Karen S. Brasko v. City of Caney, Kansas Bill Jamison Rick Pell Monte Lilburn, and Jeff Atzenhofer O.J. Bridenstine Don Fuqua Bobby Hawthorne Ray Stelfox Laurie Jamison Steve Buster David Estes Gene Vaughan Chad Bradford Mike Hines, Darla Lea Cleland v. City of Caney, Kansas Bill Jamison Rick Pell Monte Lilburn, and Jeff Atzenhofer O.J. Bridenstine Don Fuqua Bobby Hawthorne Ray Stelfox Laurie Jamison Steve Buster David Estes Gene Vaughan Chad Bradford Mike Hines, Karen S. Brasko v. City of Caney, Kansas Rick Pell Monte Lilburn Jeff Atzenhofer O.J. Bridenstine Don Fuqua Bobby Hawthorne Ray Stelfox Laurie Jamison Steve Buster David Estes Gene Vaughan Chad Bradford Mike Hines, and Bill Jamison, Darla Lea Cleland v. City of Caney, Kansas Rick Pell Monte Lilburn Jeff Atzenhofer O.J. Bridenstine Don Fuqua Bobby Hawthorne Ray Stelfox Laurie Jamison Steve Buster David Estes Gene Vaughan Chad Bradford Mike Hines, and Bill Jamison

Citation: 131 F.3d 151Docket: 97-3027

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; December 8, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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Citation of unpublished opinions is now permissible if they hold persuasive value on a material issue and are attached to the citing document or provided to the Court and all parties during oral argument, as per the General Order of November 29, 1993, which suspends 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or until further notice. In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Karen S. Brasko and Darla Lea Cleland, plaintiffs-appellees, have brought actions against current and former city council members of Caney, Kansas, and Officer Bill Jamison, alleging violations of their equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to sexual discrimination and subsequent retaliation. The plaintiffs, employed as dispatchers/emergency medical technicians, reported experiencing unwelcome sexual advances from Officer Jamison and the mayor. They raised complaints at city council meetings seeking discipline and protective policies, but the council failed to respond appropriately, leading the plaintiffs to assert that the council ratified the inappropriate conduct. The appellate court has granted the defendants' request for a decision based solely on the briefs and has reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for the individual city council members while vacating and remanding the decision regarding Officer Jamison.

City council members sought to dismiss claims against them individually, citing qualified immunity. The district court denied this claim, asserting that the law was clearly established regarding their responsibility to address potential violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. It highlighted specific allegations where plaintiffs reported sexual harassment, yet the council members failed to act to protect them or prevent further harassment. The council members appealed the decision.

Officer Jamison also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs did not state a viable claim since he was not their supervisor and, alternatively, that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court found that if plaintiffs could show Jamison acted under actual or de facto authority over them, they might recover. It ruled that the law on sexual harassment was clearly established in the Tenth Circuit, thus denying Jamison qualified immunity, leading him to appeal as well.

The denials of qualified immunity by the district court are considered immediately appealable final judgments, subject to de novo review. On appeal, the city council members contended that the district court wrongly denied their dismissal motion, claiming no established legal obligation existed to act on the sexual discrimination complaints at the time of the alleged conduct. They argued their only means of action was through voting in council meetings and that they lacked authority to manage the police department or individual liability for not voting on claims of sexual discrimination.

Qualified immunity protects government officials when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The analysis follows a two-part framework: assessing whether a constitutional or statutory right was violated and whether that right was sufficiently clear for a reasonable person to recognize that their conduct could infringe upon it. The standard for overcoming qualified immunity requires either a relevant Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit ruling or a consensus from other courts indicating that the conduct in question is unlawful.

To establish that the law is clearly defined, a plaintiff must provide specific allegations demonstrating that a reasonable official would recognize their conduct as a rights violation. General assertions are insufficient; the plaintiff must show with precision that the facts and law imply a constitutional rights breach. While some degree of generality is acceptable, the action's unlawfulness must be evident based on existing law, even if no prior case has deemed it unlawful.

In the Tenth Circuit, sexual harassment claims are actionable under Section 1983 as violations of the Equal Protection Clause. However, there is no direct precedent regarding the liability of individual city council members for failing to act on a city employee's sexual discrimination claim. The court must assess whether it was sufficiently clear in a similar factual context that these members' inaction would infringe on the plaintiffs' rights.

The district court denied qualified immunity to the individual council members, citing a precedent that holds employers liable for workplace harassment if they are aware of and fail to address the hostile environment. This liability under Section 1983 requires actual knowledge and cannot be based on negligence but rather on a deliberate violation of constitutional rights.

The court concluded that the existing law was not sufficiently specific to hold individual city council members liable for an employee's alleged sexual harassment, especially since no authority outlines their required response to complaints. Therefore, it was unreasonable to expect that these members would understand their failure to act constituted a violation of the plaintiffs' equal protection rights, leading to a determination that the district court erred in denying their qualified immunity motion.

Officer Jamison contends that the district court incorrectly denied him qualified immunity, asserting that the law regarding a nonsupervisory co-worker's sexual harassment violating equal protection rights was not clearly established at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaints. He also argues that the plaintiffs did not adequately plead facts showing he acted under color of state law. To assert a 1983 claim for sexual harassment, the defendant typically must possess supervisory authority or state authority over the plaintiff. Relevant case law indicates that liability is often tied to the authority the alleged harasser holds over the victim, which is necessary to establish state action.

While the law on co-worker liability was not clearly established, it was understood that individuals with some authority over the victim could be liable. The plaintiffs’ generic allegations that all defendants acted under color of state law were deemed insufficient to meet the heightened pleading standard applicable when qualified immunity is raised. However, the court agreed that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to amend their complaints following Officer Jamison's assertion of qualified immunity.

Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denials of qualified immunity for Officer Jamison and remanded the cases, allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaints. The judgments in specified cases were reversed and vacated, with the order noted not to be binding precedent except under certain legal doctrines. The plaintiffs are also pursuing relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination.