Plaintiffs Latasha Holloway and Georgia Allen initiated a lawsuit against the City of Virginia Beach and various local officials, asserting that the city's exclusive use of at-large voting for City Council elections diluted minority voters' votes, contravening Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Prior to the district court's decision on this issue, the Virginia General Assembly enacted legislation abolishing at-large voting for most City Council positions. Despite this development, the district court ruled that the case remained relevant, finding that the previous all-at-large electoral system violated Section 2 and granting the plaintiffs an injunction to remedy this violation moving forward. The appellate court subsequently vacated and remanded the district court's decision, with an opinion authored by Judge Harris, joined by Judge Thacker, while Chief Judge Gregory dissented.
The district court's decision regarding the electoral system in Virginia Beach was found to be erroneous, as it addressed a system that is no longer in effect, rendering the case moot. Consequently, the court's decisions are vacated. However, the plaintiffs may still have claims regarding the new electoral method, and the district court is instructed to consider allowing them to amend their complaint or further develop the record for new challenges.
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, any election-related practice that denies or abridges voting rights based on race is prohibited. The Supreme Court's Thornburg v. Gingles decision outlines a framework for evaluating at-large voting systems under Section 2, emphasizing that such systems are not inherently violative but may disenfranchise racial minorities. To establish a violation, plaintiffs must demonstrate three preconditions: (1) the minority group is large and compact enough to form a majority in a single-member district, (2) the group is politically cohesive, and (3) the white majority votes as a bloc, typically defeating the minority's preferred candidates. If these conditions are satisfied, plaintiffs must then show that the at-large system results in unequal electoral access, assessed through various factors including historical discrimination and racially polarized voting.
In Virginia Beach, the City Council is composed of a mayor and ten councilmembers, all of whom were elected at-large at the case's inception, making Virginia Beach distinct among Virginia's largest cities, which generally elect councilmembers from individual districts. Notably, seven councilmembers, despite being elected at-large, were required to reside in designated districts, meaning they campaigned citywide for specific seats aligned with their residency.
Designated seat plans, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Gingles, can dilute minority votes in at-large elections, hindering their ability to support preferred candidates. In this case, Latasha Holloway and Georgia Allen, both Black voters, challenged Virginia Beach's at-large election system, asserting it unlawfully diluted minority voting strength. They sought a declaration that the system violated Section 2, an injunction against future at-large elections, and a requirement for a compliant electoral system. Following the denial of the City’s summary judgment motion, the case proceeded to a bench trial.
Before the district court's decision, Virginia's General Assembly enacted HB 2198, altering the election system by mandating that certain council candidates be elected by district rather than at-large, which the City claimed rendered the plaintiffs’ case moot. However, the district court rejected this argument, noting that the new law did not fully address the plaintiffs’ claims or provide complete relief. The court emphasized that the City could still maintain an at-large system by amending its charter.
In evaluating the merits, the district court found that the plaintiffs met the Gingles preconditions and concluded that the at-large system diluted minority votes. Consequently, it declared the at-large method illegal, enjoined its future use, and granted the plaintiffs’ request for fees and costs, while reserving a decision on further remedial orders.
After receiving proposed remedial plans from plaintiffs, the City, and a special master, the court adopted the special master’s plan, which established ten single-member districts, including three with majority minority populations. The City appealed the district court’s ruling. Both parties now assert that the case is moot, albeit for different reasons. The City argues that the enactment of HB 2198 prior to the district court's decision rendered the plaintiffs' case moot regarding Virginia Beach’s all-at-large councilmember election system. Conversely, plaintiffs believe that while their case survived HB 2198, the City’s appeal was mooted due to subsequent developments, including the Virginia Voting Rights Act and the preclearance of the district court's remedial plan.
The court agrees with the City, concluding that the plaintiffs' case became moot with HB 2198's passage, which abolished the all-at-large system and stripped the district court of jurisdiction to rule on it. Although the plaintiffs raise concerns that the new electoral system may violate Section 2, they must first present this claim in the trial court. The court vacates and remands for the district court to determine if the plaintiffs can pursue this challenge.
