Terry Mincey, the Petitioner-Appellant, is appealing the denial of his habeas corpus petition concerning his convictions for murder, aggravated battery, and armed robbery, as well as a death sentence for the murder. He raises multiple grounds for relief, primarily claiming that incriminating statements were obtained after he requested legal counsel, the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence, and he received ineffective assistance from his attorneys. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, presided over by Judge Hugh Lawson, denied his petition, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirms this decision.
The case details events from April 12, 1982, when Mincey, along with Robert Jones and Timothy Jenkins, plotted a robbery. After meeting at Jones's trailer home, where they modified a shotgun for the robbery, they considered various targets. Eventually, Mincey proposed robbing the Mini Food Store, expressing a disregard for leaving witnesses, which led to discussions about potentially harming people present during the robbery. The narrative demonstrates their premeditated intent to commit robbery, facilitated by their possession of firearms and discussions of eliminating witnesses.
Mincey, Jenkins, and Jones arrived at a store where Mincey brandished a pistol and instructed the cashier, Paulette Riggs, to empty the cash register while forcing two teenagers, Mischell and Bubba McCook, to comply. As Mincey exited the store with Riggs, he encountered firefighter Russell Peterman at a gas pump, threatened him, and shot him twice, first in the chest and then in the head. The McCook siblings fled towards a field as Mincey shot Riggs, hitting her in the ear before executing her with a second shot to the head. After this, Mincey and his accomplices fled in a Mustang. During their escape, Mincey expressed concern over the survival of the McCook siblings, lamenting that he faced severe charges for a small sum of money. Witness Larry Ballard heard the gunshots and reported the incident, noting the distinctive Mustang used in the getaway. Following the crime, Jones drove to various locations, disposing of the shotgun involved, while investigators quickly linked him to the crime scene due to his known criminal history.
Boren, suspecting Holcomb might know Jones' location, contacted Holcomb's sister, who informed him that Holcomb and Jones were together. Boren located Jones at Holcomb's trailer-home early on April 13 and arrested him after advising him of his Miranda rights. Jones implicated Mincey as the shooter in a robbery and provided Boren with a phone number for Mincey and a description of his motorcycle. Boren traced the number to the Hill-N-Dale Trailer Park and dispatched officers to apprehend Mincey. Upon arrival, they encountered Mrs. Mincey, who confirmed Mincey's presence inside the trailer. She helped the officer contact Mincey, who was then arrested and taken to the Bibb County Law Enforcement Center (LEC). At the LEC, Mincey was read his rights again and subsequently made incriminating statements.
Later that day, Boren obtained a search warrant for Mrs. Mincey's trailer, where a .38 caliber Llama pistol and blood-stained clothing were seized. Jenkins was also arrested and confessed, implicating Mincey. On April 13, 1982, the Indigent Defense Coordinator appointed J. Robert Daniel to represent Mincey. The next day, a grand jury indicted Mincey, Jones, and Jenkins for murder, aggravated battery, and armed robbery. Jones and Jenkins entered guilty pleas on April 22, with agreements to testify against Mincey, prompting the district attorney to pursue the death penalty for him. During the pretrial hearing on April 23, Daniel informed the court of the death penalty pursuit, his consultation with co-counsel Claude R. Cook, and his request for a psychiatric evaluation of Mincey, noting his history of drug use, including possible LSD use on the crime day.
Mincey, who had a history of serious head injuries and blackouts, was subjected to a "Petition for Psychological Examination" filed by Daniel on April 26, seeking evaluation for his "competency to stand trial" and "responsibility for actions at the time of the alleged offense." Daniel cited Mincey's lack of prior violence, history of drug abuse, and head injuries as observations supporting the request. Mincey consented to the evaluation, and the district attorney signed the petition. The superior court approved the petition on April 28, mandating an evaluation by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist and requiring a report to be submitted.
However, Daniel and Cook later expressed concerns that any incriminating information disclosed by Mincey during the evaluation might be used against him at trial, prompting them to postpone the examination until they could seek clarification from the court. Concurrently, Daniel requested funds for an independent mental health expert to assess Mincey. Dr. Dan Johnson, who examined Mincey informally, found no signs of organic brain damage or basis for an insanity defense.
