion regarding sentencing, which was not present in Duvall's case. The jury instruction in this case is characterized by permissive language, clearly indicating that the jury is not mandated to impose the death penalty upon finding an aggravating circumstance. Unlike the instruction in Kemp, which had inconsistencies, Instruction No. 6 in this case maintains constitutional clarity, adequately informing the jury of their discretion regarding the death penalty. The instruction aligns with precedents such as Moore v. Butler, confirming that jurors may consider imposing the death penalty based on aggravating circumstances found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Duvall's seventh claim asserts violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, arguing that the jury was misled into believing that unanimous agreement on the existence of mitigating circumstances was necessary for individual jurors to consider such evidence. He references McKoy v. North Carolina and Mills v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court ruled that requiring unanimity on mitigating circumstances could lead to an unconstitutional death sentence. These cases emphasize that a single juror's dissent should not prevent others from considering mitigating evidence, as established in Lockett v. Ohio. However, the court clarifies that Mills and McKoy do not necessitate explicit instructions on the non-requirement of unanimity. The focus is whether the jury instructions created a substantial risk that jurors believed they needed unanimous consent to consider mitigating evidence. Relevant instructions provided by the trial court defined aggravating circumstances and indicated that if the jury did not unanimously find such circumstances, they could not consider the death penalty. Mitigating circumstances were described as factors for jurors to evaluate based on fairness and mercy, allowing them to exercise discretion in their determination. Unanimous findings of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt are required for imposing the death penalty. If such circumstances are found, they must be documented in writing, specifying which aggravating factors were identified, and included in the Verdict. The jury must indicate these findings on the Verdict form, which must be signed by the Foreman. There is no requirement for unanimity when assessing mitigating circumstances; jurors may determine their existence without a collective agreement. The instructions necessitate unanimous agreement only when weighing aggravating against mitigating circumstances before deciding on the death penalty. The jury instructions were found to comply with constitutional standards, allowing jurors to consider all mitigating factors in Mr. Duvall's favor, thus denying his claim for habeas relief. Furthermore, Mr. Duvall challenges the constitutionality of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance as vague. Instruction No. 5 defines "heinous," "atrocious," and "cruel," indicating that this aggravating factor pertains to crimes involving torture or severe physical abuse of the victim. A statutory aggravating factor is considered unconstitutionally vague if it lacks clear guidance for distinguishing between death and lesser penalties. Previous case law, including Godfrey v. Georgia and Cartwright v. Maynard, has invalidated similarly vague aggravating factors, suggesting that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" designation may also fail to provide necessary guidance under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court upheld its decision regarding the vagueness of an aggravating factor in capital sentencing, emphasizing that without specific guiding language, individuals might mistakenly believe that all intentional killings are "especially heinous." The Court noted that the Oklahoma legal framework could remedy this vagueness by adopting a definition that requires "torture or serious physical abuse." Following this guidance, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals established a definition mandating that the aggravator necessitates evidence of torture or serious physical abuse, a standard confirmed as constitutionally permissible in Hatch v. State. Despite this, the appellant, Mr. Duvall, claims that the aggravator remains unconstitutionally vague due to inconsistent application by the Oklahoma courts, arguing it fails to genuinely narrow the pool of death penalty candidates. However, the court counters this assertion, stating that the Oklahoma courts have consistently interpreted the aggravator to necessitate proof of conscious physical suffering, as demonstrated in the case of Stafford v. State. The court specified that if there is no evidence of such suffering, the standards of torture or serious physical abuse are not satisfied. The court concluded that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to determine that the victim, Karla Duvall, endured torture or serious physical abuse. Evidence included testimony from the state's medical examiner, who detailed numerous wounds, indicating the victim experienced pain prior to death. Karla Duvall did not suffer a head injury that would indicate she was unconscious before the stab wounds were inflicted, as confirmed during Mr. Duvall's confession, where he stated she "never was unconscious" and asked for help after being stabbed. Mr. Duvall subsequently suffocated her with a pillow. The jury's finding of serious physical abuse or torture was deemed adequately supported, affirming the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravator as constitutional. Consequently, Mr. Duvall is not entitled to habeas relief on this basis. In his ninth claim, Mr. Duvall argues that prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments violated his due process rights. Allegations of misconduct are reviewed de novo, and such conduct must significantly undermine the trial's fairness to warrant federal habeas relief. Mr. Duvall identifies four improper prosecutorial tactics aimed at inflaming the jury's emotions. First, he points to the prosecutor's personal opinion on his guilt, stating it was "more than beyond a reasonable doubt." While this comment was improper, it did not constitute a due process violation since the defense objected, and the trial court addressed the issue. Second, Mr. Duvall claims the prosecutor made inappropriate references to the blood and foul smell at the murder scene, using graphic language that could prejudice the jury. This involved descriptions of the crime scene's conditions, including the pervasive blood and the odor of decaying flesh, which was emphasized during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Mr. Duvall is not entitled to habeas relief based on the prosecutor's remarks during the trial. The prosecutor's statements regarding the crime scene, including descriptions of the victim's injuries, were found to be accurate and did not render the trial fundamentally unfair, despite being deemed unnecessary. The court affirmed that the prosecutor is allowed reasonable latitude in drawing inferences from evidence during closing arguments, with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals agreeing that the evidence supported the inferences made. Mr. Duvall also contended