United States v. Rivera

Citation: Not availableDocket: 17-59-cr

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; July 28, 2022; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Paul Rivera, also known by several aliases, appeals his conviction from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, where he was found guilty of multiple offenses, including racketeering, murder in aid of racketeering, narcotics offenses, interstate prostitution, and sex trafficking of minors. Rivera contends that the district court erred by allowing him to self-represent without a psychiatric evaluation. The court held that while it has the discretion to assess a defendant's mental competence prior to granting pro se representation, it is not mandatory to order psychiatric testing. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that Rivera's conviction stemmed from his involvement in the criminal organization "Together Forever," which he co-founded in the 1980s, and was implicated in various criminal activities including drug trafficking and forced prostitution. Rivera was arrested in 2012 following a traffic stop that uncovered illegal drugs, leading to his indictment in 2013 for multiple charges, including narcotics conspiracy and murder. Over the course of his legal proceedings, he changed attorneys seven times before deciding to represent himself. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Attorney Steve Zissou represented Rivera starting March 1, 2013, for his initial appearance in district court. On March 18, the government sought to disqualify Zissou due to a conflict of interest, as his wife represented a victim-witness whose identity needed protection. The government asserted Zissou's disqualification was crucial because he was privy to the victim-witness's identity and her cooperation with the government. Zissou opposed the disqualification, citing Rivera's challenging personality—describing him as distrusting, difficult, and potentially psychologically unstable—and warned that replacing counsel would complicate representation.

Despite Zissou's objections, the district court disqualified him and appointed new counsel. Rivera subsequently hired a privately-retained attorney, who withdrew after a month due to a conflict, leading to the appointment of Martin Goldberg. Rivera later expressed dissatisfaction with Goldberg, claiming an "impasse" in their relationship, partly due to his lingering admiration for Zissou. The court then appointed Guy Oskenhendler as his attorney. 

On October 7, a grand jury issued a second superseding indictment against Rivera for murder in aid of racketeering, a capital offense. David Stern was later appointed to assist Oskenhendler. After the government opted not to pursue the death penalty, Rivera chose to continue with Stern. In May 2014, Rivera requested a change, and the court replaced Stern with Donald DuBoulay, cautioning that he would not receive an eighth attorney.

On April 27, 2015, Rivera sought to represent himself due to disagreements with DuBoulay regarding legal strategy, asserting that DuBoulay acted as though he were guilty. The judge conducted an ex parte hearing, outlining the dangers of self-representation, especially given the potential life sentence Rivera faced and the risk of inadvertently admitting guilt through proffer statements. Despite the judge’s concerns regarding Rivera’s understanding of his situation and previous pro se submissions containing harmful admissions, she ultimately allowed him to proceed pro se, with DuBoulay serving as standby counsel.

Counsel for Rivera's co-defendant moved to sever their cases, citing Rivera's perceived mental illness and irrational behavior. The prosecutor echoed concerns about Rivera's decision-making. However, the judge observed no such behavior and determined that Rivera had knowingly and voluntarily chosen to represent himself pro se. During the trial, Rivera insisted on wearing his prison uniform and claimed factual innocence, prompting the admission of his incriminating statement. His cross-examinations were criticized as ineffective, leading him to request assistance partway through. Following a guilty verdict on all counts, Rivera sought to have his former counsel reappointed, which was granted. His counsel then filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. Rivera received a life sentence for murder related to racketeering, along with additional consecutive and concurrent sentences. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred by allowing him to represent himself without ensuring his competency, citing his long-term substance abuse and signs of mental illness. Rivera claimed the court violated principles from Indiana v. Edwards regarding self-representation. The legal framework established by Faretta v. California supports a defendant's right to self-representation, provided they knowingly waive the benefits of counsel. The court maintains that a defendant must intelligently forgo these benefits to proceed pro se.

The district court is required to ensure that a defendant understands the risks of self-representation, establishing that the decision is made knowingly. In the case of Edwards, the Supreme Court established a limited exception to the right to self-representation for defendants who are competent to stand trial but suffer from severe mental illness, allowing courts to mandate counsel in such cases. Rivera contended that under Edwards, the district court had a duty to order a psychiatric evaluation to ascertain whether he fell into this category. However, the court rejected this assertion, clarifying that while an inquiry is permitted, it is not mandated. Other circuit courts have similarly concluded that there is no obligation for a court to conduct an additional competency evaluation for defendants wishing to represent themselves if they are already deemed competent for trial.

The ruling emphasized that Edwards does not require courts to deny self-representation based on questionable mental competence nor to conduct additional competency inquiries for every defendant seeking to proceed pro se. The district court retains discretion and may choose not to conduct a psychiatric evaluation prior to allowing a defendant to represent themselves. In Rivera's case, the judge effectively communicated the risks of self-representation and assessed his understanding of those risks, having observed his behavior over two years without issues. Despite Rivera's claims that his self-representation was detrimental, the court found no evidence of severe mental illness impairing his ability to conduct his defense. Thus, the district court's decision to permit Rivera to proceed pro se was affirmed.