Regarding the City’s appeal, the court finds it was not mooted by the preclearance of the remedial plan under the Virginia Voting Rights Act, as the existence of a federal injunction on city election procedures maintains the City’s stake in the appeal. Vacating the injunction would allow the City to seek preclearance for an alternative plan. The court notes that regardless of when the case became moot, the customary practice is to vacate the lower court's judgment when a case becomes moot on appeal through no fault of the parties.
Jurisdiction under Article III is confined to actual cases and controversies, applicable at all litigation stages. A lawsuit must remain viable throughout; even if a controversy exists at the start, subsequent events may moot the claim. The determination of mootness is subject to de novo review. A dispute is deemed moot when the issues are no longer "live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, typically occurring when statutory changes eliminate the challenged practice. However, minor adjustments to a statute that do not address the core of a plaintiff's claims do not render a case moot. A claim becomes moot when a challenged law is replaced by a significantly revised statutory framework. Recent Supreme Court rulings affirm that legislative amendments can moot ongoing challenges, as seen in a case involving New York's firearm licensing statute that was altered after litigation commenced. The amendments were substantial enough to fulfill the plaintiffs' original requests, thus rendering their challenge moot. Under these principles, HB 2198 has mooted the current case by replacing the contested electoral system with a significantly different one. The plaintiffs' challenge did not address at-large voting per se, but rather the specific at-large system in Virginia Beach, which they argued diluted minority voting strength. Their allegations focused on the unique nature of Virginia Beach's electoral system, which combines at-large voting with residency requirements, leading to discriminatory effects against minority voters.
The district court identified a Section 2 violation in Virginia Beach's electoral system, highlighting its exclusive use of at-large voting as distinctive among Virginia's major cities, which typically utilize single-member districts or mixed systems. The court noted that the combination of at-large voting with designated residency seats worsened the discriminatory impact on minority voters. Virginia Beach's electoral structure, including its staggered terms and lack of a reasonable justification for this unique arrangement, was seen as problematic.
The enactment of HB 2198 significantly reformed the electoral system, mandating that candidates for seven residency seats be elected from individual districts rather than at-large, thereby reducing the number of at-large seats to three, which do not have residency requirements. This change directly addresses the plaintiffs' concerns by mitigating the previously burdensome conditions for minority candidates and aligning Virginia Beach's system more closely with those of comparable cities.
The legal challenge is rendered moot since the key issues in the plaintiffs' complaint have been resolved by HB 2198, which prohibits the City from continuing its previous at-large election method. The court cannot provide a ruling on the merits of a case with no practical effect, as the plaintiffs have achieved their aims through the new law, leaving only the potential for an advisory opinion on an outdated electoral system, which falls outside federal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs seek court-ordered relief against the City’s election system, specifically an injunction and implementation of a new system compliant with Section 2. However, they must first demonstrate that the City's conduct violates Section 2, as remedies must address specific violations rather than abstract claims. The district court did not find that the proposed new system, compliant with HB 2198, violates Section 2, nor did the plaintiffs allege that the use of at-large voting in City Council elections contravenes this section. The court assessed the previous electoral system's effects under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, which concluded with the enactment of HB 2198, effectively ending the plaintiffs' case against the old system. Any future challenges to the new system must be viewed as separate cases, requiring distinct analyses. The district court's view that the City’s cessation of the challenged conduct does not moot the plaintiffs' claims is misinterpreted; the change resulted from legislative action, not the City's voluntary cessation of practices. Consequently, the City did not engage in any voluntary actions that would invoke the voluntary cessation doctrine.
The district court overestimated the authority of Virginia Beach to reinstate at-large elections for all City Council seats due to the City Charter's residency requirements. Only the General Assembly has the power to amend this charter, meaning the City cannot circumvent HB 2198 to return to an entirely at-large election system. Consequently, the plaintiffs' challenge is deemed moot, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to address it, leading to the vacating of the district court's judgment on both liability and remedy. However, rather than instructing immediate dismissal, the appellate court allows for the possibility of the plaintiffs raising new challenges under the electoral system enacted post-HB 2198. The remand permits the plaintiffs to amend their pleadings or develop the record for any viable claims against the City’s new electoral system. The case is vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
Chief Judge Gregory dissents, arguing that the case remains justiciable despite the enactment of HB 2198, which restricts at-large voting for seven out of ten City Council seats. He contends that the invalidation of part of the City's electoral system does not render the plaintiffs' challenge moot. The plaintiffs' primary grievance pertains to the at-large voting system in Virginia Beach, and their complaint seeks redress for all ten at-large districts, indicating that HB 2198 does not provide complete relief since it does not address the three remaining at-large seats or define the boundaries of the newly established single-member districts.
