Andrew Bridgman, a Minor, by and Through Lynne C. Bridgman, His Mother and Guardian v. New Trier High School District No. 203 and Mary Dailey

Citations: 128 F.3d 1146; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30434; 1997 WL 695378Docket: 97-1412

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; November 4, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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Andrew Bridgman, a minor and freshman at New Trier Township High School, was required to attend a smoking cessation program after being caught smoking on school property. During the program, Mary Dailey, the program supervisor, observed Bridgman acting distractively and noted his bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, leading her to suspect drug use. After Bridgman denied using drugs, Dailey allowed him to call his mother on speakerphone. 

Subsequently, Nurse Joanne Swanson conducted a medical assessment, finding elevated blood pressure and pulse but did not conclude that Bridgman was under the influence of drugs. Dailey then required Bridgman to remove his outer clothing and empty his pockets for a search, to which he complied. Bridgman's mother arrived and, after a private discussion, was asked for permission to test her son's eye reactivity to light. She declined, opting instead to take him to a pediatrician for a definitive drug test, which later confirmed he had not used marijuana.

Bridgman, represented by his mother, initiated a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New Trier High School and Mary Dailey, claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment rights due to unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as a state law claim for false light invasion of privacy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, which Bridgman appealed. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. 

The standard for summary judgment requires that there be no genuine issue of material fact, allowing the moving party to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, who must demonstrate that a genuine issue remains for trial, rather than relying on mere allegations. 

Regarding Dailey's search of Bridgman, the Fourth Amendment protects students from unreasonable searches by school officials. However, school officials are not required to show probable cause; instead, a search must be justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it. A search is warranted if there is reasonable suspicion that a regulation or law has been violated, and the measures taken must not be excessively intrusive given the student's age, sex, and the nature of the infraction.

Bridgman argued against the appropriateness of summary judgment by presenting expert testimony that bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils are unreliable indicators of marijuana use. The expert also contended that blood pressure and pulse measurements, taken by Dailey and Swanson during the medical assessment, do not reliably indicate marijuana use. In contrast, Dailey and New Trier cited documents from organizations like the American Medical Association that associate these symptoms with marijuana use. 

The district court emphasized that the key issue was not the medical community's consensus on the symptoms but whether Dailey's actions—in ordering the assessment and searching Bridgman—were reasonable. Dailey's qualifications as a certified drug addiction counselor and her supporting publications suggested that her suspicions were justified. 

However, Bridgman contested Dailey's claims regarding his behavior and the symptoms she observed. Nurse Swanson and Bridgman's mother both testified that they did not notice any unusual behavior or bloodshot eyes, although they did observe dilated pupils. Dailey's assertion about Bridgman's handwriting being erratic lacked supporting evidence. 

In reviewing the summary judgment, it was determined that Bridgman's uncorroborated testimony did not create a genuine issue of material fact. Dailey's assessment of Bridgman’s behavior was deemed within her judgment as the program leader. The observations made by Swanson and Bridgman's mother were not sufficient to dispute Dailey's claims since they occurred after Dailey's initial suspicion. Consequently, the search was considered justified and aligned with its intended purpose.

The Court affirms the district court's conclusion that the search conducted on Bridgman was not excessively intrusive relative to its purpose. Citing *Cornfield*, the Court emphasizes that the reasonableness of searches under the Fourth Amendment increases with their intrusiveness. The search of Bridgman was deemed less intrusive than the strip search in *Cornfield*, as he was not physically touched during the search of his clothing, which he wore throughout, and any contact by Nurse Swanson was minimal and limited to medical assessments. Therefore, the search did not violate constitutional standards.

Bridgman also argues that New Trier's practical search policies violate the Constitution, claiming that written reports of all searches should be mandatory to ensure accountability. However, the Court notes that the disparity between New Trier's written policy and its actual practice did not result in a constitutional violation. Bridgman failed to identify any legal precedent supporting his assertion that comprehensive written records are constitutionally required.

Additionally, the district court's summary judgment on Bridgman's state law claim for false light invasion of privacy is upheld. The Court finds that he did not provide sufficient facts to demonstrate the necessary elements of publicity or actual malice for this claim. Since Bridgman did not address this state law issue on appeal, it is considered waived. Thus, the summary judgment is affirmed in its entirety.