During a pretrial conference on April 30, the court deferred a decision on the funding motion pending the court-ordered examination results. At a hearing on May 3, the court discussed the implications of the examination with the involved parties, ultimately ruling that Mincey could invoke his Fifth Amendment rights but did not limit the examiner's questions. Following this hearing, Mincey's attorneys decided he should proceed with the court-ordered examination to avoid claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
On May 17, the forensic team reported to the court that Mincey was competent to stand trial and sane at the time of the offense, noting no evidence of thought disorder, a lack of prior psychiatric treatment, logical and coherent speech, and good reality contact. The report highlighted Mincey's drug abuse and antisocial behavior as significant findings. Under Georgia law, to establish an insanity defense, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they lacked the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the crime.
Under Georgia law, insanity is an affirmative defense that the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (Grace v. Hopper, 566 F.2d 507, 510; Adams v. State, 254 Ga. 481). To succeed, the defendant must demonstrate that, due to mental illness, he acted under a delusional compulsion that overpowered his will (Ga.Code Ann. 16-3-3). Additionally, the defendant must show both the act resulted from a delusion and that the facts, as perceived, would justify the act (Freeman v. State, 132 Ga.App. 742).
In the case of Mincey, his attorneys concluded that establishing an insanity defense was not feasible based on forensic findings regarding a crime at the Mini Food Store. They also believed that suggesting Mincey was under the influence of acid could be detrimental, as he had indicated to jail personnel that he wanted to pursue an insanity defense based on drug use. His attorneys were concerned that the prosecution would effectively counter such a defense. Instead, they decided to create reasonable doubt about whether Mincey, rather than his accomplice Jenkins, was the shooter.
During the trial, Mincey had discussed with Jenkins his intention to claim an insanity plea due to being "wired out on acid." However, after investigation, his attorneys found no factual basis for this claim. When the prosecution questioned witnesses about drug use before arriving at the Mini Food Store, both Jones and Jenkins reported sharing only a marijuana cigarette with Mincey, who did not appear to be under the influence.
In closing arguments, Mincey's counsel countered the prosecution's insinuation regarding drug use as a defense, emphasizing their commitment to honesty. Ultimately, Mincey was found guilty on August 26, 1982, and sentenced to death the same day. He later appealed his convictions and death sentence to the Georgia Supreme Court, raising claims regarding the legality of his warrantless arrest and the validity of statements made to police after being denied legal counsel, citing violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, respectively.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Mincey's conviction and rejected his claims of error in Mincey v. State. Following this, the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari on November 7, 1983. On March 5, 1984, Mincey, through attorney Michael R. Hauptman, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Butts County Superior Court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by attorneys Daniel and Cook during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. He claimed they failed to investigate his case adequately and did not call witnesses who could have provided favorable testimony. Hauptman highlighted that Mincey had suffered a head injury from a motorcycle accident, leading to personality changes and violent outbursts, which were relevant to his defense but not sufficiently explored by his attorneys. The defense's psychological evaluation was minimal, and no experts were called to testify on Mincey's behalf.
The superior court held an evidentiary hearing where Daniel and Cook defended their actions. Ultimately, the court found no merit in Mincey's claims and denied relief on February 7, 1988. The Georgia Supreme Court subsequently denied his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his certiorari petition on October 3, 1988.
On February 9, 1989, Mincey, now represented by new counsel, petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for habeas corpus, introducing claims not previously presented in state courts, including allegations of prosecutorial misconduct for withholding exculpatory evidence, specifically notes regarding his competency evaluation. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice due to failure to exhaust state remedies. Consequently, on December 7, 1989, Mincey, with new representation, filed another habeas corpus petition in the Butts County Superior Court.
On November 30, 1993, Mincey amended his habeas petition, prompting the court to hear arguments regarding the State's motion to dismiss it as successive. The court determined that Mincey could have raised his Brady claim regarding the prosecutor's notes during his first habeas petition filed on March 5, 1984. Consequently, the court found that Mincey's claims were barred due to either prior litigation or the possibility of being raised earlier, leading to the dismissal of his petition on March 3, 1994, under Georgia's abuse of the writ statute (Ga.Code Ann. 9-14-51).