Gregory further critiques the majority's conclusion that the case is moot, asserting that they misinterpret the Supreme Court's standard for mootness from New York State Rifle, Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, which emphasizes that a case only becomes moot if the court cannot provide any effective relief. He underscores that the plaintiffs still possess standing and supports the district court's findings on the merits. Additionally, he clarifies that HB 2198 does not eliminate the City's electoral system but only renders parts of it illegal under Virginia law. He emphasizes that jurisdiction should not be declined improperly, and that as long as there is a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation, the case should not be considered moot. Finally, he notes that a statutory change must substantially alter a law to moot a challenge, rather than merely differing in some respects.
The district court affirmed that a challenge to a statute remains valid even if an amended statute addresses some of the previous shortcomings. The key inquiry is whether the new ordinance resolves the principal issues raised by the plaintiff. A case becomes moot only when a new statute completely addresses the concerns raised against the prior statute. The Supreme Court has clarified that a change to statutory provisions can moot a lawsuit if it delivers the exact relief sought by the plaintiffs. However, if the core issues of the complaint persist, a statutory amendment does not render the case moot.
In this context, the City of Virginia Beach has employed at-large elections for its City Council for over fifty years. Although the minority voting age population has increased to 38.5%, the election of minority candidates has been minimal. Plaintiffs, two Black registered voters (one of whom previously ran for a council seat), filed suit against Virginia Beach, claiming that the at-large electoral system violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting the voting power of minority voters, thereby denying them equal participation in the electoral process. They seek a declaratory judgment that the at-large system unlawfully diminishes minority voting strength and an injunction against its further use.
An order was issued requiring future elections for the Virginia Beach City Council to comply with the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. The district court found that Virginia Beach's at-large election method violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and prohibited its further use. Following this decision, a remedial plan was ordered, which included establishing ten single-member districts. This was in response to the plaintiffs' request for relief, which sought to declare the at-large system unlawful, enjoin its use, and implement a compliant election system. In December 2021, the Virginia State Assembly enacted HB 2198, mandating that members elected from districts must be chosen by voters within those districts, thereby prohibiting at-large voting for seven seats with residency requirements. However, this law did not affect the three at-large seats without residency requirements. The majority opinion referenced the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle, concluding that the plaintiffs' case became moot following the passage of HB 2198, as the new law altered the election framework in question.
Petitioners argued their legal suit was not moot due to claims in their amended complaint that the Second Amendment guarantees "unrestricted access to gun ranges and shooting events." They contended that even with new legislative changes, their rights might still be infringed as they could face restrictions while traveling to gun ranges for necessary stops like food or fuel. The court previously ruled that the case was moot because petitioners could now transport firearms to shooting ranges outside the city, fulfilling their original request. The court did not acknowledge the term "unrestricted access" as a basis for ongoing claims. It characterized concerns about routine travel stops as residual claims not previously asserted and remanded the case for further development of these new claims.
In contrast to the New York State Rifle case, where plaintiffs received the exact relief they sought, petitioners here did not obtain full relief. They challenged the City’s at-large voting system for City Council seats under the Gingles framework, advocating for a plan with single-member districts that would ensure minority representation. While recent legislation (HB 2198) altered the voting system for some seats, it did not eliminate at-large voting for three seats or modify existing district boundaries. The author argues that the majority's application of New York State Rifle expands its precedent too broadly, as HB 2198 does not overhaul the City’s electoral system but only renders parts of it illegal.
The dissent in New York State Rifle raises concerns about the implications of statutory changes on legal challenges. It presents hypotheticals where a government entity enacts ordinances that could potentially moot lawsuits by altering regulations governing editorial approvals and abortion certification. The dissent emphasizes the need to assess whether the new laws are sufficiently similar to the repealed ones to determine if the original grievances persist. For instance, if a city reduces the number of required approvals for editorials, or if a state decreases the number of physicians required for abortion certification, the question arises whether the original lawsuits would remain relevant or require new filings. The dissenters argue that amended legislation may reduce but not eliminate the alleged injuries, countering the majority's view that such changes render suits moot. It’s noted that the plaintiffs in a related case sought a specific remedy—ending at-large voting in Virginia Beach—while the new law (HB 2198) did not provide that exact relief, paralleling the arguments made in the New York State Rifle dissent. Ultimately, the dissent underscores the complexity of determining mootness based on legislative amendments and the enduring nature of the original claims.
