Aloha Islandair Inc. v. Linda Tseu, Executive Director, Hawaii Civil Rights Commission Hawaii Civil Rights Commission, State of Hawaii
Docket: 95-16656
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 14, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Aloha Islandair, Inc. filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission and its Executive Director, Linda Tseu, to prevent them from enforcing disability discrimination laws regarding monocular pilot applicant Bruce Pied. Islandair maintains a policy against hiring monocular pilots, which led Pied to file charges of discrimination and retaliation with the Commission in 1991 and 1994, respectively. Islandair argued that the investigation into Pied's claims was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978, which prevents states from enforcing laws related to airline services. The district court granted summary judgment for Islandair, following precedent that disability discrimination laws applied to airline pilots were preempted by the ADA. This judgment extended to Pied's retaliation claim, deemed a continuation of the earlier charge. Tseu is appealing this decision. The ADA's express preemption clause bars state laws affecting airline operations, with the term "services" interpreted broadly. However, connections too remote do not warrant preemption. Islandair acknowledges that anti-discrimination laws based on race or gender remain unaffected by the ADA but seeks an exception for laws against discrimination based on physical disabilities.
Islandair claims that physical-disability discrimination should be treated differently from other types of employment discrimination due to safety concerns related to flying. They argue that laws impacting aircraft safety are preempted as they pertain to air carrier services. However, the court agrees with appellant Tseu that Pied's disability discrimination claim does not present significant safety issues. Despite having monocular vision, Pied was fully medically approved by the FAA to fly and was a pilot for another airline, authorized to operate more complex aircraft. FAA regulations permit individuals who do not meet all medical criteria to apply for discretionary certification if they can demonstrate safe performance capabilities. The court rejects Islandair's stance on preemption, asserting that the FAA's stringent requirements ensure pilot qualification and that the link between disability discrimination claims and air carrier services is too weak for preemption. Pied's claim is rooted in the legality of not hiring him based on monocular vision if it does not impair his flying ability. The court finds no congressional intent to exempt FAA-certified pilots from state employment discrimination protections, referencing the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Airline Deregulation Act. Islandair’s citation of Robinson v. American Airlines is deemed inappropriate, as that case did not grant airlines deference in establishing pilot qualifications, which is a matter of policy outside judicial authority.
The D.C. Circuit in Robinson prioritized the Department of Labor's interpretation of the ADA over airlines' discretion in hiring practices, allowing airlines to implement more stringent hiring criteria than FAA standards. The case did not address whether the ADA preempted state laws against discrimination based on perceived physical disabilities. Appellant Tseu contends that Robinson does not support unrestricted discretion in hiring and does not permit irrational disability discrimination, arguing that a discriminatory hiring practice cannot be justified as a qualification standard, even if safety is claimed as the rationale. Tseu asserts that his retaliation claim against Pied is not preempted by the ADA since it pertains to vindictive hiring rather than airline services. He maintains that the retaliation claim is distinct from the discrimination claim and that preemption of the latter does not extend to the former. Islandair counters that the retaliation claims are dependent on the merits of the discrimination charge and therefore preempted since the discrimination claim is preempted. However, the relevant Hawaii statute prohibits retaliation regardless of the discrimination claim's merit, meaning Islandair could be liable for retaliation if it refused to hire Pied due to his previous discrimination complaint, irrespective of his monocular vision. Even if a disability discrimination claim is preempted under the ADA, a retaliation claim would still stand as it is unrelated to the quality or safety of airline services. Previous case law supports the notion that retaliation claims do not have a direct connection to airline services, further affirming the distinction between discrimination and retaliation claims. The summary judgment for Islandair is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings, while the dismissal against the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission on Eleventh Amendment grounds remains unchallenged by Islandair.
Appellant Tseu contests Islandair's assertion that the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempts state laws related to safety, which are tied to services provided by air carriers. The court recognizes a division of authority on this matter, indicating differing interpretations within various jurisdictions. Specifically, there is significant debate on whether the term 'services' in section 1305(a)(1) of the ADA limits state or local oversight of aircraft safety. The Hawaii Revised Statutes section 378-3(2) clarifies that establishing bona fide occupational qualifications essential for a business's operations is permissible. Islandair cites Belgard v. United Airlines, which concluded that the ADA preempted Colorado's anti-discrimination laws concerning pilot applicants with prior eye surgery. Nonetheless, the court expresses its disagreement with Belgard’s analysis and opts not to follow its precedent.