The Georgia Supreme Court denied Mincey's application for a certificate of probable cause on October 27, 1994, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari on June 19, 1995. Following exhaustion of his claims, Mincey returned to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on April 24, 1996, filing a new habeas corpus petition signed by attorneys Michael Garrett and M. Elizabeth Wells, which included nineteen claims of constitutional error. After an amendment on September 19, 1996, the total claims increased to twenty-five.
The district court, after reviewing the State's response and state court records, concluded it could resolve Mincey's claims without an evidentiary hearing. On May 7, 1997, the court issued an order rejecting all of Mincey's claims and ruled in favor of the State. Mincey subsequently filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that, if given an evidentiary hearing, he could demonstrate "cause" for the procedural default of his Brady claim and the resulting "prejudice."
On August 26, 1997, the district court denied Mincey's Rule 59(e) motion, concluding that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. The court did not address the merits of claims VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XIV, including Mincey's Brady claim regarding the prosecutor's notes, due to procedural default—Mincey failed to present these claims to Georgia state courts, which did not rule on them. Mincey did not establish "cause" for this failure or demonstrate resulting "prejudice," referencing Wainwright v. Sykes. The district court found the remaining claims insufficient as a matter of law. Mincey's motion also challenged the adequacy of his attorneys' performance during trial and appeal, asserting the state habeas court's hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel was not "full and fair" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), requesting a new evidentiary hearing. The district court rejected this assertion, affirming that the state habeas hearing was adequate and that Mincey did not justify the need for a new hearing, believing Mincey's argument was merely a misapplication of the Strickland v. Washington standard. In his motion, Mincey recognized the state's claim that he had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim by not including it in his first habeas petition, arguing for an evidentiary hearing to determine the default status. The district court ruled that such a hearing was unwarranted, as the Butts County Superior Court had declared the Brady claim barred as successive. On September 26, 1997, Mincey appealed the May 7 judgment and the August 26 order. Subsequently, the district court appointed new counsel for Mincey. Ultimately, twenty-one of Mincey's twenty-five claims were either procedurally defaulted or meritless, leading to their dismissal. The remaining claims, discussed in part III, included issues related to the jury selection process and restrictions on defense counsel's voir dire.
The trial court made several legal errors, including improperly excusing jurors with reservations about capital punishment while retaining those committed to the death penalty, and wrongfully excusing a juror who knew Mincey’s family. The prosecutor violated Batson v. Kentucky by using peremptory challenges to strike African-American jurors. Exculpatory evidence was withheld from the defense, including statements from witnesses and mitigating evidence, violating Brady v. Maryland. The court improperly allowed statements made by codefendants and inmates to be introduced, as well as unreliable identification testimony. The prosecutor's closing arguments were deemed improper and prejudicial, impacting the fairness of the trial. During sentencing, the trial court disallowed mitigating evidence and allowed the introduction of impact evidence and Mincey's prior convictions, which were also improper. The closing argument in the sentencing phase appealed to juror emotions, and the jury instructions were confusing and restrictive. The trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence was based on an unconstitutional test. Claims regarding juror selection, evidence withholding, and improper arguments were found to be procedurally defaulted due to Mincey's failure to timely present them in state courts, while others were deemed meritless. Additionally, Mincey argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to a warrantless arrest, which invalidated subsequent evidence, and that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was denied legal counsel during police questioning. Lastly, it was claimed that the prosecutor failed to provide notes from a competency evaluation prior to trial, further violating due process.
Mincey's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial is evaluated. For a valid review of his Fourth Amendment claim, it is established that Mincey had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim in state court, as mandated by Stone v. Powell. The Supreme Court's precedent indicates that if a state provides such an opportunity, federal habeas corpus relief cannot be granted based on unconstitutional search or seizure claims. The concept of "full and fair litigation" is clarified through Townsend v. Sain, which outlines factors including the availability of hearing procedures, the development of factual issues, and the adequacy of trial court fact-findings. The record indicates Mincey received a comprehensive hearing in the Bibb County Superior Court regarding his arrest, where six witnesses testified, and the court ultimately denied his motion to suppress evidence, concluding that the officers had probable cause and that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless arrest. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, confirming that Mincey had a fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, thus precluding further federal review.