Plaintiffs argue that Virginia Beach's at-large electoral system for ten nonmayoral City Council seats has negatively impacted Minority Voters by reducing their opportunities to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice. They assert that the at-large election method interacts with historical and social conditions in the City, leading to systemic disadvantages for these voters. The plaintiffs challenge the election of all ten seats under this at-large system, while the majority contends that the challenge should be confined to the specific at-large voting system employed, which includes residency districts for seven seats. The plaintiffs' claims reference the Voting Rights Act and cite the Gingles case, emphasizing that the consistent defeat of candidates preferred by minority voters would not occur if single-member districts were used. They contend that the minority population in Virginia Beach is substantial enough to create a majority in at least two single-member districts, and their amended complaint requests an injunction against further use of at-large elections. The legal framework surrounding these claims suggests that multi-member or at-large districting poses greater risks to minority voting participation compared to single-member districts, aligning with the Gingles precedent that addresses vote dilution.
The Gingles Court reconciled Congress's adoption of a results test for vote dilution claims under Section 2 with specific limitations on such claims, stating that at-large elections are not inherently violations. The Court clarified that the combination of a dilutive electoral mechanism and a lack of proportional representation does not, by itself, constitute a violation. It emphasized that Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, including but not limited to vote dilution, which can occur through multimember districts and at-large voting schemes that minimize the voting strength of racial minorities.
The Court noted that a key concern is the dilution of minority voting power in districts where a racially bloc-voting white majority can defeat the candidates preferred by minority groups. Vote dilution has emerged as a prevalent form of voting rights violation following the elimination of more overt discriminatory practices. In Mobile v. Bolden, the Supreme Court required a showing of purposeful discrimination to support a Section 2 claim, but Congress's 1982 amendment replaced this "intent" standard with a "results" test.
The Gingles decision established three necessary conditions for proving that multimember districts impair minority voters' ability to elect their representatives: (1) the minority group must be large and geographically compact enough to form a majority in a single-member district, (2) it must be politically cohesive, and (3) the white majority must vote in a bloc sufficient to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Gingles codified these proof requirements and provided a framework for evaluating vote dilution claims.
The Gingles Court established that if the initial precondition for minority voters to elect representatives is not met, a multi-member electoral structure cannot be held accountable for the failure of minority voters to elect their candidates. Minority voters must demonstrate the ability to elect representatives without the contested electoral system. The “Dole Compromise” proviso added to Section 2(b) clarifies that no right exists for protected class members to be elected in numbers proportional to their population. The Senate Report from the 1982 amendments emphasized that at-large elections are not inherently unlawful; a violation occurs only when such systems, alongside other factors, effectively deny minority group participation.
Regarding the second and third preconditions, the Court indicated that if a minority group lacks political cohesion, it cannot claim that a multi-member structure undermines its interests. Furthermore, if the minority is evenly distributed within a district or too small compared to the majority to form a single-member majority, they cannot argue they would elect representatives without the multi-member structure. The at-large election system alone does not violate Section 2 unless a minority group can demonstrate the potential to elect representatives under a single-member district plan. The single-member district serves as the benchmark for assessing minority electoral potential, as it is the smallest unit for electing representatives. The analysis of vote dilution claims is closely tied to the means of remedy through redistricting, requiring proof of how districting impairs the ability of a minority group to elect its representatives. Demonstrating geographic compactness and minority political cohesion is essential to prove the potential for minority representation in single-member districts, while showing minority cohesion and majority bloc voting is necessary to establish that districting dilutes the minority vote.
