State v. Brienza

Citation: 829 S.E.2d 894Docket: A19A0698; A19A0699

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; June 20, 2019; Georgia; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The State appeals the Fayette County State Court's decision to grant Tyler Brienza's motion to exclude parts of a video recorded during his encounter with police, which resulted in obstruction of justice charges. The State contends the trial court incorrectly suppressed the video, asserting that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Brienza at the time the recording was made. This appeal is the second for this case, with Brienza also challenging the trial court's failure to dismiss the State's appeal due to a previously incomplete transcript. 

Before addressing the merits of the State's appeal, the court must determine if it is properly before them. Brienza was charged with obstruction and disorderly conduct and filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony from state witnesses reliant on the allegedly prolonged detention without reasonable suspicion. The trial court granted this motion. After the State filed its initial appeal, Brienza sought to dismiss it due to the State's failure to timely request the transcript. However, by the time this was heard, the case had already been docketed in this Court. 

The State later requested a remand due to the incomplete record, which Brienza opposed, citing delays caused by the State's actions. The court denied Brienza's motion to dismiss, noting it lacked authority to dismiss appeals based solely on transcript filing delays. It did grant the State's remand request to complete the record. Upon return, Brienza again moved to dismiss the appeal, but the trial court denied this motion. Brienza cross-appeals, arguing that the appeal should have been dismissed due to the State's failure to timely file a complete transcript. The court agrees with Brienza's position.

OCGA 5-6-42 mandates that an appellant must file a transcript of evidence and proceedings within 30 days after filing a notice of appeal. If there is an unreasonable and inexcusable delay in filing, the trial court may dismiss the appeal after a hearing. A delay exceeding 30 days is generally considered prima facie unreasonable, though this presumption can be rebutted by evidence demonstrating the delay was justifiable. The trial court must evaluate several factors, including the length and reasons for the delay, whether the appellant caused it, and if it was inexcusable, exercising discretion in its decision. The trial court in this case reviewed these factors but confused the terms "unreasonable" and "inexcusable." Despite this confusion, the court found that the delay from April 21, 2017, to July 12, 2017—84 days—was not unreasonable due to its heavy caseload. However, the court's reasoning did not sufficiently support its conclusions regarding the delay's reasonableness or excuse. The absence of the transcript from the hearing on the motion to dismiss led to an assumption that it supported the court's findings. Ultimately, the court erred in not dismissing the State's appeal, as the findings did not substantiate its legal conclusions about the delay being reasonable or excusable.

The court determined that the State's delay in securing the appropriate transcript for its appeal was inexcusable. The trial court found that while the State requested part of the transcript shortly after filing its notice of appeal, it failed to request an extension, exhibited "slight negligence," and did not follow up on the transcript's progress. The initially requested portion was only filed on July 28, 2017, after the State requested the entire transcript on July 12, 2017. This delay was compounded by the fact that the State needed the complete transcript for its appeal, not just a portion. 

The trial court acknowledged that delays exceeding 30 days are prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable. Despite this, it concluded that there was "no prejudice" from the delay, leading to the denial of Brienza's motion to dismiss the appeal. However, the appellate review found that the trial court's factual findings did not support its legal conclusions, particularly regarding the State's failure to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness surrounding the 84-day delay. 

The initial docketing of the appeal was delayed significantly, with the State's notice of appeal filed on April 10, 2017, but not docketed until August 22, 2017. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment in Case No. A19A0699 and dismissed the appeal in Case No. A19A0698, as the findings indicated the State was responsible for the delays and failed to act diligently.