Mincey asserts that police obtained incriminating statements from him after he requested an attorney, thereby violating his Fifth Amendment rights and the established principles from *Miranda v. Arizona* and *Edwards v. Arizona*. He argues for the suppression of these statements. During the pre-trial suppression hearing, the sequence of events was largely undisputed. Mincey was arrested outside his mother's trailer, handcuffed, and placed in a police vehicle with Officer Boren and Officer Spires. Boren began advising Mincey of his Miranda rights, to which Mincey interrupted, claiming he was aware of his rights. Boren continued to read the rights in full and confirmed Mincey's understanding.
After reaching the Law Enforcement Center (LEC), Boren read the rights again and left Mincey alone with Spires, whom he knew from a previous encounter. Spires reiterated the Miranda rights using a waiver form, which Mincey read but ultimately refused to sign, stating he needed a lawyer for the case. The waiver form outlined his rights to remain silent and the possibility of using any statements against him in court. The incident raises questions about whether Mincey’s request for counsel was adequately respected, influencing the admissibility of his statements.
Individuals have the right to consult with an attorney before making statements, and to have an attorney present during such statements. If a person cannot afford an attorney, the court must appoint one. Upon requesting an attorney, questioning must cease until the attorney is present. Terry Mincey was informed of his rights regarding an ongoing murder investigation. He voluntarily waived these rights, despite being aware of his need for legal representation. Mincey refused to sign the waiver form, particularly objecting to phrases acknowledging his understanding of his rights. He expressed a desire for a lawyer and communicated this to law enforcement, yet he proceeded to discuss the robbery and shootings with officers, stating he felt compelled to talk since he believed he wouldn't receive legal assistance. During a subsequent interview, Mincey acknowledged understanding his rights but mentioned that he was induced to make a statement due to promises made by the officers. Testimony indicated that Mincey acknowledged aspects of the events that occurred, including a chilling comment about a victim's potential death, demonstrating an awareness of the gravity of his situation.
Mincey admitted to shooting the cashier, Peterman, but claimed he did not understand why he did it and did not intend to harm two teenagers present during the incident. During police questioning, when asked if he would provide a signed statement, Mincey stated he needed "forty-five lawyers" to navigate his situation, marking the first mention of a lawyer during the interview. Following this comment, the officers stopped questioning him. On cross-examination, Mincey clarified that the "forty-five lawyers" remark was an exaggeration and acknowledged he had indicated a need for a lawyer at various points. He confirmed he was aware of his rights to remain silent and to request counsel, which had been explained to him multiple times. The officers had not coerced him, and he voluntarily made statements. The investigative report referenced Mincey's comments during the interview, including his admission of shooting Peterman. At the suppression hearing, officers Smallwood and Boren indicated they did not view Mincey's comment as a formal request for counsel and would have ceased questioning if he had explicitly asked for an attorney. On August 13, 1982, the court denied Mincey's motion to suppress his statements, concluding that he was knowledgeable about his rights and understood he could have counsel present during questioning.
Mincey waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily answered officers' questions, understanding that his statements could be used against him. The court examined Mincey's request for deletion of parts of the rights waiver form and his refusal to sign it, concluding that this behavior did not indicate a desire for legal counsel or a wish to remain silent; instead, it suggested he was trying to avoid written documentation of his statements. Although Mincey mentioned wanting a lawyer during the interrogation, the court determined he never formally requested one, noting that his comment about needing "45 lawyers" was merely casual and not a genuine request. Consequently, the court ruled that Mincey's statements were admissible as they were made freely and voluntarily after a proper waiver of rights. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings, confirming that Mincey was adequately informed of his rights and willingly waived them. The district court, in reviewing Mincey's habeas corpus petition, also adopted the state trial court's findings, presuming their correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and found no evidence of coercion or improper conduct during the questioning. Mincey seeks habeas corpus relief under the pre-AEDPA standard, asserting that his petition was filed before the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, while the State argues for the application of the post-AEDPA standard.