Establishing a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires satisfying the Gingles preconditions; without them, no injury or remedy exists. In this case, plaintiffs compared Virginia Beach's at-large electoral system to a proposed plan with ten single-member districts, where minority voting age citizens would constitute a majority in two districts. The challenge focuses on at-large voting for all ten non-mayoral City Council districts. Federal courts emphasize deference to legislative choices regarding the size of legislative bodies, meaning actionable vote dilution must be assessed against the current number of government positions rather than a hypothetical model. This ensures no artificial voting rights violation is created by simply increasing the number of seats. The plaintiffs' expert analysis indicated that the existing residency districts do not have a majority minority citizen voting age population. The majority opinion deemed the case moot, referencing the need for a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for Section 2 violations. A mere change in electoral system aspects does not automatically moot a Voting Rights Act challenge, as plaintiffs must still prove that the electoral structure minimizes or negates their ability to elect preferred candidates. While establishing Gingles prerequisites suggests a likelihood of success under totality-of-the-circumstances, the burden remains on the plaintiffs to demonstrate the specific impact of the electoral system in question.
A plaintiff proving the three Gingles factors typically indicates a Section 2 violation, but the Senate Report from the 1982 amendments outlines nine relevant factors for a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, which are not exhaustive or mandatory. The court emphasized that no specific number of factors must be established to prove a violation. Changes that appear to lessen harm, such as the introduction of staggered terms in elections, do not automatically moot a case. The district court noted that staggered terms contributed to the dilution of minority voting strength by minimizing the impact of single-shot voting. The use of residency districts combined with at-large voting practices further hindered minority candidates by preventing concentrated voting support and enhancing the dilutive effects of the electoral system. The court also highlighted the challenges faced by minority candidates due to the large scale of election districts, noting that candidates must campaign over extensive areas (e.g., 249 square miles in Virginia Beach), which places additional burdens on those with fewer resources. The court's analysis included multiple factors that supported the conclusion that the third Gingles factor was met, emphasizing the structural disadvantages faced by minority communities in at-large election systems.
The court highlighted the detrimental impact of Virginia Beach's large size on minority candidates, particularly due to the financial demands of television advertising and direct mail, which are pivotal in Council elections. As Virginia Beach has a population of 450,000, the largest in Virginia, candidates face significant competition. The court noted that the proposed district plans would reduce electoral competition area by 90%, resulting in mean district sizes of 24.9 square miles. Evaluating the ninth factor regarding the rationale behind voting qualifications, the court found that Virginia Beach's electoral system—characterized by at-large elections, designated seats, and staggered terms—lacked justification and was unique among Virginia's cities with populations over 50,000. The court emphasized that the City failed to provide credible reasons for maintaining its at-large system. Furthermore, it clarified that not all Senate factors must favor a Section 2 violation, and the analysis should not be a mechanical point-counting exercise. In this case, the district court appropriately assessed all nine Senate factors, concluding that each supported a Section 2 violation claim. The court also noted that longstanding advocacy from the minority community for a change in the electoral system underscored the egregious nature of the practice, which deviated from standard procedures elsewhere in the jurisdiction, ultimately denying minorities fair access to the electoral process.
The district court's analysis regarding Section 2 violations was centered on the impact of at-large voting on minority voters' ability to participate in the political process in Virginia Beach. It concluded that at-large voting, in conjunction with the area's social and historical context, denied minority voters an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. The court noted that the prior electoral scheme, which included at-large districts, diluted minority voting strength and violated the Voting Rights Act.
In evaluating whether House Bill 2198 offers a sufficient remedy to resolve the lawsuit, the court referenced the Senate Report from the 1982 amendments, emphasizing the need for remedies that fully address past voting dilution and ensure equal opportunities for minority citizens. Although the report did not specify a standard for measuring the completeness of the remedy, it reiterated the principle that if a violation is established, the districting system should be restructured to mitigate vote dilution as much as possible. Past case law, including McGhee, illustrated the application of these principles, where a remedial plan was implemented to rectify violations of Section 2.
The court's findings suggest that the plaintiffs' challenge against the City of Virginia Beach's at-large voting system remains relevant and active, as the proposed legislative changes do not adequately address the core issues identified in the case.
The proposed "single member district electoral plan" by the County allows Black voters, who constitute over 40% of the voting age population, to elect only one commissioner. The court referenced the Gingles precedent, noting that remedies for dilution violations are limited by district characteristics such as size and cohesion. Plaintiffs acknowledged that no alternative multi-district plans could provide Black voters with better electoral opportunities. Consequently, the County's proposed plan was deemed a "complete" remedy, representing the maximum feasible redistricting solution for addressing vote dilution.
