Penal Code section 1001.95 allows superior court judges to grant pretrial diversion for misdemeanor offenses, even against prosecution's objections, except for specific misdemeanors such as registrable sex offenses, domestic violence, and stalking. Misdemeanor DUI charges, under Vehicle Code sections 23152 and 23153, are not expressly excluded from this diversion eligibility. However, Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibits pretrial diversion for both felony and misdemeanor DUI charges. The Superior Court granted diversion to Jessica Ortiz for her misdemeanor DUI charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.95. The appellate court previously upheld this diversion order as valid.
The People filed a petition claiming that the diversion order was unauthorized, arguing that Penal Code section 1001.95 did not implicitly repeal the prohibition in Vehicle Code section 23640 regarding misdemeanor DUIs. The Court of Appeal concurred with the People, ruling that misdemeanor DUI charges are categorically ineligible for diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95. It noted that three other appellate courts had reached similar conclusions, emphasizing that the legislative intent behind the statutes was unclear and that the plain language of the statutes indicated that DUI charges remain ineligible for diversion. The petition to vacate the diversion order was granted.
Grassi and Tan's decisions are supported by the People, while Ortiz contends they were incorrectly decided, arguing that the statutes cannot be harmonized and conflict irreconcilably. Ortiz asserts that Penal Code section 1001.95 should take precedence due to its legislative intent to allow misdemeanor DUI charges to be eligible for diversion. Citing Diaz-Armstrong and Tellez, Ortiz claims that the statutes conflict and that the new statute should prevail over Vehicle Code section 23640.
The court agrees with Tan and others that the statutes can be harmonized, allowing for concurrent application, where judges can offer diversion for all misdemeanors except those explicitly excluded in Penal Code section 1001.95(e), which includes DUI charges. The court finds that there is insufficient evidence to imply a partial repeal of Vehicle Code section 23640 by Penal Code section 1001.95. Therefore, it concludes that Vehicle Code section 23640 remains in effect and bars diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges.
In the procedural background, Ortiz faced misdemeanor DUI charges in July 2020, pleaded not guilty, and later sought to enter a new misdemeanor diversion program, which the superior court approved despite prosecutorial objections. The People petitioned to vacate this diversion order, which was denied by the appellate division in a split decision. The People subsequently petitioned for a writ to vacate the diversion order on grounds of it being unauthorized under Vehicle Code section 23640. A show cause order was issued, and Ortiz's request for judicial notice of legislative history was granted.
The California DUI Lawyers Association (CDLA) has submitted an amicus brief supporting Ortiz's position that section 1001.95 of the Penal Code was intended by the Legislature to permit diversion for DUI charges. While the applicability of section 1001.95 to cases not finalized on appeal as of its January 1, 2021 effective date remains unaddressed, its potential to reduce punishment for eligible misdemeanor charges suggests it would apply to pending misdemeanor DUI cases.
Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibits pretrial diversion for DUI-related offenses, reflecting legislative intent aimed at ensuring swift and certain punishment for DUI violations. This prohibition has roots in statutes enacted in 1981, which were later repealed and reenacted in 1998 without substantive changes.
The introduction of sections 1001.95 to 1001.97 through Assembly Bill No. 3234 on January 1, 2021, established a discretionary diversion program for misdemeanors, allowing judges to offer diversion despite prosecutorial objections. Notably, misdemeanor DUI charges are not explicitly excluded from this program, and Vehicle Code section 23640 is not referenced in the new Penal Code sections. The purpose of the diversion program is to facilitate treatment and rehabilitation, enabling individuals to avoid the long-term impacts of a criminal record.
The question of whether misdemeanor DUI charges are eligible for diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95 will be assessed through statutory interpretation, focusing on the Legislature's intent and the law’s purpose.
To determine legislative intent, courts first examine the statute’s language, interpreting it with a plain and common sense meaning, as established in *California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist.*. Statutory language is the primary indicator of intent, but if ambiguity arises, courts may utilize extrinsic sources such as legislative history and the intended objectives behind the statute, following *People v. Gutierrez*. Historical context and canons of statutory construction may also aid in interpreting legislative intent, though they are not definitive. Courts must harmonize statutes to reconcile inconsistencies and give effect to all provisions, treating related statutes as a unified entity. Implied repeals are disfavored unless there is clear evidence of intent to supersede and only when statutes are irreconcilably conflicting. In the context of conflicts between Vehicle Code section 23640 and various diversion statutes, courts have encountered challenges in determining legislative intent, resulting in inconsistent rulings regarding the applicability of diversion for DUI charges.
In People v. Weatherill (1989), the court navigated a conflict between former Vehicle Code section 23202, which barred diversion for DUI charges, and Penal Code section 1001.20 et seq., a 1981 diversion statute for individuals with cognitive developmental disabilities. The majority ruled that the DUI diversion bar was applicable, interpreting the legislative intent and history to affirm that all DUI defendants should be processed without delay or diversion. They cited two canons of statutory construction: the specificity of Vehicle Code section 23202 concerning DUI cases and its later enactment. The majority dismissed the defendant's argument that the 1982 diversion statutes, which exempted DUI charges, created a conflict, asserting that these statutes were designed to avoid impliedly repealing Vehicle Code section 23202. In dissent, Justice Johnson acknowledged that both sides presented valid arguments, suggesting that DUI cases might qualify for diversion under Penal Code section 1001.21, though traditional canons of statutory interpretation did not decisively resolve the issue. Johnson noted that the argument for Vehicle Code section 23202 being a general statute could be made, as Penal Code section 1001.20 et seq. specifically targeted certain defendants, allowing for diversion irrespective of the misdemeanor charged.
The 'later-in-time' canon was deemed inapplicable because implied repeals are generally disfavored, and the statutes could be reconciled to allow diversion for misdemeanor DUI cases under Penal Code section 1001.21 while prohibiting it for other DUI defendants. Justice Johnson argued that the Legislature's inaction to amend Penal Code section 1001.20 et seq. to exclude DUI charges in 1982, despite enacting two other diversion programs that did exclude DUI charges, suggested an intention to permit diversion for DUI under the earlier section. Legislative history surrounding Vehicle Code former section 23202 did not indicate awareness of Penal Code section 1001.20 et seq. at the time of its enactment in 1981, implying that the Legislature aimed to eliminate local DUI diversion programs rather than the state-level statute. Justice Johnson noted the complexity of the statutes, expressing a desire for clarity from the Legislature regarding DUI diversion eligibility under section 1001.21.
In 2014, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1001.80 for pretrial diversion of current and former military members charged with misdemeanors, which initially did not exclude any misdemeanors from diversion eligibility. In 2016, two courts of appeal issued conflicting rulings on whether Vehicle Code section 23640 precluded diversion for misdemeanor DUI under Penal Code section 1001.80. The court in People v. VanVleck concluded that Vehicle Code section 23640 barred such diversion, while Hopkins v. Superior Court found that Penal Code section 1001.80 impliedly repealed Vehicle Code section 23640 regarding DUI charges. Both courts analyzed the statutes' texts, legislative histories, canons of statutory construction, and the Weatherill decision, with VanVleck ultimately favoring the more specific Vehicle Code section 23640 in its reasoning.
Hopkins determined that conflicting statutes could not be reconciled, noting that the specific versus general canon was unhelpful due to its reliance on an arbitrary subject matter focus. He concluded that Penal Code section 1001.80 prevailed over Vehicle Code section 23640 because it was enacted later and its legislative history indicated an intent to allow diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges. The California Supreme Court granted review in both related cases but rendered the conflict moot when the Legislature amended section 1001.80 in the 2017-2018 session, explicitly allowing misdemeanor DUI charges for diversion, leading to the dismissal of the Supreme Court reviews.
Section 1001.36, enacted in 2018, allows pretrial diversion for misdemeanor or felony offenses if the defendant suffers from a specified mental disorder, which significantly influenced the commission of the offense and is treatable. Initially, it did not exclude any offenses, but subsequent amendments in late 2018 specified exclusions without including DUI offenses. Unlike section 1001.80, section 1001.36 does not explicitly state it allows diversion for DUI charges.
In 2020, two court decisions interpreted Vehicle Code section 23640 as barring diversion for DUI charges under Penal Code section 1001.36, citing that the statutes conflict and cannot be harmonized. One statute prohibits diversion for DUI offenses, while the other allows it for eligible defendants, establishing that one statute must provide an exception to the other.
Vehicle Code section 23640 and Penal Code section 1001.36 are in conflict regarding the eligibility of DUI defendants for diversion programs. Tellez determined that the legislative history surrounding both statutes, particularly during the 2017-2018 session, clarifies that the Legislature intended for Vehicle Code section 23640 to take precedence, thereby maintaining the long-standing prohibition against diversion for DUI offenses. Tellez detailed the evolution of Penal Code section 1001.36, noting its amendments aimed at excluding serious offenses but not DUI. The absence of a similar amendment to section 1001.36, as seen in the amendments to section 1001.80, indicates the Legislature’s intent not to override the existing Vehicle Code provision. This conclusion was supported by the Moore decision, which echoed Tellez's findings and emphasized that the legislative history did not support DUI defendants’ eligibility for diversion under section 1001.36. Both Tellez and Moore acknowledged the irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes, with Tellez asserting that one must prevail over the other without attempting to harmonize them. The judicial interpretation confirms that Vehicle Code section 23640 controls over Penal Code section 1001.36, barring DUI defendants from diversion eligibility.
Presumptions against implied repeals dictate that courts should only find an implied repeal when two statutes are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and inconsistent to the extent they cannot operate concurrently. The Courts of Appeal in Grassi, Tan, and Islas have determined that Penal Code section 1001.95 and Vehicle Code section 23640 can be harmonized, excluding misdemeanor DUIs from diversion eligibility under section 1001.95, in addition to other specified ineligible misdemeanors. These courts noted that the legislative history of section 1001.95 is ambiguous regarding any intention to partially repeal the diversion restrictions of section 23640 concerning misdemeanor DUIs.
The appellate division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court in People v. Superior Court (Espeso) concluded that section 23640 bars diversion for misdemeanor DUIs under section 1001.95. The court emphasized that any tension between the statutes must be resolved by interpreting them together, adhering to the presumption against implied repeal. It found no clear intent in the legislative history of section 1001.95 to repeal section 23640. Consequently, it held that individuals are eligible for diversion except for those specifically listed in section 1001.95, subdivision (e), and misdemeanor DUIs, as outlined in section 23640.
Following Espeso, the Riverside County Superior Court in Diaz-Armstrong also concluded that the statutes conflict irreconcilably, as one prohibits diversion for misdemeanor DUIs while the other allows it. The majority opinion in Diaz-Armstrong rejected the dissent's argument for harmonization, reinforcing the understanding that section 23640 presents a genuine conflict with diversion statutes.
Courts must harmonize potentially inconsistent statutes without redrafting them. The majority opinion in Diaz-Armstrong determined that Penal Code section 1001.95 was intended to prevail over Vehicle Code section 23640, based on legislative history and policy objectives of a new diversion program. Evidence indicated that legislators acknowledged the bill's lack of exclusions for DUIs during debates, yet it was passed without rebuttal. In dissent, Judge Firetag argued that the statutes could function together. He noted that Penal Code section 1001.95 does not explicitly replace Vehicle Code section 23640's prohibition on DUI diversion, as it does not define its list of excluded offenses as exclusive. He also highlighted similarities between Penal Code sections 1001.36 and 1001.95, which both allow diversion under certain conditions and do not mention DUIs or indicate exclusivity of exceptions. The central inquiry is whether these statutes can be reconciled or if they irreconcilably conflict. While viewed separately, they appear unambiguous: Vehicle Code section 23640 explicitly prohibits DUI diversion, whereas Penal Code section 1001.95 allows it for misdemeanors without explicitly excluding DUIs, suggesting a conflict that needs to be resolved through statutory harmonization.
Statutes can only be harmonized if full effect is given to all their provisions. Conflicts arise when provisions cannot coexist, as seen in prior cases where disclosure mandates or statutes of limitation could not be reconciled. In contrast, Vehicle Code section 23640 and Penal Code section 1001.95 can be harmonized, permitting diversion for all misdemeanors except those explicitly ineligible, such as DUI charges and certain other offenses. Penal Code section 1001.95 does not indicate that its exclusions are comprehensive or that it overrides other laws, allowing for an interpretation that maintains the DUI prohibition in Vehicle Code section 23640. This interpretation respects both statutes, ensuring that diversion remains available for misdemeanors not specified as ineligible while confirming that DUI charges remain barred from diversion. The absence of language in Penal Code section 1001.95 specifying it applies to all misdemeanors supports this construction. Therefore, the statutes can operate concurrently without conflict, necessitating their harmonization to give full effect to both provisions.
Ortiz contends that interpreting Penal Code section 1001.95 to exclude DUI offenses would misrepresent the Legislature's intent and undermine the statute's purpose. He argues that harmonizing inconsistent statutes should not lead to redrafting that creates exclusions not intended by the Legislature. However, the current interpretation does not alter the statutes but rather clarifies that they can be harmonized to prevent diversion for misdemeanor DUIs. Ortiz's alternative reading, which seeks to treat the list of misdemeanors ineligible for diversion as exclusive, is contested on two grounds. First, the harmonization process should prioritize the statutes' texts over their purposes, and Ortiz's approach fails to account for the Vehicle Code section 23640, which explicitly bars diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges. Second, allowing for exemptions based on omission would contradict the principle that statutes are presumed to apply broadly unless expressly stated otherwise. The interpretation aligns with established statutory construction principles, emphasizing that unless explicitly exempted, all statutes must be respected in their application.
Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibits diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges, which creates a conflict with Penal Code section 1001.95’s nonexclusive list of exempted misdemeanor charges. The necessity to harmonize these statutes arises, as no statute explicitly states that Vehicle Code section 23640 does not apply to Penal Code section 1001.95. Previous rulings, including Tellez and Diaz-Armstrong, have recognized an irreconcilable conflict between these statutes. Tellez determined that Vehicle Code section 23640, which forbids diversion for DUI offenses, and Penal Code section 1001.36, which allows mental health diversion, could not be reconciled because each statute is unambiguous and one prohibits what the other permits. Legislative history indicated that Vehicle Code section 23640 should prevail over Penal Code section 1001.36.
The Diaz-Armstrong majority followed this reasoning, concluding that Vehicle Code section 23640 and Penal Code section 1001.95 also irreconcilably conflict, with the Legislature intending for Penal Code section 1001.95 to prevail. Both Penal Code sections 1001.36 and 1001.95 contain similar provisions allowing diversion with specified exceptions, but neither statute claims its list of ineligible offenses is exclusive.
Both Penal Code sections 1001.36 and 1001.95 do not explicitly state that they apply despite other laws, such as Vehicle Code section 23640, leading to a potential conflict regarding DUI charge diversions. However, when analyzed together, these statutes can be harmonized with Vehicle Code section 23640, which prohibits pretrial diversion for DUI charges. Court decisions in Grassi, Tan, and Islas suggest that while some interpretations view the statutes as conflicting, the practical result is a harmonious application that maintains the prohibition of diversion for DUI offenses under Penal Code section 1001.36.
The analysis also addresses whether the enactment of Penal Code section 1001.95 indicated a legislative intent to partially repeal Vehicle Code section 23640. The presumption against implied repeals applies, requiring clear evidence of intent to repeal, which the parties dispute. The People argue that the legislative history is ambiguous and does not demonstrate a clear intent for repeal, supporting the conclusions reached in Grassi and Tan, which emphasize that the intent to alter established laws must be explicitly stated.
Ortiz and amicus curiae CDLA contend that the courts in Grassi and Tan incorrectly interpreted legislative history regarding misdemeanor DUI charges under Penal Code section 1001.95. They argue that the Legislature's intent was to allow misdemeanor DUI charges to be divertible, as evidenced by the Legislature's refusal to expressly exclude these charges from eligibility. This implies a partial repeal of Vehicle Code section 23640, as the Legislature could not have intended to permit diversion without repealing the existing prohibition. The legislative history, discussed in Grassi, Tan, and other cases, indicates that Assembly Bill 3234, initially unrelated to misdemeanor diversion, was amended to propose a court-initiated misdemeanor diversion program without statutory exclusions for specific offenses. This program would allow judges to divert misdemeanor defendants at their discretion, contrasting with existing programs that had exclusions, including DUIs. The bill's opponents cited prior programs, such as a 2014 Los Angeles County pilot program, which had excluded DUIs.
The August 3 Assembly floor analysis failed to reference Vehicle Code section 23640 or clarify that existing law prohibited pretrial diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges. On August 20, 2020, the Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) issued a floor alert opposing the bill, claiming it permitted diversion in all misdemeanor cases, including serious offenses like "misdemeanor DUI w/injury" and "vehicular manslaughter w/alcohol but without gross negligence." The OCDA criticized the bill as a “gut and amend” tactic that bypassed the legislative process, warning it could lead to significant and hazardous changes in public policy without thorough examination.
On August 24, 2020, the Assembly amended the bill to exclude offenses specified in Penal Code section 1001.95, subdivision (e) from the new diversion program. An earlier version of the program, proposed under Assembly Bill No. 88, did not exclude any misdemeanors from eligibility. During the June 26, 2020, debate on Assembly Bill 88, concerns were raised about allowing diversion for any misdemeanor, including DUI charges, but neither Assemblymember Cooper nor others mentioned Vehicle Code section 23640 or existing law prohibiting DUI diversion. The August 24 Assembly floor analysis also omitted any reference to Vehicle Code section 23640.
The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) later issued a floor alert, echoing the OCDA's concerns and urging a NO vote on AB 3234. During the August 24 Assembly floor debate, Assemblymember Ting acknowledged amendments to exclude certain offenses from the diversion program, but Assemblymember Cooper highlighted that "DUI with injury" still remained unexcluded. Despite these objections, the Assembly ultimately voted 43 to 26 in favor of the bill.
On August 31, 2020, the Judicial Council issued a Senate floor alert opposing a bill unless it was amended to align with the Los Angeles County pilot program, highlighting that the pilot program excluded DUIs and other offenses not excluded in the new bill. During the Senate debate, Senator Melendez raised concerns that the bill allowed unlimited diversion for misdemeanors, excluding only sex offenses, domestic violence, and stalking, which was not disputed by other senators. The Senate ultimately voted 27 to 10 in favor of the bill. On September 8, 2020, the California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) sent a veto request to the Governor, arguing that the bill’s provisions regarding DUI offenses could hinder the justice system's ability to manage chronic offenders, as diverted charges would be treated as if they never occurred. The Governor, in his September 30 signing statement, expressed concern over the inclusion of DUIs and indicated intentions to address the issue in the next legislative session. In the 2021-2022 session, two bills were introduced to amend section 1001.95 to exclude or restrict diversion for DUIs; however, Assembly Bill 282 passed the Assembly but failed in the Senate, while Senate Bill 421 did not progress. The legislative history indicates that despite opposition, the Legislature intended to permit diversion for misdemeanor DUIs under Penal Code section 1001.95.