A federal court may deny habeas relief on claims previously adjudicated by state courts unless the state decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as defined by the Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of facts considering the evidence presented. Under the AEDPA, federal courts must presume state court findings of fact as correct, which can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. In Mincey's case, the district court applied the AEDPA standard, presuming the state trial court's findings were correct and denying his habeas petition. Mincey contended that the pre-AEDPA standard should apply since his petition was filed before the law's enactment. However, the district court determined that the outcome would be the same under either standard. Mincey's petition was filed on April 24, 1996, the same day the AEDPA was signed into law. The effective date of the AEDPA is critical as it applies to all federal habeas petitions, with the signing occurring later that day. The exact time of the signing is unspecified, but it was confirmed to be in the afternoon.
The President signed the AEDPA into law on April 24, 1996, after Mincey filed his habeas petition. Judicial notice is taken of this fact as it is not subject to reasonable dispute. The State has not satisfied the "opt-in" requirements under the Chapter 154 amendments to Title 28, meaning the AEDPA standard does not apply to this case. The district court's conclusion that Mincey's request for a writ fails is upheld, as the state court conducted a "full, fair, and adequate hearing" on Mincey's claims, and its factual findings are binding. While the district court's legal determinations are reviewed de novo, Mincey’s assertion that he did not waive his right to remain silent or his right to counsel is rejected. He was informed of his Miranda rights and admitted to speaking with officers voluntarily. The trial court found he understood his rights and was willing to talk, despite refusing to sign a waiver form. There is no evidence he was coerced or promised anything. Mincey’s real contention appears to be that he invoked his right to counsel, and officers continued questioning him afterward.
When a suspect in custodial interrogation requests counsel, the interrogation must stop. A suspect's request for counsel must be articulated clearly enough for a reasonable officer to understand it as such. In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the statement "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" was not an unequivocal request for counsel, establishing that if a statement is ambiguous, officers are not obligated to cease questioning. In the case of Mincey, the trial court found that while he expressed a desire for a lawyer, he did not make a clear request. Mincey's comments, including "go ahead and run the lawyers" and his statement about needing "forty-five lawyers," were deemed insufficiently clear. His refusal to sign a waiver of rights form was also not considered an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. The trial court concluded Mincey was not genuinely asserting his right to counsel but rather "toying" with the investigator. The court took into account all circumstances surrounding Mincey's statements and actions, ultimately determining that he had not unambiguously invoked his right to counsel.
Mincey engaged with law enforcement without legal counsel, believing it would facilitate his ability to deny statements made, which led him to refuse signing a waiver form. His third claim focuses on the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, as mandated by the Due Process Clause and established in Brady v. Maryland. Mincey argues that the prosecutor violated the Brady rule by withholding notes taken during a pretrial interview with a forensic team that evaluated his competency and sanity. The forensic report indicated Mincey had no evidence of mental illness and was capable of aiding his defense, although it noted drug abuse and antisocial behavior. After receiving the report, the prosecutor had a meeting with the forensic psychiatrist, Dr. James Craig, where he made notes that Mincey claims would have been beneficial to his defense during trial. The legal status of the prosecutor's notes is questioned, as it is unclear whether they constitute work product exempt from Brady disclosure requirements. However, existing case law suggests that Brady mandates the production of materials that can be considered exculpatory, thereby superseding procedural rules.
Work-product immunity under Rule 16(a)(2) protects certain discovery materials but does not exempt the prosecutor from the obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence as mandated by Brady v. Maryland. Mincey, who had a history of drug use including LSD and quaaludes, suffered brain damage from a motor vehicle accident, leading to potential irrational behavior. He raised a Brady claim in his first habeas petition, which was dismissed due to failure to exhaust state remedies. Following a second habeas petition in state court, which was dismissed as successive, Mincey submitted another petition in the district court that included his Brady claim. This claim asserted that the District Attorney failed to disclose exculpatory information regarding Mincey's mental health, violating multiple constitutional amendments. The claim was supported by evidence from the prosecutor's handwritten notes, which were discovered through the State Open Records Act and indicated Mincey's brain damage and substance influence at the time of the crime. These notes had been concealed in the District Attorney's file until revealed by post-conviction counsel.
