Nellie BRASIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEINEMANNS INC., Bakeries, Defendant-Appellee

Citations: 121 F.3d 281; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19802; 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,882; 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 943; 1997 WL 426945Docket: 96-3559

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 30, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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Nellie Brasic was terminated from her position at Heinemann's Bakeries after slapping a co-worker, Nicholas Lemus, in violation of the company's "no-hitting" rule, which mandates immediate termination for such conduct. Following her termination, Brasic, supported by her union, filed a grievance which was denied by Heinemann's. Subsequently, she sued the company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming sex discrimination, alleging that male employees involved in similar altercations were not terminated.

Heinemann's moved for summary judgment, asserting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Brasic's termination—her violation of company policy. Brasic attempted to counter this by citing instances of male employees not facing termination for similar conduct but failed to adequately substantiate her claims according to procedural rules. Specifically, she did not file the required concise response or supporting materials as mandated by Local Rule 12(M) and 12(N).

The district court found that Brasic's opposition lacked the necessary citations and supporting evidence, leading to the conclusion that Heinemann's policies were uniformly enforced. The court determined that Brasic's arguments did not effectively counter the established facts supporting Heinemann's position, resulting in a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Brasic's subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court emphasizing the importance of properly filed statements in summary judgment proceedings.

Brasic appeals, asserting that she adequately addressed the defendant's claims according to Local Rule 12(M) and points to instances where the "no-hitting" rule was allegedly not enforced for male employees. However, the court emphasizes that when a non-moving party fails to respond appropriately to uncontested facts in the moving party's 12(M) statement, those facts are deemed admitted. Consequently, the court accepts as true all material facts presented by Heinemann that were supported by the record but not contested by Brasic.

The burden rests on Brasic to demonstrate that Heinemann's stated reason for her termination—a legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason—was pretextual. Heinemann provided evidence, including written rules against fighting and an acknowledgment from Brasic of her violation (striking a co-worker). The decision to terminate was made by plant manager Lowell Lindholm, with no indication that Brasic's gender influenced this decision. A grievance meeting upheld the termination based solely on her actions, and Heinemann cited past instances of male employees being terminated for similar conduct to reinforce that the no-hitting rule was consistently applied.

Heinemann's justification for terminating Brasic is central to the case, with Brasic contesting certain facts outlined by Heinemann. She admitted to several paragraphs but claimed others were false or repetitious, particularly asserting that she was treated differently than male employees regarding termination for similar conduct. Brasic cited numerous exhibits to support her claims but failed to provide specific references in accordance with Rule 12(N), which requires parties to identify particular evidence rather than broadly referencing entire affidavits or the full record. The court emphasizes that it is not responsible for searching the record for evidence of a triable issue; the nonmoving party must clearly indicate conflicting facts and supporting evidence. Brasic's lack of a separate 12(N) statement, detailing additional facts and specific references to the record, further undermines her position. Her claims regarding male employees' misconduct and unequal treatment were not substantiated with the required specificity, leaving the district court without adequate information to consider her arguments.

Brasic's noncompliance with Local General Rule 12(N) prevented the district court from considering additional evidence necessary to challenge Heinemann's business justification for her termination. The court found that Heinemann had a no-hitting policy that mandated termination for a first offense, and Brasic was terminated after physically striking Lemus. This failure to adhere to the procedural rule was deemed a significant error, leading to summary judgment for Heinemann. 

On appeal, while the review is de novo, the court noted that it would not search for unaddressed material facts. Brasic attempted to introduce evidence suggesting that male employees violated the same rule without facing termination; however, the testimony from Caroline Seestadt lacked substance, as she did not confirm management's awareness of the incidents or their outcomes. Her claims, considered hearsay and irrelevant, did not effectively challenge the legitimacy of Heinemann's actions. 

One specific incident cited by Brasic involved a male employee who was not fired after being struck, but this was undermined by the victim retracting his accusation and the absence of witnesses. The court emphasized that the mere existence of one unpunished incident does not invalidate the policy or its enforcement, particularly when the plaintiff admits to violating the rules. The judiciary is not to interfere with legitimate business decisions, and employers are allowed a degree of discretion in their judgment as long as they genuinely believe in their rationale for disciplinary actions.

Evidence of a similar incident involved two employees who struck each other and were terminated, illustrating Heinemann’s strict enforcement of its no-hitting policy, which was similarly applied to Brasic. The district court properly concluded that Brasic was terminated for the same violation due to a lack of contradictory evidence. Heinemann was entitled to summary judgment regardless of whether Brasic's evidence complied with local rules. Therefore, the court affirms the summary judgment in favor of Heinemann. Additionally, Brasic initially raised claims of sexual harassment but later withdrew them, leaving those claims unaddressed on appeal. The document cites the requirements of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois' Local General Rules 12(M) and 12(N), detailing the necessary components for filing and opposing motions for summary judgment, including the submission of affidavits, memorandums of law, and concise statements of material facts. Failure to comply with these requirements can lead to denial of the motions.