Penal Code section 1001.95 may supersede Vehicle Code section 23640 if the two statutes irreconcilably conflict; however, they do not. Both statutes can coexist without one negating the other, thereby maintaining the presumption against implied repeals. To counter this presumption, there must be clear legislative intent to repeal, which must be unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied without ambiguity. Ortiz and CDLA argue that the lack of exclusion for misdemeanor DUI charges under Penal Code section 1001.95 implies a repeal of Vehicle Code section 23640’s prohibition on diversion for such charges. However, legislative history indicates no intent to partially repeal section 23640. The Legislature passed Assembly Bill 3234 despite significant opposition regarding its potential to allow diversion for DUIs, yet did not discuss or reference Vehicle Code section 23640 during the legislative process. The absence of mention by both supporters and opponents of the bill suggests that the Legislature did not intend to override the existing prohibition on diversion for DUI charges. Legislative objections noted by some members were understood to reflect concerns about including DUIs under the new diversion program rather than an intent to repeal Vehicle Code section 23640. Thus, the legislative action cannot be interpreted as a partial repeal of the Vehicle Code prohibition.
Legislators did not assert that the bill would permit diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges during debates, despite acknowledging that it would not exempt DUI charges from diversion. DUI charges were not the main focus of the legislation, with only Senator Melendez mentioning "DUI." There was no indication that the bill intended to partially repeal Vehicle Code section 23640 or that any legislators supported it for such a reason. Legislative silence regarding an implied repeal of Vehicle Code section 23640 is prevalent in both the text of Penal Code section 1001.95 and its legislative history, which does not suggest any intention to alter the existing ban on diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges. Courts generally disfavor implied repeals based on silence, as they could undermine the authority of prior legislatures without current majority support. The argument that the Legislature should clearly express its intent does not imply a requirement for specific wording to demonstrate such intent. The presumption against implied repeal remains, necessitating unequivocal evidence of legislative intent to counter it.
The Legislature must clearly express its intention to repeal Vehicle Code section 23640 to counter the presumption against implied repeal. In this instance, the Legislature did not demonstrate such clarity, particularly as it did not contemplate a partial repeal of section 23640 when enacting Penal Code section 1001.95. If there were irreconcilable conflicts between the two statutes, Vehicle Code section 23640 would take precedence as it specifically addresses the eligibility of misdemeanor DUI charges for diversion, contrary to Penal Code section 1001.95, which applies more generally to misdemeanors. In situations of conflicting statutes, the specific statute prevails over the general one unless legislative intent to repeal is clearly articulated. Previous cases indicate the specific versus general canon has led to inconsistent interpretations regarding Vehicle Code section 23640 and diversion statutes. However, in this case, the specific provisions clearly indicate that Vehicle Code section 23640 governs the issue of DUI diversion eligibility, as it explicitly bars diversion for misdemeanor DUI offenses, unlike Penal Code section 1001.95, which does not limit eligibility to specific groups but encompasses a broader category.
The rule of lenity does not apply to Ortiz's interpretation of Penal Code section 1001.95 regarding pretrial diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges. Ortiz argues that any ambiguity in this statute should favor eligibility for DUI defendants under the rule of lenity, which dictates that penal statutes with two reasonable interpretations should be construed favorably to the defendant. However, the court clarifies that the rule applies only when there is significant ambiguity and uncertainty about legislative intent. In this case, Penal Code section 1001.95 is deemed unambiguous, as it can be harmonized with Vehicle Code section 23640, which prohibits diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges. The court finds no clear evidence that the Legislature intended to partially repeal Vehicle Code section 23640 when enacting Penal Code section 1001.95. Therefore, the integrity of both statutes is preserved by interpreting Vehicle Code section 23640 as prohibiting pretrial diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges. Consequently, the court orders the superior court to vacate its prior decision granting Ortiz pretrial diversion and to deny it instead. The judgment is certified for publication. Additionally, a concurring opinion emphasizes that specific legislative statements typically take precedence over general ones when interpreting conflicting statutes.
Conflicting commands within two statutes regarding diversion for misdemeanors and DUIs are interpreted in conjunction, reflecting different levels of legislative intent. One statute (Pen. Code § 1001.95) allows misdemeanor diversion with specified exceptions, while another statute (Veh. Code § 23640) explicitly prohibits diversion in DUI cases. The principle of specific-over-general statutory interpretation applies here, as the Legislature's clear intent to preclude DUI diversion takes precedence over the more general misdemeanor diversion statute, following Code of Civil Procedure § 1859. This canon emphasizes that when a specific provision exists, it should govern over a more general one. The author argues that ordinary readers would naturally reconcile these statutes in favor of the DUI prohibition. The interpretation challenges arise not from the statutes' texts but from the understanding that the general diversion statute was enacted later. Historically, the specific-over-general canon underscores that a legislature does not intend for a general law to override a specific one without explicit intent. The author questions whether the silence regarding DUI in the general statute was a tactical decision by legislators, reflecting varied views on its impact on the existing DUI prohibition. The conclusion is that legislative intent should be clearly expressed to modify or repeal existing specific statutes.
Proponents of repealing a law are encouraged to be vague, hoping the courts will interpret the law favorably for them. The Supreme Court has established that the specific-over-general canon does not depend on which statute was enacted first. Generally, if a specific statute conflicts with a general one, the specific statute is treated as an exception, regardless of its enactment date. This principle was reinforced in recent cases, such as Stoetzl v. Department of Human Resources and State Department of Public Health v. Superior Court, where it was noted that specific statutes take precedence over more general ones, even if enacted later.
In examining conflicting statutes, courts have acknowledged that the determination of specificity can be subjective. However, in this case, the distinction is clear. Section 1001.95 allows diversion for a wide range of misdemeanors without listing them individually, covering familiar offenses like assault, theft, and drug-related crimes, among others. Conversely, section 23640 specifically excludes only two offenses: DUI crimes defined in the Vehicle Code. Therefore, the prohibition on DUI diversion is specific, while the authorization for diversion encompasses a broad array of misdemeanors, leading to the conclusion that the DUI diversion prohibition is indeed more specific than the general statute.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the relationship between specific and general statutes indicates that the applicable test is not whether the general statute includes elements absent in the specific statute but whether a violation of the specific statute commonly results in a violation of the general statute. This test is supported by California’s Vehicle Code, which classifies the majority of DUI offenses as misdemeanors, particularly noting that approximately 96% of DUI arrests in 2020 were misdemeanors. Legislative intent regarding DUI diversion must be explicitly demonstrated, and a lack of clear intent to repeal existing laws suggests that harmonization between statutes is necessary. The absence of mention of DUI diversion in legislative analyses and the lack of supportive statements from proponents of relevant bills further imply that DUI diversion was not intended to be altered by subsequent legislation. Implied repeal of statutes can only occur when the conflicting statutes are irreconcilable and cannot coexist.