The Central State Hospital evaluators submitted a report on May 17, 1982, focusing solely on Mr. Mincey's competency to stand trial, neglecting to mention his brain damage or the impact of his drug use (LSD and quaaludes) on the night of the crime. They informed the District Attorney of his brain damage but failed to disclose this to the Court or defense counsel, violating Brady v. Maryland, which mandates disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The District Attorney was aware that the report was misleading and concealed crucial evidence for over eight years until it was uncovered by post-conviction counsel. To establish a Brady claim, the petitioner must demonstrate: 1) the state possessed undisclosed evidence, 2) the evidence was favorable to the defense, and 3) the evidence was material, meaning its disclosure would likely have changed the trial outcome. Mr. Mincey met these criteria, as the undisclosed notes were favorable and material to his mental health defense, suggesting he would not have been convicted if disclosed timely. The State argued that Mincey's Brady claim was procedurally defaulted due to dismissal by the Butts County Superior Court under Georgia's successive petition rule. Although Mincey did not seek to amend his petition to show cause and prejudice for the default, the district court dismissed the claim on May 7, 1997. Mincey later requested a hearing to demonstrate cause for the procedural default, but the court determined his showing of resulting prejudice was insufficient as a matter of law, reaffirming its dismissal on August 26, 1997. The review of the district court's handling of Mincey's Brady claim will be conducted in two parts, starting with the procedural default dismissal.
The court reviewed whether it abused its discretion in denying Mincey's Rule 59(e) relief regarding his Brady claim. The district court concluded that Mincey had procedurally defaulted his claim, meaning it could not be addressed on the merits under federal law. Federal habeas courts cannot consider claims defaulted in state court due to an adequate and independent state procedural rule unless the petitioner demonstrates "cause" for the default and resulting "prejudice," or shows that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" would occur. Under Georgia law, a prisoner must present all grounds for relief in the original habeas petition to avoid barring subsequent petitions. Mincey failed to comply with this requirement by not including his Brady claim in his original petition to the Butts County Superior Court. Consequently, the district court could not address the merits of his claim unless he proved cause for the omission and resulting prejudice or demonstrated a manifest injustice. Mincey did not attempt to show cause or prejudice in response to the State's assertion of default and failed to take any steps to amend his petition. As a result, the district court was justified in denying Mincey's claim as procedurally defaulted.
The district court's decision not to amend the May 7 final judgment under Rule 59(e) regarding Mincey's Brady claim was evaluated for potential abuse of discretion. Under Rule 59(e), altering a judgment is at the discretion of the district judge, as established in *American Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess. Assocs.* Mincey did not argue that his procedurally defaulted Brady claim met the criteria for a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," which would have been rejected due to his inability to show a "colorable showing of innocence." A letter Mincey sent to Jones shortly after the trial, used by the State against Mincey in his motion for a new trial, indicated Mincey's awareness of their culpability.
The court noted that Mincey did not inform the court of any cause for his procedural default before filing his Rule 59(e) motion. His Brady claim's mention of the prosecutor's notes being "hidden" was interpreted as supporting his assertion of materiality rather than indicating a cause for default. The burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion is challenging.
Mincey's Rule 59(e) motion introduced for the first time that he could show cause for his procedural default and resulting prejudice if given an evidentiary hearing. He claimed he could not access the prosecutor's file until a 1989 ruling made law enforcement files publicly accessible, which hindered his ability to include his Brady claim in his initial state habeas petition. He argued that the notes would have led to evidence demonstrating his insanity or diminished capacity at the time of the offense, potentially affecting both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of his trial, as they would support claims of brain damage from a motorcycle accident and drug use impacting his accountability.
An abuse of discretion by a judge occurs when there is a failure to apply the correct legal standard, follow proper procedures, or when findings of fact are clearly erroneous. A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) is not intended for relitigating previous matters or presenting new legal theories, nor for providing the moving party another opportunity to argue issues that could have been raised before the judgment. Denial of such a motion is not an abuse of discretion if it pertains to matters that could have been addressed earlier. Additionally, a Rule 59(e) motion introducing new evidence will not succeed unless the moving party demonstrates that the evidence was unavailable at the time of judgment. In the case involving Mincey, the district court presumed he could show cause for procedural default, negating the need for an evidentiary hearing. The court then assessed whether the evidence Mincey provided met the "prejudice" requirement, which examines if undisclosed evidence could have changed the trial's outcome. The standard is whether the trial was fair and resulted in a verdict that can be trusted, rather than merely if a different verdict was likely. Mincey’s claim of unaccountability was supported by an affidavit from Dr. James Larson, a psychologist. The court acknowledged Mincey’s delayed access to the prosecutor's notes as possibly sufficient cause for not previously raising his claim, but expressed skepticism about his ability to satisfy the Sykes standard. It noted that Mincey’s counsel could have pursued access to the prosecutor's information well before the initial habeas petition in 1984.
