Kennedy v. Hines

Citations: 823 S.E.2d 306; 305 Ga. 7Docket: S18A1391

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; January 22, 2019; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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Appellant Kathleen Kennedy, Warden, contests a habeas court's decision that overturned Deborah Hines's convictions and sentences for four counts of identity fraud. The habeas court ruled that Hines's plea was involuntary due to improper participation by the trial court in the plea process, violating due process. Upon review, it was determined that the habeas court incorrectly placed the burden on the Warden to prove the voluntariness of Hines's plea and misinterpreted the trial court's comments as coercive. The trial court had previously sentenced Hines to 45 years, with 20 to serve, after a jury conviction in 2009. In a 2013 hearing, Hines accepted a plea deal that reduced her sentence and included waivers of her rights to appeal and seek habeas relief. In her 2017 habeas petition, Hines claimed her plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily. The habeas court granted her relief in 2018, citing coercion in the plea process and improper trial court involvement, referencing relevant case law and court rules. Ultimately, the findings of the habeas court were reversed, emphasizing the correct burden of proof regarding plea voluntariness lies with the defendant, not the State.

Ms. Hines has been found guilty by a jury and is asked by the court if she wishes to enter her guilty plea, to which she affirms. The habeas court deemed the court's reminder of her previous guilt and the statement “I don’t want to play any games” as coercive. The Warden appealed the habeas court's decision, which correctly noted that a guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. However, it is Hines's responsibility to prove that her plea was involuntary. She argues that the trial judge improperly influenced her plea discussions, citing USCR 33.5 (A) and claiming a violation of her due process rights. The court clarified that violations of court rules are not grounds for habeas relief unless they involve substantial constitutional rights. Hines’s argument regarding USCR 33.5 (A) is therefore dismissed.

The focus remains on Hines's constitutional claim of intimidation and coercion. Case law indicates that significant judicial participation in plea negotiations can render a plea involuntary, particularly if a judge implies that a harsher sentence will follow if the defendant rejects a plea deal. A distinction is made between explicit threats of a harsher sentence and mere advisories regarding potential outcomes. Recent cases illustrate that repeated statements by a trial judge suggesting a preference for harsher sentences if a plea is rejected can invalidate the plea.

In McDaniel v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court found that a trial court's comments about its reluctance to impose a death sentence and its inclination towards a life sentence made the defendant's plea involuntary. Similarly, in McCranie v. State, the court ruled that the trial court's suggestions about preferring a longer sentence and allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea also rendered it involuntary. However, the court noted that constitutional violations do not occur when a judge articulates potential maximum sentences in conditional terms without coercive implications, as seen in Hayes, where informing a defendant about a maximum 20-year sentence did not equate to guaranteeing that sentence.

In Houston v. State, the court upheld a trial court's actions where the judge suggested a defendant remain present during co-defendants' pleas, leading the defendant to plead guilty voluntarily after being informed of her rights. In Hines's case, the trial court's factual statement regarding her prior jury conviction and its non-coercive inquiry about her guilty plea did not imply pressure or threaten a harsher sentence. The trial court's comments did not reveal a preference for Hines's decision and did not violate her due process rights.

The habeas court erred by incorrectly placing the burden on the Warden and by misinterpreting the trial court's exchange with Hines as excessively coercive. The evidence did not support a finding that Hines's plea was involuntary or that she did not understand the plea process. Consequently, the habeas court's order granting relief and overturning Hines's convictions and sentences was reversed.

All Justices concur that the habeas court correctly determined the plea transcript indicates Hines was adequately informed of her rights as per the Boykin standard. Hines argues that under Lejeune, the State must prove her plea was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, while she only needs to overcome the presumption of regularity. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with Lejeune's ruling that places the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate a lack of voluntariness. The State retains the burden to show a plea’s validity during direct appeals. The trial court informed Hines of the possible sentences, and there is no evidence of confusion undermining her plea's validity. Hines acknowledged her understanding of the plea’s consequences, affirming satisfaction with the terms. Testimony at the habeas hearing confirmed that the plea terms were communicated effectively. Additionally, Hines received a more favorable sentence than previously imposed, which supports the conclusion that her plea was not coerced or involuntary, as favorable outcomes are a consideration in assessing plea voluntariness according to Georgia appellate courts.