Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; August 27, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Phillip T. Still appealed the United States District Court's summary judgment favoring his former employer, Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., claiming wrongful termination due to a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court ruled that Still was not legally disabled under the ADA, leading to the affirmation of its judgment.
Freeport, a petroleum exploration company, had employed Still since 1988, initially as a safety equipment clerk, and later transferring him to a warehouse clerk position at Caminada Mine. Following the mine's closure in March 1994, Still was offered a transfer to work as an outside rig worker but declined, citing safety concerns due to his partial blindness. His refusal resulted in his discharge.
The district court found that Still's partial blindness did not constitute a disability since it did not substantially limit any major life activities, which include seeing and working. The court noted that Still could perform daily activities such as driving and marksmanship, demonstrating that he was not substantially limited in his sight or ability to work. Consequently, Still failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, which requires proof of having a disability, being qualified for the job, and experiencing adverse employment actions due to that disability.
Still is not substantially limited in his ability to work, as he has not shown significant restrictions in performing a broad range of jobs compared to an average person with similar skills. The inability to perform one specific job does not equate to a substantial limitation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Evidence indicates that Still has held various positions, including security officer, acting sergeant, road deputy, reserve officer, oil sales representative, and field accountant, all of which involve strenuous work. This diverse employment history suggests he can perform a broad range of jobs, indicating he is not legally disabled.
Even if Still presented evidence of a disability, the district court's judgment would still be upheld because he is not a "qualified individual" under the ADA. To succeed in an ADA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate qualification for the job they hold or seek. The closure of Still's position as a warehouse clerk at the Caminada Mine does not obligate Freeport to create a new position for him. Although Freeport offered him a position as a rig worker, Still claimed he was not qualified for the job and that no reasonable accommodation could enable him to fulfill its basic requirements. By his own admission, he was therefore unqualified for the position. Consequently, the summary judgment by the district court is affirmed.
Regulations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) define "substantially limits" as a significant restriction in the ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs compared to an average person with similar skills. Inability to perform a specific job does not qualify as a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. To assess whether an individual is substantially limited in this context, several factors are considered: (A) the geographical areas accessible to the individual; (B) the job from which the individual is disqualified due to impairment, along with the number and types of similar jobs also affected; and (C) the disqualified job and the number of disqualified jobs that do not require similar skills within the same geographical area. This interpretation is outlined in 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3) and referenced in Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996).