Petitioner obtained a witness statement from the prosecutor's file through a Georgia Open Records Act request in June 1987, prior to the Parker decision, which does not serve as a sufficiency of the evidence test. The inquiry focuses on whether the undisclosed evidence significantly impacts the jury's conclusions. Expert testimony indicates that Terry Mincey suffered a serious head injury in 1980, which likely resulted in an Organic Mental Disorder and Organic Personality Disorder, altering his cognitive and personality functioning. Following the injury, his behavior became unpredictable, and he experienced memory issues. This impairment, exacerbated by the stress of a robbery, compromised his impulse control and judgment, suggesting his actions during the offense were irrational rather than premeditated.
In a Rule 59(e) motion, Mincey argued that Dr. Larson's affidavit could have supported jury instructions on affirmative defenses of insanity or diminished capacity. However, Georgia law does not recognize diminished capacity as a defense. Instead, it acknowledges an insanity defense, which requires proving the inability to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense, or a delusional compulsion. The proffered testimony from Dr. Larson would not substantiate either defense, as general insanity is not a valid defense under Georgia law, which requires a clear inability to distinguish right from wrong related to the criminal act.
Charging the jury on an insanity defense is not mandated unless evidence suggests the defendant lacked the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong. In Jackson v. State, the court determined that evidence, including the defendant's release from a mental institution, ongoing medical care, and inability to recall the alleged offense, was insufficient to warrant an insanity instruction. Dr. Larson's testimony did not meet the legal criteria for a delusional compulsion defense, which requires proof that a mental condition caused the defendant to act against his will due to a delusion related to a factual justification for the act. The court concluded that the prosecutor's failure to provide notes before trial did not prejudice Mincey's defense, as there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the notes been disclosed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in this finding. Additionally, while some states recognize an irresistible impulse defense, Georgia law does not, as established in Hicks v. State, which states that a defendant who can distinguish right from wrong has no insanity defense if compelled by an uncontrollable impulse. Regarding the penalty phase of Mincey's trial, the absence of the prosecutor's notes did not deprive him of a fair trial, as he must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome would have changed with the notes' disclosure.
To assess whether Mincey has satisfied the "reasonable probability" standard, the analysis examines evidence from the penalty phase of his trial and the evidence he presented in support of his Rule 59(e) motion. The prosecution established Mincey's prior convictions for three armed robberies committed in 1977, including details from witness Durwood Shores, who was also convicted for these offenses. During the Majik Market robbery, Mincey shot at a vehicle leaving the scene, justifying his actions by claiming the occupants shouldn't have been out that late. The prosecution substantiated Mincey's convictions through indictments and guilty pleas.
In contrast, Mincey's defense involved six witnesses, including family members and a family friend, who depicted him as a fundamentally decent person with a troubled upbringing. They highlighted the instability caused by his father's career as a minister, the impact of his parents’ divorce, and his subsequent drug abuse. Testimony also addressed the significant behavioral changes following a severe motorcycle accident in 1980, which resulted in serious injuries, including a cerebral contusion and a seizure. Family members noted a decline in Mincey's memory and mood after the accident, contrasting with his previously cheerful disposition. Notably, many potential mitigation witnesses could not provide substantial testimony regarding Mincey's character.
After the motorcycle accident in July 1980, Mincey exhibited notable personality changes, becoming moody, impulsive, and prone to anger, which was a shift from his previously easygoing demeanor. Witnesses, including family members, testified that he experienced memory issues and heightened emotional responses, leading to difficulties in daily tasks, such as remembering prices at his job in a meat market. Dr. Larson's affidavit supported these observations, linking Mincey's behavioral changes to brain damage from the accident and characterizing his actions as irrational rather than premeditated. The district court considered whether this expert testimony could have influenced the sentencing phase of Mincey’s trial, ultimately concluding that it would not have made a difference, a determination with which the reviewing body concurred.
