Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; June 5, 2007; North Carolina; State Appellate Court
Respondent mother appeals the district court's order terminating her parental rights regarding her minor child, Abby. The court upheld that the trial court's findings justified the termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111 (a)(6), as the respondent did not contest the decision that termination was in Abby's best interests. The involvement of the Pitt County Department of Social Services (DSS) began in October 2002 after Abby was burned while in respondent's care; respondent delayed medical attention until directed by DSS. Following this, she entered a substance abuse facility but left before completing the program. Subsequently, she faced multiple relapses and legal issues, including drug possession charges leading to incarceration in March 2003, which resulted in DSS obtaining custody of Abby. Throughout 2003, respondent struggled with substance abuse, was declared civilly incompetent in September, and Abby was adjudicated a dependent juvenile in November. The respondent's only contact with Abby in 2004 was during a birthday visit, after which she lost contact with DSS. Despite temporary periods of sobriety and attempts at treatment in 2004 and 2005, she continued to relapse and failed to maintain stable contact with DSS. By September 2005, the trial court ceased further reunification efforts, and a petition to terminate parental rights was filed in October 2005 while the respondent was incarcerated.
On 14 December 2005, DSS discovered that the respondent had left a detox program against staff advice but returned by 29 December 2005, where staff indicated she required intensive treatment. On 30 December 2005, she entered the Walter B. Jones Alcohol and Drug Treatment Center for 30 days but left against medical advice on 12 January 2006, only to be readmitted later. By 31 January 2006, the respondent informed DSS of her intention to live in a recovery home and moved into a halfway house in April 2006, where she secured employment at Burger King. On 26 April 2006, her competency was restored, and the trial court noted her positive strides, including sobriety and attending Narcotics Anonymous.
Despite these improvements, the court initiated termination of parental rights proceedings on 8 June and 6 July 2006, culminating in an order on 23 August 2006. The court highlighted that past relapses could not be disregarded and concluded that the respondent's recent progress was insufficient to warrant the return of her child, Abby. The court found grounds for termination based on: 1) neglect of Abby, 2) willful failure to correct the conditions causing Abby’s removal after over 12 months, 3) failure to contribute to Abby's care costs in the preceding six months, 4) incapacity to provide adequate care for Abby, and 5) willful abandonment for at least six months before the petition.
The court determined that termination was in Abby's best interests. The respondent appealed, and the appellate process involves an adjudicatory phase to confirm grounds for termination and a dispositional phase to assess the child's best interests. The review of the trial court's findings focuses on their evidentiary support and legal conclusions. The respondent's challenges to the trial court's findings were not preserved for appeal and are thus deemed abandoned, leading to a presumption of evidentiary support for the findings.
The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact support the conclusion that grounds existed to terminate the respondent's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(6). The court did not consider the respondent's arguments regarding other grounds for termination. The respondent claimed that the Department of Social Services (DSS) failed to notify her in its petition that it sought to terminate her rights under the specific statutory provision. However, the court referenced In re Humphrey, stating that a petition's adequacy is based on whether it provides sufficient facts to warrant a determination of grounds for termination, regardless of whether it cites the exact statute.
Section 7B-1111(a)(6) allows for termination if a parent is incapable of providing proper care, resulting in the juvenile being deemed dependent, with a reasonable probability of continued incapacity. The petition alleged the mother's incapability due to substance abuse, mental retardation, and mental illness, which aligns with the statutory language and provided adequate notice to the respondent regarding the grounds for termination.
The respondent argued that her parental rights should not be terminated because she had regained legal competency and maintained sobriety. However, the law does not require a parent to be adjudicated civilly incompetent to terminate parental rights. The respondent's regaining of competency in April 2006 only indicated she could manage her own affairs, not that she was incapable of parenting.
Restoration of the respondent's competency does not equate to her ability to adequately care for her child, as established in In re T.W. While she may be competent in assisting counsel and maintaining employment, her mental illness continues to impact her parenting capacity. The trial court determined that despite the respondent's seven months of sobriety starting January 2006, grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111 (a)(6) were still valid. The respondent acknowledged her prior incapacity to care for her daughter before December 31, 2005, arguing that her recent behavior demonstrated newfound parenting capability. However, the trial court weighed her three years of substance abuse relapses against the recent sobriety, concluding that the history of relapses indicated a likely continuation of her incapacity. The court referenced precedents affirming that historical patterns of behavior, including mental health evaluations, are relevant in assessing a parent's ability to provide a safe environment for a child. The trial court upheld its decision to terminate parental rights, emphasizing that the respondent did not contest the conclusion that this action was in the best interests of the child, referred to as "Abby" for privacy. The court also noted that the biological father's rights were terminated based on other grounds, but he is not involved in this appeal. The only contested findings in the respondent's brief pertained to the statutory language for termination grounds. The trial court's order is affirmed. Judges STEELMAN and LEVINSON concur.