The Supreme Court supports single-member districts as the preferred remedy in voting rights cases, citing their effectiveness in enhancing minority voter participation compared to multimember or at-large systems. The court criticized the lower district court's decision to modify electoral laws not directly challenged by the plaintiffs. It established that the appropriate remedy for vote dilution caused by at-large schemes is a single-member district plan, drawn to ensure equal electoral opportunities for affected minority groups.
The district court ultimately adopted the Special Master Plan, consisting of ten single-member districts designed to provide three "opportunity-to-elect" seats for minority voters. The defendants' proposed plans, a 7-3 and a 10-district scheme, were rejected for failing to adequately remedy the Section 2 violation. The 7-3 plan, despite removing at-large voting for non-mayoral City Council seats, was insufficient as it included super wards that did not fully address the dilution issue. The Special Master emphasized that retaining any at-large features would not effectively rectify the voting dilution.
The Special Master misinterpreted the 7-3 plan, mistakenly believing it retained an at-large feature for three super ward seats, which is central to the claim of a Section 2 Voting Rights Act violation. The Court found that the previous electoral map, which included three at-large districts, diluted minority voting in Virginia Beach. The plaintiffs have not received adequate relief, as legislation preventing at-large voting for only some City Council seats does not address the full scope of their claims. The majority referenced a previous case, NAACP v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education, where a similar challenge was deemed moot due to a state law change that restructured the electoral system, which the plaintiffs had proposed during negotiations. In that case, the plaintiffs did not argue they lacked complete relief, and the court affirmed the dismissal of their suit, finding they were not prevailing parties since the state legislature enacted the changes. The current situation differs because the plaintiffs have not shown that the legislation (HB 2198) provides the complete remedy sought or addresses the violations acknowledged by the district court. Consequently, the case should not be considered moot. Furthermore, the City contends that the plaintiffs lack standing because they are improperly asserting the rights of Hispanic and Asian voters through a coalition claim.
A litigant generally cannot assert the legal rights of third parties to seek relief. However, the City misinterprets the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the nature of the plaintiffs' claims by suggesting that plaintiffs must include representatives from all minority groups in a coalition claim to have standing. The VRA allows "aggrieved persons" to bring lawsuits, which does not necessitate a class action, and individual representation is not prohibited. The plaintiffs, as Black voters, claim their votes are diluted by at-large voting, asserting their own rights rather than those of other ethnic groups. The coalition of Black, Hispanic, and Asian voters is relevant only as part of the evidentiary framework under the Gingles test rather than as a basis for standing. The district court confirmed the plaintiffs' standing and found they met the Gingles preconditions for a Section 2 claim, establishing that the Minority Community has less opportunity to participate politically. This case differs from Nordgren v. Hafter, where a non-Black individual could not assert standing on behalf of Black applicants.
A trial court's finding of vote dilution can be set aside only if deemed clearly erroneous. On appeal, the City contends that the district court incorrectly found the three Gingles preconditions were met. The district court determined that the plaintiffs satisfied the first Gingles precondition by demonstrating that the Minority Community was sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. This conclusion was based on evidence from plaintiffs’ expert, Anthony Fairfax, who presented ten illustrative plans showing majority-minority districts. The court deemed Fairfax a credible expert and noted he adhered to five common redistricting criteria: equal population, contiguity, compactness, minimizing political subdivision splits, and preserving communities of interest.
The City argues the district court erred by allowing the plaintiffs to use a coalition of Black, Hispanic, and Asian voters to support their claim, a question that has not been definitively resolved by the courts. While the district court allowed this coalition claim, it noted that such claims align with the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The legality of coalition claims is evaluated de novo. Section 2(a) of the VRA prohibits voting practices that deny or abridge the right to vote based on race, color, or language-minority status. Coalition claims differ from cross-over claims, which have been rejected by the courts, as cross-over claims involve minority citizens forming coalitions with white voters.