Opposing statements regarding the applicability of Vehicle Code section 23640 may be strategically vague, aiming to secure legislative support for a bill despite known disagreements. In 2017, the California Legislature successfully enacted Penal Code section 1001.80, which allowed for DUI diversion specifically for military personnel, despite the restrictions of section 23640. However, proponents of Penal Code section 1001.95 did not include a similar "notwithstanding" clause or address DUI diversion in their analyses or statements, raising questions about legislative intent. The absence of express authorization for DUI diversion in section 1001.95 may reflect political challenges in enacting such provisions, particularly without restrictions on recidivism or DUI severity. The continued existence of section 23640 requires the Legislature to confront the issue of DUI diversion directly, rather than relying on ambiguous statements. The author argues for a principle that specific statutes should take precedence over general ones, advocating for a clear legislative intent when partially repealing existing laws. Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibits diversion for both felony and misdemeanor DUIs, while Penal Code section 1001.95 permits diversion for misdemeanors, leading to an apparent conflict. The author concludes that misdemeanor DUIs are eligible for diversion under section 1001.95, as the statutes irreconcilably conflict, with 1001.95 controlling due to its later enactment. Legislative history supports this interpretation, indicating an intent to allow diversion for misdemeanor DUIs, contrary to the positions taken in the majority and concurring opinions.
In People v. Superior Court (Espeso), the court's majority and concurring opinions clarify the interaction between section 1001.95 and Vehicle Code section 23640, concluding that section 1001.95 permits diversion for all misdemeanors, except for those explicitly ineligible and DUIs. Importantly, the court does not interpret section 1001.95 as allowing diversion for misdemeanor DUIs, which are outright barred by Vehicle Code section 23640. This interpretation reveals that the initially perceived conflict between the two statutes does not exist; thus, the statutes can be harmonized rather than one being deemed superior over the other.
The distinction between harmonization and recognizing an irreconcilable conflict is significant and influences the legal analysis. If harmonization is pursued, there is a presumption against implied repeal, leading to an interpretation that respects the older statute. Conversely, if a conflict is deemed irreconcilable, the newer statute would prevail. The dissent outlines its structure: Part 1 introduces the legal framework, Part 2 argues for an irreconcilable conflict, Part 3 contends that section 1001.95 should control, and subsequent parts examine case law and opinions. The dissent ultimately finds no valid argument supporting the harmonization of the statutes or the ineligibility of misdemeanor DUIs under section 1001.95, leading to a respectful dissent.
An implied repeal of statutes may only be found when two potentially conflicting statutes cannot be harmonized due to irreconcilability and inconsistency. Courts are required to harmonize statutes where possible but cannot redraft them to create a compromise. If an actual conflict exists that prevents full effect from being given to both statutes, one statute must be interpreted as an exception to the other. Established rules dictate that later enactments supersede earlier ones, and more specific provisions take precedence over general ones. However, when these rules conflict, the specificity rule prevails. A strong presumption against implied repeal exists, necessitating interpretation that resolves conflicts while maintaining the intent of the legislature. In the specific case of Section 1001.95 and Vehicle Code Section 23640, a conflict arises, as Section 23640 explicitly prohibits diversion in DUI cases, stating that courts cannot suspend proceedings to allow participation in treatment programs for DUI offenses.
Section 1001.95 of the California Penal Code allows for pretrial diversion for all misdemeanors with specific exceptions, notably excluding registrable sex offenses, domestic violence, and stalking. However, it does not list DUIs among the exceptions, thereby suggesting they may be eligible for diversion. In contrast, Vehicle Code section 23640 explicitly prohibits diversion for all DUIs, including misdemeanors. This creates a direct conflict between the two statutes, as one permits and the other prohibits diversion for DUIs.
The conflict is underscored by case law, particularly in Hopkins v. Superior Court, where the court noted that the language of both statutes is unambiguous, and they cannot be reconciled regarding DUI cases. The court rejected attempts to harmonize the statutes by limiting the application of section 1001.80 to non-DUI misdemeanors, emphasizing that such harmonization would improperly rewrite the statute. The Tellez decision echoed this reasoning in the context of mental health diversion under section 1001.36, affirming the irreconcilable nature of the conflict between Vehicle Code section 23640 and the diversion provisions of section 1001.95.
Section 1001.36 allows diversion for defendants charged with misdemeanor or felony offenses if they have a mental disorder and meet specific eligibility criteria. Notably, DUIs are not listed among the exceptions to eligibility for diversion. Conversely, in People v. VanVleck, a court determined that diversion under section 1001.80 is not available for DUIs, citing the specific nature of Vehicle Code section 23640 as overriding the broader provisions of section 1001.80. The California Supreme Court agreed to review both Hopkins and VanVleck, which addressed conflicting interpretations of diversion eligibility related to DUIs. Before a resolution was reached, the Legislature amended section 1001.80 to explicitly allow military diversion for DUIs, notwithstanding other laws, including section 23640.
The text highlights a fundamental conflict between Vehicle Code section 23640, which prohibits diversion for DUI offenses, and sections 1001.36, 1001.80, and 1001.95, which permit diversion for qualifying defendants charged with misdemeanors or felonies, including those not disqualified by statute. The conflicts among these statutes indicate that they cannot be harmonized, as each clearly sets contradictory rules regarding diversion eligibility for DUI offenses. The analysis suggests that if the order of enactment were reversed, the conflicts would remain irreconcilable.
Section 1001.95 clearly permits diversion for misdemeanor DUIs, as it authorizes diversion for any defendant charged with a misdemeanor, excluding certain exceptions, none of which include DUIs. Following the enactment of Vehicle Code section 23640, which explicitly prohibits diversion for misdemeanor DUIs, a conflict arises between these two statutes. Both are unequivocal in their language, with section 1001.95 allowing diversion and section 23640 denying it, making harmonization impossible.
In determining which statute prevails, the principles of statutory interpretation apply: a more specific statute takes precedence over a more general one, and a later statute overrides an earlier one unless the earlier statute is more specific. In this case, neither statute is more specific than the other, as Vehicle Code section 23640 pertains solely to DUIs, while section 1001.95 encompasses all misdemeanors. Thus, the general-versus-specific rule does not provide a clear resolution.