Gobeil and Hodges, JJ., concur regarding the discretion of trial and appellate judges to grant extensions for filing transcripts without motion or notice, as outlined in OCGA 5-6-39 and related statutes. The party responsible for filing must do so within 30 days of the notice of appeal, unless an extension is granted. The trial judge is obligated to provide necessary extensions for the court reporter to complete the transcript. A trial court may dismiss an appeal for unreasonable delays in filing the transcript or transmitting the record if such delays are deemed inexcusable and caused by a party's failure to pay costs or file an affidavit of indigence. However, an appellate court cannot dismiss an appeal due to a party's failure to file the transcript within the prescribed time. Brienza's cross-appeal lacked the transcript from a January 2018 hearing. Although the trial court's order did not explicitly mention "unreasonable" or "inexcusable," it sufficiently addressed the relevant factors for dismissal under OCGA 5-6-48 (c). This aligns with case law affirming dismissals even when precise statutory language is absent, emphasizing substance over form. The determination of whether a delay is unreasonable is distinct from whether it is inexcusable, focusing on the delay's length and impact rather than its cause.

In Cook v. McNamee, the court emphasized that in the absence of a hearing transcript for appellate review, the findings of fact made by the trial court are presumed correct. This principle was supported by various precedents, including Jenkins v. Edelhertz and Sadeghy v. State, which establish that without a transcript, the appellate court must assume the evidence presented at trial substantiated the trial court's conclusions. The appellee argued that the lack of a transcript rendered any alleged errors harmless because it must be presumed that the trial court’s actions were supported by evidence. However, the appellate court maintained that it requires clear findings of fact to ascertain that the trial court considered the appropriate factors in its decision-making process.

The court noted that without a transcript, it must assume the evidence supports the trial court's findings, which adequately justified its judgment regarding alimony. Even in the absence of detailed findings about how circumstances affected a child, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that changes in circumstances materially impacted the child's welfare. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion.

Moreover, the record showed that the defendant’s appeal was dismissed due to an unexplained delay exceeding five months in filing the trial transcript. The appellate court found no error in this dismissal, affirming that the responsibility to ensure timely ordering and preparation of the transcript lies with the appealing party, not the court reporter. It concluded that imposing a duty on court reporters to monitor transcript status would create an impractical burden. The State's notice of appeal clearly requested that all transcripts be included in the record, reinforcing the obligation of the appealing party to manage the transcript process effectively.

Notice of appeal under OCGA 5-6-51 must indicate whether a transcript of evidence and proceedings will be filed, guiding the trial court clerk on record transmission. A delay exceeding 30 days in payment of costs, without justification, precludes the trial court from denying a motion to dismiss the appeal. The judgment of the trial court was reversed based on past rulings that find a delay of 57 days without valid excuse as an abuse of discretion. The trial court's contradictory conclusions regarding the nature of the delay—initially described as "slightly unreasonable" but later deemed "not unreasonable"—highlight inconsistency in its reasoning. Delays that prejudice a party or affect the timeliness of an appeal are considered unreasonable. A presumption of inexcusable delay can be rebutted by evidence showing the delay was not caused by the appellant. The appellants are not responsible for delays attributed to court clerks or reporters, only for those they directly cause. Evidence of delays due to external factors, such as a backlog, may lead to a finding that the delay is excusable.

In Allan v. Jefferson Lakeside, L.P., the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that a trial court improperly dismissed a notice of appeal, as the appellant demonstrated that the delay was due to a reasonable, albeit incorrect, belief regarding the payment of transcript preparation costs. The appellant had timely ordered the transcript, made reasonable inquiries about its status, and paid the clerk's bill promptly after the request. Thus, the delay was deemed excusable. The excerpt references multiple cases illustrating varying delays in the appellate process, highlighting that delays causing the docketing of appeals to be postponed to later terms are problematic. For instance, delays of four-and-a-half months, eight months, ten months, and 150 days were identified as unreasonable and resulted in delayed docketing. The document also outlines the court's procedural timeline, specifying three terms per year with set start and end dates, emphasizing that cases must be decided within the following term after docketing. It concludes that delays that do not significantly impact the docketing process or impede timely appellate decisions are not considered unreasonable. Judicial notice is taken of relevant statutes and court organization.