To establish a violation of Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), Section 2(b) specifies that the provision applies to members of a protected class, emphasizing that not all members must share the same race, color, or language minority status. The district court determined that the key requirement is that the class members must experience denial of the right to vote based on these characteristics. The City argues against coalition claims, citing the Sixth Circuit's interpretation that Section 2 refers to a singular class and does not explicitly mention minority coalitions. This interpretation suggests that if Congress intended to include coalition claims, it would have used plural terminology or omitted the term "class." The City asserts that Section 2 mandates a comparison between the voting abilities of a singular protected class and other electorate members, which includes both white voters and other minority groups.
In contrast, the district court and most other circuits agree that Section 2 does encompass coalition claims. They argue that the lack of explicit mention of coalition claims in the text does not preclude their interpretation. The term "class" is defined broadly to include groups with common characteristics, thus including any group whose voting rights have been denied based on race or color. The necessary comparison under Section 2 involves harmed minority voters against unharmed members of the electorate, potentially including white voters and other minority groups. Restricting Section 2 claims to discrete minority groups misinterprets the term "class" within its legislative context. Additionally, even if ambiguity exists regarding the protection of coalitions under Section 2, the legislative history and the VRA's broad remedial intent support the recognition of such claims.
In the 1982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), Congress acknowledged that multiple minority groups could be considered a single plaintiff class for legal protection, as indicated in a dissenting opinion by Judge Keith. The Senate Judiciary Committee referred to a Supreme Court case, Wright v. Rockefeller, which involved both Black and Hispanic voters, illustrating that the VRA's protections were not limited to one minority group. The 1975 expansion of the VRA to include language minority groups also reflected Congress's awareness of the discrimination faced by various minorities, including Hispanic and Asian Americans, similar to that experienced by African Americans.
The excerpt references a 1972 federal court ruling that found the use of multi-member districts in Texas unconstitutional for diluting the voting power of Mexican Americans and Blacks, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester. Legislative history indicates that coalition claims have been recognized, aligning with the VRA's broad aim to eliminate racial discrimination in voting. The text argues for the cognizability of coalition claims in proving violations of Section 2, supporting the district court's ruling. The overarching intent of the VRA is to provide the broadest scope in addressing racial discrimination in voting.
The district court determined that the Minority Community in Virginia Beach met the second Gingles precondition of political cohesion, which requires that a significant number of minority members vote for the same candidates. The court found this cohesion based on the community's tendency to vote as a bloc, shared advocacy for similar issues, and common experiences of discrimination. On appeal, the City contended that the court used an incorrect legal standard, asserting that plaintiffs must provide statistical evidence showing that each constituent group within the coalition shares the same voting preferences. The City referenced the Fifth Circuit case Brewer, which emphasized the need for evidence of voting alignment among different minority groups. However, it was acknowledged that statistical techniques could not adequately estimate voting patterns for the smaller Hispanic and Asian communities in Virginia Beach due to their size and dispersion. Consequently, the plaintiffs' expert provided estimates for voting support among White, Black, and an aggregated "All Minority" group. The City misinterpreted Brewer, as that case cited Campos, which rejected the strict standards the City proposed. The City further argued that the plaintiffs' approach was flawed, as high support from the larger Black community could obscure lower levels of support from the smaller Hispanic and Asian communities.
Plaintiffs' expert acknowledged that while a cohesive group voting scenario was a possibility, it was deemed less likely than the occurrence of cohesive voting among the group. The district court evaluated the statistical data's limitations and dismissed claims of its flaws, emphasizing that the expert employed robust statistical methods to address these limitations, which were not unique to the current case. The court also referenced the Campos decision, stating that demonstrating the cohesiveness of a minority group does not require proving cohesion among individual subgroups, as collective voting for a candidate by Blacks and Hispanics is sufficient. Additionally, the Brewer court highlighted that statistical evidence is not mandatory for establishing cohesion, and alternative evidence could suffice under Section 2. A significant number of minority group members voting together can demonstrate political cohesiveness necessary for a vote dilution claim. The district court recognized substantial qualitative evidence of political cohesion within the Virginia Beach Black, Hispanic, and Asian communities, citing their collaborative efforts on various community issues. Consequently, the court applied the correct legal standard and concluded that the plaintiffs met the second Gingles precondition for proving cohesion. Furthermore, the district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the third Gingles precondition by showing that the white majority in Virginia Beach typically defeats the minority's preferred candidates, noting that the extent of racial bloc voting relevant to a vote dilution claim varies based on specific factual circumstances.
