Travis J. Harrington v. Rice Lake Weighing Systems, Inc., and Rice Lake Bearing, Inc.
Docket: 96-2978
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 25, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Travis Harrington was terminated by Rice Lake Weighing Systems, Inc. shortly after returning to work from neck surgery, despite his physician lifting all medical restrictions and indicating a full recovery. Harrington claimed that he was regarded as disabled by Rice Lake and was discharged for that reason, leading him to file a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court ruled in favor of Rice Lake, stating that Harrington did not provide sufficient evidence to prove he was disabled as defined by the ADA, resulting in a summary judgment for the defendants. Harrington had worked for Rice Lake from May 1991 until his termination in December 1992, performing multiple roles including customer service and supervision. His injury occurred on August 2, 1992, during a trade show, and he was diagnosed with a cervical disk herniation that required surgery. After the surgery on October 23, 1992, he initially returned to work with temporary lifting restrictions, which were expected to be lifted soon based on his doctor’s assessments. Following a slip and fall incident at work on December 10, 1992, Harrington experienced renewed neck issues and scheduled a doctor's appointment, but the situation culminated in his dismissal before he could address these concerns.
Dr. Gianaris and Harrington confirmed on December 16 that, despite a slip on the stairs, Harrington's cervical range of motion was improving, and strength in his right arm was recovering as expected, with no further work restrictions imposed. On December 18, 1992, Harrington received a dismissal notice from Rice Lake Weighing Systems due to continued absences without proper sign-out, effective immediately. Following his dismissal, Harrington relocated to Louisiana, where doctors discovered a collapse of the fused-bone structure from prior surgery, necessitating a second surgery. Post-surgery, doctors advised him to seek less physically demanding employment. Harrington then filed a claim with the Wisconsin Worker’s Compensation Division, alleging Rice Lake violated Wis. Stat. 102.35(3) by not rehiring him after his work-related injury. An administrative law judge ruled in his favor on November 1, 1994, and he succeeded in an appeal. Subsequently, he filed a lawsuit in district court under the ADA, claiming discrimination based on disability. The district court granted summary judgment for Rice Lake, concluding Harrington failed to demonstrate he was "disabled" under the ADA. Harrington appealed this decision, arguing he provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue regarding his disability status and that the findings from the Worker’s Compensation Division should preclude Rice Lake's defense in the ADA case. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, and to survive summary judgment, Harrington must prove he qualifies as such under the statute's definitions of "disability."
An impairment is defined as any physiological disorder, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or mental disorder that affects one of the body's systems. To determine if an impairment is substantially limiting, courts consider the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration, and its long-term impact. Major life activities are basic functions that the average person can perform with minimal difficulty, such as breathing, hearing, seeing, speaking, walking, working, and learning.
Harrington contends that the district court wrongly granted summary judgment, arguing that he provided enough evidence for a jury to decide whether Rice Lake perceived him as disabled. However, this claim does not hold. The "regarded as" provision of the ADA aims to address misconceptions employers may have about impairments that are not substantially limiting. The ADA outlines three criteria to meet the "regarded as" test: (1) an individual with a non-substantially limiting impairment treated as if it were substantially limiting; (2) an individual whose impairment is substantially limiting due to others' attitudes; and (3) an individual with no impairment who is perceived as having a substantially limiting impairment.
In Harrington's case, the third category does not apply since he has a neck injury, classified as an impairment. The second category also does not apply as there is no evidence that his impairment significantly limited his work ability post-surgery. Although initial lifting restrictions were placed by Harrington’s physician, these were temporary and lifted before discharge. Harrington's role as a salesperson and personnel manager involved minimal lifting, and being unable to perform minor job aspects does not equate to a substantial limitation on working. An employer does not regard an employee as handicapped merely because the employee cannot meet specific job demands, as established in legal precedents. An impairment that restricts a plaintiff from a narrow range of jobs does not qualify as substantially limiting under the ADA.
Harrington must demonstrate that Rice Lake perceived him as substantially limited in his job due to a disability. He cites his request for assistance post-surgery as indicative of Rice Lake's perception, despite having no lifting restrictions at the time of his termination. Harrington claims Rice Lake was aware of his recovery issues from a self-report about potential permanent problems and an incident where he slipped at work. However, these self-reports do not sufficiently imply that management understood his condition as a substantial limitation, especially since he was performing his duties adequately at the time of his discharge.
Harrington further argues that the removal of part of his workstation upon his return from surgery suggested Rice Lake believed he would not return to work for long. This assertion is deemed speculative, as there was no evidence that Rice Lake lacked the items needed for Harrington to perform his job.
He also contends that a worker's compensation ruling indicating he was fired due to his injuries implies Rice Lake regarded him as disabled. Nonetheless, a compensable injury under Wisconsin law is distinct from a disability under the ADA; thus, being fired for an injury does not inherently establish an ADA claim.
Ultimately, the court finds that there is no evidence to suggest Rice Lake regarded Harrington as disabled prior to his discharge. The conclusion that Rice Lake must have perceived him as disabled simply based on his firing is deemed circular and unsupported by facts, as all medical evaluations indicated a positive recovery trajectory. The court affirms that Harrington did not meet the burden of proof required to establish he was disabled as defined by the ADA at the time of his termination, resulting in the affirmation of summary judgment in favor of Rice Lake.