Previous Court of Appeal opinions consistently reached the same conclusion regarding the conflict between these statutes, with multiple cases affirming the interpretation that section 1001.95 allows diversion for misdemeanor DUIs while section 23640 does not. The legislative history uniformly supports this interpretation, reinforcing the understanding that section 1001.95 controls due to its later enactment, despite the lack of specificity between the two statutes.
Moore and Hopkins concluded that Vehicle Code section 23640 and section 1001.80 are of equal specificity, making the later-enacted statute, section 1001.95, controlling due to the absence of contrary legislative intent. Legislative history indicates a clear intent to allow diversion for all misdemeanors, particularly DUIs, except those specifically excluded in section 1001.95. This section was established by Assembly Bill No. 3234, which initially did not exclude any misdemeanors from diversion. The Assembly floor analysis highlighted existing diversion program limitations, noting that section 1001.95 would not impose similar exclusions or requirements. However, the bill was later amended to exclude certain offenses from diversion eligibility. The amendments maintained the core intent of allowing judicial discretion in offering diversion for misdemeanors, with specific exclusions outlined in subdivision (e) of section 1001.95.
Certain Vehicle Code offenses are currently excluded from misdemeanor diversion programs, but Assembly Bill No. 3234 proposes no statutory eligibility requirements for defendants and does not exclude any misdemeanors from diversion. The final version of the bill maintains these features while acknowledging that specific misdemeanors listed in subdivision (e) of section 1001.95 cannot be diverted. Opposition from the Orange County District Attorney and the California District Attorneys Association highlighted concerns that the bill would permit diversion for DUIs, a point echoed by several legislators during debates. Despite various confirmations regarding the bill's implications for DUIs, no legislator or advocacy group claimed it would prevent diversion for these offenses. Initially, section 1001.95 had no exceptions, but amendments later introduced exclusions while the claim that no misdemeanors were excluded persisted. Legislative history suggests an intention to allow diversion for all misdemeanors except those specified in subdivision (e), including DUIs. Although the legislative discourse could have been clearer regarding the intent to include misdemeanor DUIs, there is no evidence indicating that legislators believed the bill would not permit such diversion. Overall, the legislative history supports the conclusion that section 1001.95 was designed to authorize diversion for misdemeanor DUIs.
The legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended to permit diversion for misdemeanor DUIs under section 1001.95, despite the evidence being somewhat sporadic. No conflicting evidence exists to suggest otherwise. The analysis concludes that Vehicle Code section 23640 and section 1001.95 are in conflict, with neither being more specific or general than the other. Section 1001.95, being the more recently enacted statute, should prevail unless there is strong evidence of contrary legislative intent, which is absent. Thus, section 1001.95 authorizes diversion for misdemeanor DUIs.
The Court of Appeal has consistently ruled that misdemeanor DUI charges are not eligible for diversion under section 1001.95. Although the author is hesitant to diverge from established appellate decisions, they find the reasoning of these decisions unpersuasive. The Grassi case was the first to address the conflict between the two statutes, concluding that they could be harmonized and that section 1001.95 allows diversion for all misdemeanors except those specifically excluded, including misdemeanor DUIs under Vehicle Code section 23640. The author critiques Grassi's interpretation of the statutory language, arguing that the statutes conflict and necessitate determining which serves as an exception to the other.
The Grassi court misinterpreted the implications of its earlier conclusions regarding two statutes that are unambiguous yet contradictory, with one permitting actions that the other prohibits. This contradiction precludes harmonization, which requires that both statutes can coexist without conflict. As asserted by Grassi, the unambiguous nature of the statutory language leaves no room for multiple interpretations, thus making harmonization impossible. The court's error centered on failing to recognize this impossibility, which would have shifted its analytical framework from a presumption against implied repeal—in favor of the earlier statute—to a rule favoring the later-enacted statute, unless the earlier statute is more specific. Furthermore, the court's reliance on the presumption against implied repeal skewed its analysis, effectively disadvantaging the later statute. The court insisted that the legislature did not intend to repeal the earlier statute, yet Grassi's interpretation of the legislative intent behind the later statute, which clearly authorized diversion for misdemeanor DUIs, contradicts this assertion. The court's reasoning appears to hinge on the presumption against implied repeal, which lacks relevance if the statutes cannot be harmonized. Lastly, the court presumed legislative awareness of existing statutes when enacting the later statute, thereby implying redundancy in excluding misdemeanor DUIs, but this assumption undermines its own conclusions.
Hopkins determined a conflict between Vehicle Code sections 23640 and 1001.80, ruling that section 1001.80 takes precedence due to its later enactment and allows for DUI diversion, despite not explicitly mentioning section 23640 at that time. The Grassi court questioned why the Legislature would omit a specific exclusion for misdemeanor DUIs in section 1001.95 if it was aware of Hopkins. Grassi argued that the absence of DUIs in the exclusions of section 1001.95 suggested intentionality, not redundancy. This interpretation, however, is critiqued for misapplying the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which holds that specified exemptions imply the exclusion of others unless legislative intent indicates otherwise. The existence of section 23640 alone does not clarify legislative intent, and evidence suggests the Legislature aimed to include DUIs for diversion under section 1001.95. Courts typically refrain from applying this maxim when it contradicts a clear legislative intent, as seen in various case precedents. Thus, the legislative history supports the notion that DUIs should be eligible for diversion, challenging the conclusions drawn in Grassi.
The list of exemptions in subdivision (e) is deemed exclusive, affirming that section 1001.95 permits diversion for misdemeanor DUIs. Grassi acknowledges that the panel could have concluded otherwise, noting that DUIs are not explicitly excluded and referencing the principle that expressing some exclusions implies the exclusion of others. Both Vehicle Code section 23640 and section 1001.95 are recognized as unambiguous yet conflicting; however, Grassi's opinion suggests they can be harmonized, which is viewed as inconsistent. Tan similarly asserts that the statutes can be reconciled, concluding that diversion is unavailable for DUI defendants. Tan interprets section 1001.95 as granting judges discretion for diversion unless the offense falls within specifically excluded categories, while recognizing that Vehicle Code section 23640 categorically prohibits diversion for DUIs. Ultimately, Tan deduces that the conflict between the statutes is apparent rather than real, as nothing in section 1001.95 indicates an intention to overrule the prohibition established by section 23640. Tan's analysis suggests a lack of legislative intent to authorize misdemeanor DUI diversion, contradicting earlier claims made in the analysis.