that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy for the victim. While the court does not condone such comments, it determined that these remarks did not significantly affect the outcome of the penalty phase due to the strong evidence of aggravating circumstances from Duvall’s confession and testimonies, which likely generated sympathy for the victim prior to the prosecutor's closing arguments. Overall, the court concluded that the prosecutor's comments did not undermine the fairness of Mr. Duvall's trial or deny him due process, and thus he is not entitled to habeas relief on these grounds. Additionally, Mr. Duvall claimed inadequate notice of the State's evidence regarding the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravator, which remains part of his appeal. Mr. Duvall claims that the Bill of Particulars lacked specific acts and witness identifications related to an aggravating circumstance, leading to a due process violation characterized as trial by ambush. The State counters that Duvall is procedurally barred from raising this issue since he did not present it during his direct appeal. Although he attempted to address it in his post-conviction appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruled it lacked jurisdiction due to Duvall's failure to file a Petition in Error and attach the district court's order as required by Rule 5.2(C). This rule mandates the filing of a petition and brief within thirty days of the district court's final order, with noncompliance resulting in a bar to consideration of the appeal. The legal framework surrounding procedural defaults indicates that federal habeas review is prohibited unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The State court's procedural default finding is deemed independent from federal law and must be strictly followed. Although the procedural bar under Rule 5.2(C) may not have been "firmly established" in Oklahoma case law, compliance with its requirements is clearly mandated. An appellate court must assess how the district court addressed a defendant's claims, as noted in Duvall, 871 P.2d at 1388. The district court's order is essential for evaluating the judgment, establishing that the state court's procedural rule was adequate. Mr. Duvall defaulted on his federal claims in state court under this procedural rule, barring habeas review unless he demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice or shows that failing to consider his claims would lead to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Mr. Duvall did not present arguments for cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, resulting in the conclusion that he is not entitled to relief. Even if his claim were not procedurally barred, Mr. Duvall would still not qualify for habeas relief on the merits. The Due Process Clause requires that a defendant receives adequate notice of the potential death penalty and has a meaningful opportunity to contest the state's evidence. In this case, Mr. Duvall was informed that the death penalty was sought due to the murder's especially heinous nature and was provided with a list of witnesses. The district attorney assured that all witnesses in the penalty phase were previously disclosed. Mr. Duvall had the opportunity to explain or contest the evidence, particularly since his confession contained much of the incriminating evidence. Consequently, there was no issue of trial by ambush, and Mr. Duvall's due process rights were not violated. The review concluded that Mr. Duvall's trial did not suffer from constitutional error, affirming the integrity of the death sentence review process. The district court's denial of Mr. Duvall's habeas corpus petition is affirmed. In the related appeal, Duvall v. Reynolds, Mr. Duvall's Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Judgment in his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 death penalty habeas action is also affirmed. Mr. Duvall does not contest the court's finding of no ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial's guilt phase. The record reveals that Pearl Duvall was largely unaware of Mr. Duvall's violent past. According to Oklahoma law, first-degree murder is defined as causing the death of another with malice aforethought, which is inferred from the act of killing unless reasonable doubt exists. A design to kill can be formed instantaneously. Second-degree murder involves acts imminently dangerous to another, reflecting a depraved mind without premeditated intent. Manslaughter in the first degree occurs when the killing is done without intent in a heat of passion, using a dangerous weapon, unless it qualifies as justifiable homicide. The court clarified the purpose of admitting testimony from Ms. McKinney, indicating it was not for the truth of the matter but to inform the jury of the deceased's state of mind regarding Mr. Duvall. Similar instructions were given for Mr. Bobbett's testimony, emphasizing its relevance to potential provocation that might lead to a manslaughter charge, which requires adequate provocation to establish heat of passion. Under Oklahoma law, a court may defer proceedings after a guilty plea under specific conditions. Upon fulfilling specified conditions, a defendant is released without a formal judgment of guilt, and their guilty plea is expunged from official records, as per Oklahoma law (OKLA. STAT. tit. 22. 991(c. West 1986)). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has not examined this issue's merits in direct or habeas corpus reviews, consistently rejecting similar arguments in past cases, such as Valdez v. State and Bryson v. State. The court has held that jury instructions adequately inform jurors of their discretion regarding the death penalty, allowing for life imprisonment despite aggravating circumstances, with no opinion expressed on whether such instructions could be viewed as "jury nullification" (referencing Walker v. State). The court has also reviewed cases where it upheld the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator, alongside cases where it reversed jury findings regarding this aggravator. Lastly, the State contended in federal district court that procedural default rules applied to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate notice raised by Mr. Duvall. The district court denied Mr. Duvall's habeas relief without addressing the procedural default rule. On appeal, the State contends that this rule applies solely to Mr. Duvall's inadequate notice claim. The court holds that the procedural default rule is indeed applicable to this claim, but notes that the State may waive this defense by not raising it in a timely manner, as established in Jenkins v. Anderson. The respondents did not assert procedural default in either the District Court or the Court of Appeals, leading the court to deem the defense waived and allowing the petition to be considered on its merits. The court opts not to raise the procedural default issue sua sponte concerning other matters, citing the precedent set in United States v. Hernandez, which emphasized the necessity for the petitioner to demonstrate cause and prejudice. Although a court has the discretion to raise the procedural bar defense sua sponte for reasons of judicial efficiency, it chooses not to do so at this late stage of the proceedings.