No straightforward doctrinal test exists for determining legally significant racial bloc voting. To assess whether the third precondition for such a claim is satisfied, courts must first identify minority-preferred candidates and evaluate whether these candidates are typically defeated by majority white voting. A candidate is considered a minority-preferred candidate of choice if they would have won solely among minority voters, even without achieving 50% of the minority vote.
Between 2008 and 2018, sixteen Black candidates ran for City Council in Virginia Beach, with nine being minority-preferred candidates. Of these, only 50% were successful, contrasting sharply with a 94% success rate for white candidates favored by the white community. The city contends that this 50-50 split does not demonstrate that the white majority usually defeats minority-preferred candidates. However, when two recently elected Black candidates are excluded due to special circumstances, the success rate for minority-preferred candidates drops to 42%.
The district court noted that over a decade, only one Black minority-preferred candidate was elected outside the influence of the ongoing lawsuit, and that the two elected in 2018 received unusually high support from white voters compared to past elections. The City argues that the court improperly dismissed the significance of the 2018 elections and misinterpreted the influence of white support on the candidates’ success.
A consistent pattern of racial bloc voting over time is more indicative of legally significant polarization than the outcomes of individual elections. Additionally, isolated instances of racially polarized voting do not negate the existence of such voting patterns. Courts must be cautious in interpreting minority candidate success, as special circumstances (like lack of opposition or incumbency) can skew results, as highlighted in previous rulings. Overall, the historical context of elections should be weighed more heavily than isolated successes of minority candidates.
The court acknowledged significant increases in Black electoral success during the 1982 election, post the filing of the current lawsuit, and considered the impact of the litigation on this success. The district court assessed the relevance of the 2018 elections, where two Black candidates were elected, after a thorough investigation into the election's context. Notably, the court observed that the lawsuit was a topic during the 2018 election, and both victorious candidates received atypical support from white voters compared to other Black candidates since 2008. Specifically, Aaron Rouse garnered 24% of the white vote, exceeding the average support for other Black candidates, and Sabrina Wooten achieved a majority with 51% of the white vote. The court emphasized that the overall success rate of 50% for minority-preferred candidates did not accurately reflect white bloc voting, as the rate dropped to 21.4% when focusing solely on Black candidates. Furthermore, it highlighted that four out of five white minority-preferred candidates won due to substantial white voter support, while the only white candidate who lost failed to gain similar backing. The court concluded that the data suggested substantial evidence of white bloc voting in Virginia Beach's elections and determined that minority voters had less opportunity to participate in the political process and elect their preferred candidates, aligning its findings with the totality of the circumstances.
A district court's determination that an election scheme dilutes minority voters' participation and violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Under this standard, an appellate court cannot reverse the district court's findings if they are plausible based on the entire record, even if the appellate court would have weighed the evidence differently. In this case, the district court evaluated nine factors from the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 VRA amendments and concluded that each factor was met, citing a history of official discrimination against the Minority Community in Virginia Beach, the disproportionate impact of this discrimination on economic and social conditions, and the City’s lack of responsiveness to minority needs.
The City contended that the district court erred by not analyzing each factor for each minority group separately, arguing that this was required for a coalition claim. However, precedent indicates that a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis does not necessitate that all factors be satisfied for each group. The court clarified that adopting the City's proposed standard would misinterpret the requirement that violations be assessed based on the totality of circumstances. The City also argued that the presence of minority-preferred candidates on the City Council, in proportion to the voting-age population, should weigh against a Section 2 violation, but the district court found no clear error in its analysis.
In De Grandy, the Supreme Court determined that effective voting majorities formed by minority voters in districts, proportional to their share of the voting-age population, are significant within the totality of circumstances despite ongoing discrimination and racial bloc voting. The weight assigned to proportionality may differ based on other facts. The district court found De Grandy inapplicable to the case at hand, reasoning that the recent election of two Black candidates to the City Council was influenced by unique circumstances. The district court's assessment, which assigned less probative value to the 2018 election of minority-preferred candidates Aaron Rouse and Sabrina Wooten, is deemed well-supported and not a clear error. The plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the at-large election system for ten City Council seats denies Black, Hispanic, and Asian voters in Virginia Beach equal access to the electoral process, violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Therefore, the district court's ruling is affirmed.