Subdivision (a) of section 1001.95 explicitly permits diversion for misdemeanor offenses, including misdemeanor DUIs, as they are not excluded by subdivision (e). This clear statutory language indicates the Legislature's intent to authorize such diversion, as supported by case law (Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1369). Contrary to claims that section 1001.95 does not intend to overrule the prohibition on diversion for DUIs in Vehicle Code section 23640, the language of section 1001.95 demonstrates the Legislature's intention to create an exception to this prohibition.
Even if the legislators were not aware of Vehicle Code section 23640 during the enactment of section 1001.95, this ignorance does not affect the clarity of the statutory language. The hypothetical scenario illustrates that even without subdivision (e) or awareness of Vehicle Code section 23640, section 1001.95 would still unambiguously authorize diversion for all misdemeanors, including misdemeanor DUIs. Consequently, the assertion that section 1001.95 does not suggest an intent to override Vehicle Code section 23640 is either incorrect or irrelevant, reinforcing that section 1001.95 clearly authorizes diversion for misdemeanor DUIs.
The absence of a direct reference to Vehicle Code section 23640 or DUIs in section 1001.95 does not create ambiguity that would allow for harmonization with section 23640, as a conflict remains. Tan argues that the lack of a phrase like “notwithstanding other provisions of law” indicates the Legislature did not intend to allow diversion for DUI cases. Diaz-Armstrong counters that section 1001.95 does not imply adherence to other laws, as the Legislature could have included such qualifiers but chose not to. Tan further claims that since misdemeanor DUIs are not explicitly excluded in subdivision (e), it is unclear whether they are eligible for diversion. However, interpreting the exceptions list in subdivision (e) as non-exclusive would create absurdities, complicating the determination of diversion eligibility for misdemeanors. Consequently, Tan concludes that section 1001.95 permits diversion for all misdemeanors except those listed in subdivision (e) and DUIs, thereby asserting that the list in subdivision (e) is exclusive, with DUIs being the missing item. Grassi concurs with this interpretation.
Section 1001.95 permits diversion for all misdemeanor defendants except those specified in subdivision (e) and misdemeanor DUI defendants under Vehicle Code section 23640. The interpretation put forth by Tan is flawed for two main reasons: it contravenes the expressio unius canon and suggests that any two statutes could be harmonized through interpretative exceptions that are not present in the text. This approach undermines the existence of irreconcilable statutory conflicts, as demonstrated in prior case law. Tan's interpretation effectively creates a legislative exception that was not enacted and attempts to reconcile conflicting statutes inappropriately.
Tan's analysis also incorrectly assumes that section 1001.95 and Vehicle Code section 23640 can be harmonized without recognizing their irreconcilable conflict, a crucial point emphasized in the Diaz-Armstrong case. Tan's critiques of other cases, such as Hopkins and Tellez, are incomplete and fail to address their findings regarding the conflicts between the statutes. Overall, Tan's arguments lack persuasiveness, failing to identify ambiguities in the statutory language, neglecting the expressio unius canon, and suggesting a problematic method of harmonization. Islas agrees with Tan's reasoning and primarily summarizes Tan's analysis, thus not warranting separate analysis.
Espeso was the first appellate case to address the conflict between Vehicle Code section 23640 and section 1001.95, concluding that the statutes can be harmonized and that misdemeanor diversion is permissible except in specific cases listed in section 1001.95(e) and DUI cases under section 23640(a). This decision was influenced by the presumption against implied repeal. In contrast, Diaz-Armstrong held that the two statutes irreconcilably conflict, declaring section 1001.95 as controlling; its dissent argued for harmonization based on the non-exclusivity of section 1001.95(e). The majority opinion aligns with previous cases in supporting harmonization but diverges significantly by asserting that section 23640 is more specific than section 1001.95 and therefore prevails. It explicitly rejects the Tellez ruling, which found an irreconcilable conflict between section 23640 and section 1001.36, suggesting that the same conflict would apply to section 1001.95. The majority opinion counters this by claiming both diversion statutes can coexist with section 23640, asserting that nothing in the diversion statutes prohibits such an interpretation. The core issue remains whether section 1001.95 and Vehicle Code section 23640 can be harmonized, which the majority addresses using arguments already presented.
Section 1001.95 does not explicitly indicate that the exemptions listed in subdivision (e) are exclusive, leading the majority opinion to conclude they are not. The majority relies on the absence of a "notwithstanding other law" clause in section 1001.95 but fails to address or refute the counterargument presented in Diaz-Armstrong. Furthermore, the majority opinion does not adequately engage with the previous court's ruling in Moore, which implicitly adopted Tellez's reasoning that the relevant statutes cannot be harmonized, despite suggesting that Moore left this issue open. The majority introduces a new argument stating that the authorization for misdemeanor diversion in subdivision (a) of section 1001.95 is consistent with Vehicle Code section 23640 because it refers to “a misdemeanor” rather than “any misdemeanor.” This interpretation is criticized as meritless, as the indefinite article “a” can imply either a particular instance or a general category, depending on context. Subdivision (a) allows judges to offer diversion for misdemeanors at their discretion, even against the prosecutor's objection.
Indefinite articles in the analyzed sentence imply universality, designating any judge in the superior court, any prosecuting attorney, any defendant, and any misdemeanor. The majority opinion's justification for reconciling Vehicle Code section 23640 with section 1001.95 is flawed, as it contends that the phrase "a misdemeanor" in section 1001.95 does not mean "any misdemeanor." This misinterpretation undermines the possibility of harmonization, as the majority fails to clarify what an alternative meaning could be. The majority's argument that it does not create an additional exemption for misdemeanor DUI charges is invalid, given that section 1001.95 clearly allows diversion for all misdemeanors except those explicitly exempted, which does implicitly include DUI charges. Additionally, the majority acknowledges that legislative history indicates an intention to allow diversion for misdemeanor DUI charges under section 1001.95, suggesting that this section should override Vehicle Code section 23640 in cases of irreconcilable conflict.
The majority opinion asserts that the statutes in question can be harmonized and thus interprets them under the presumption against implied repeal, which necessitates a rigorous evaluation of legislative history. It concludes that the legislative history allows for "competing inferences" regarding the authorization of diversion for misdemeanor DUIs, rendering it insufficient to counter the presumption. The author of the dissenting opinion acknowledges this foundational determination but argues that recognizing the inability to harmonize the statutes would eliminate the presumption against implied repeal, revealing clear legislative intent to authorize diversion for misdemeanor DUIs.
The dissent critiques the majority's complex argument distinguishing between legislative intent to authorize diversion and intent to partially repeal Vehicle Code section 23640. The majority acknowledges that legislators understood the enacted bill did not exempt misdemeanor DUI charges from diversion but contends that this understanding does not equate to an intent to partially repeal the existing law. The majority further emphasizes the integrity of the legislative process, arguing that an implied repeal based on legislative silence undermines the authority of statutes passed by previous legislative majorities, as the absence of explicit language in the newer statute cannot confirm current majority support for repeal.
Implied repeals based on legislative silence pose a risk of undermining the decisions of a legislative majority with lesser support from a subsequent legislature. The argument presented does not clarify whether section 1001.95 is ambiguous or can be harmonized with Vehicle Code section 23640. If the statutes are inharmonious, the argument suggests the earlier statute prevails unless explicitly repealed by the later statute, which contradicts established case law that does not require explicit repeal and asserts that the later statute controls unless it is less specific. If the statutes can be harmonized, the argument implies that implied repeals by silence should be avoided; however, this is already guided by a presumption against such repeals. The argument either contradicts binding precedent or contributes little to the analysis, yet it demands a response due to its implications on legislative intent and the requirement for explicitness, which could misrepresent the nature of statutes like Vehicle Code section 23640. If section 1001.95 were enacted without exceptions, it would conflict with Vehicle Code section 23640, making it the controlling statute despite the absence of an explicit reference to it. The conclusions remain valid regardless of the legislative history or awareness of Vehicle Code section 23640 by legislators. Ultimately, if section 1001.95 clearly allows diversion for misdemeanor DUIs, it irreconcilably conflicts with Vehicle Code section 23640 and prevails as the later-enacted statute, reaffirming that the later statute is not merely a tiebreaker but a foundational principle.
The passage highlights the principle that the current Legislature retains the authority to enact laws that reflect contemporary public policy, independent of past legislative actions. It emphasizes that statutes, including Vehicle Code section 23640, do not possess inherent permanence simply due to their historical enactment. The Legislature has the power to modify or repeal existing laws as it sees fit, without needing to reference specific statutes or topics. The majority opinion's reliance on legislative intent is critiqued as potentially undermining legislative authority. Additionally, the discussion touches on the relationship between specific and general statutes, asserting that the majority's conclusion regarding Vehicle Code section 23640 as the controlling statute is inconsistent with prior case law, which suggests that either statute could be deemed more specific based on the context. The passage argues that the majority's interpretation fails to harmonize the statutes adequately and conflicts with established judicial reasoning.
The majority opinion asserts that Vehicle Code section 23640, which is limited to DUI charges, is more specific than section 1001.95, which applies more broadly to all misdemeanors. However, the majority's conclusion relies on an arbitrary focus, as Vehicle Code section 23640 applies to both felonies and misdemeanors, while section 1001.95 is restricted to misdemeanors only. Therefore, the general-versus-specific rule of statutory construction does not provide a clear resolution. The majority opinion ultimately argues that harmonization of the two sections is impossible, especially since section 1001.95's language referring to “a misdemeanor” indicates it encompasses all misdemeanors.
In contrast, the concurrence claims that the two sections can be reconciled by applying the principle that a more specific statute prevails over a general one. This perspective is deemed unpersuasive because it violates the rule that the specific statute controls only when the statutes cannot be reconciled. While the majority acknowledges the possibility of reconciliation, it also suggests that if reconciliation fails, Vehicle Code section 23640 would prevail due to its specificity. The concurrence's reliance on a hypothetical example of conflicting park signs to illustrate its point is criticized as doctrinally incoherent, as it overlooks the necessity of reconciling the two statutes before determining which one controls.
The concurrence's interpretation of section 1001.95 alongside Vehicle Code section 23640 is flawed due to a misunderstanding of the ambiguity in noun phrases. It explains that noun phrases can have both universal and particular meanings based on context. An example is provided comparing signs that allow food and drinks, with the ambiguity of whether "all" or "some" is permitted. The first sign does not unambiguously allow all food and drinks, as clarified by a second sign prohibiting alcoholic beverages. If the first sign explicitly states "all food and drinks allowed," it creates a contradiction with the second sign, making reconciliation impossible. The analysis asserts that the phrase "a misdemeanor" in section 1001.95 unambiguously indicates "any misdemeanor," a point on which no alternative interpretations have been offered. The concurrence's argument relies on the Williamson rule, which suggests that if a general statute encompasses conduct also covered by a special statute, the latter is the exclusive means of prosecution. This principle underscores the distinction between the statutes in question, reinforcing the argument against their harmonization.
Special statutes in the Vehicle Code classify making or filing a false report of vehicle theft as a misdemeanor (Veh. Code. 10501, subd. a) and prohibit filing false statements with the Department of Motor Vehicles (Veh. Code. 20). The case of Williamson addresses whether a conspiracy to violate a specific Business and Professions Code section can be prosecuted under a general prohibition on conspiracies or only under the specific section. The concurrence disagrees with the dissent regarding the interpretation of conflicting statutes, emphasizing that the issue is not whether one statute is exclusive but whether two statutes can be reconciled. It asserts that Vehicle Code sections 23640 and 1001.95 conflict irreconcilably, as one prohibits what the other permits, making the Williamson rule inapplicable. The concurrence also states that the Legislature must explicitly target a statute for repeal, and merely enacting a conflicting statute is insufficient. The conclusion critiques the majority and concurrence for their attempts to harmonize the conflicting statutes, arguing that their analyses are flawed, inconsistent, and overlook essential canons of statutory construction.
Several arguments fail to adequately address counterpoints, notably regarding the lack of a “notwithstanding” clause in section 1001.95. While all parties agree that section 1001.95 and Vehicle Code section 23640 can be harmonized, none identify ambiguities in the statutory language. The nearest attempt involves the majority opinion noting that section 1001.95 refers to "a misdemeanor" instead of "any misdemeanor," yet this distinction does not hold, as "a misdemeanor" is interpreted as "any misdemeanor." The majority opinion also acknowledges that the statutes are unambiguous when viewed separately but does not clarify any ambiguity when considered together. California district attorneys had previously informed the Legislature that section 1001.95 would prohibit diversion for DUIs, yet the Legislature enacted it regardless. After failing to prevent its enactment, the district attorneys shifted their argument, asserting that section 1001.95 does not permit diversion for DUIs, leading to judicial acquiescence in their favor, except for the majority opinion in Diaz-Armstrong. The courts have not provided a compelling rationale for disregarding the Legislature's clear intent that diversion under section 1001.95 applies to all misdemeanors not explicitly excluded. Consequently, the author concludes that the petition should be denied and expresses dissent.