Dr. Larson's affidavit suggests that Mincey was not impulsive or seriously impaired before the motorcycle accident and would not have acted as he did on April 12, 1982, without that incident. However, evidence contradicts this assertion, as Mincey's behavior was already irrational and violent prior to the accident, notably demonstrated by his armed robbery spree in April 1977, including an unprovoked shooting incident at the Majik Market. His actions on April 12, 1982, were consistent with his prior conduct and a prison pact to eliminate witnesses. Therefore, the district court reasonably concluded that Dr. Larson's expert testimony would have had minimal impact on the jury, justifying the denial of Mincey’s Rule 59(e) relief regarding his Brady claim.
Additionally, Mincey argued he was denied effective assistance of counsel during both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, a claim assessed under a two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington. To prove ineffective assistance, Mincey must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense, depriving him of a fair trial. The court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The performance of defense attorneys is evaluated against prevailing professional norms, respecting reasonable tactical decisions made under the circumstances.
Great deference is given to counsel's strategic decisions, emphasizing the need to evaluate their performance from the perspective at the time of the trial, while minimizing hindsight bias. The reasonableness of counsel's actions can be influenced by the defendant's own statements. To succeed on the first prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must overcome the presumption that the challenged actions were sound trial strategy. Additionally, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's errors likely affected the trial's outcome, but not necessarily to the extent of proving that it was more likely than not that the result would have changed. Instead, a "reasonable probability" must be shown, which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. In capital cases, establishing prejudice involves demonstrating that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would not have warranted a death sentence absent the errors. The document notes Mincey's ineffective assistance claims regarding his counsel’s handling of pretrial motions, defense at trial, and appeal, all of which were found to be without merit. The state habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing, thoroughly reviewing the performance of Mincey's attorneys, and the district court upheld these findings due to their strong evidentiary support.
Mincey was denied relief on his ineffective assistance claim by both the district and state habeas courts. They relied on the records from Mincey's pretrial and trial proceedings, which showed that his counsel effectively managed the pretrial suppression hearing and defended Mincey's strategy of asserting that Jenkins, not Mincey, killed Riggs. No constitutionally deficient actions were identified during the direct appeal. Mincey contends that head injuries from a 1980 motorcycle accident and drug use on the day of the crime impaired his judgment, arguing that had his attorneys consulted the forensic team or pursued funding for a mental health expert, they could have presented a diminished capacity defense, potentially resulting in a life sentence instead of a harsher penalty.
Mincey believes that contacting Dr. Craig, who reported brain damage that might have increased Mincey's susceptibility to irrational behavior, could have altered the trial strategy. However, it remains unclear if Dr. Craig would have testified that the brain damage affected Mincey's capacity at the time of the offense, as no proffer of his testimony exists in the record. The forensic team concluded that Mincey could distinguish right from wrong and was not under delusional compulsion during the offenses. Thus, the court found no failure of duty in counsel's lack of contact with Dr. Craig. Even if there were, there was insufficient evidence of prejudice per Strickland’s standard. Additionally, while Mincey's counsel did seek funds for an independent mental health expert, the court denied this motion without prejudice, allowing Mincey to pursue it after the forensic team's evaluation was complete, which Mincey claims should have been further pursued by his counsel.
Counsel's decision not to pursue funds for an independent mental health expert was deemed reasonable. Early in the case, attorneys Daniel and Cook learned of Mincey's motorcycle accident and sought a court evaluation due to concerns about his competency. The court approved a forensic examination, which confirmed Mincey did not exhibit organic brain damage or severe personality disorders, nor did it support an insanity defense. Daniel testified that Dr. Johnson's report resolved any concerns they had, leading them to forgo the motion for additional funding. Mincey argues that a deeper investigation into possible brain damage and drug use could have supported a defense of temporary insanity or diminished capacity, but the court found this argument meritless, noting that such a defense does not exist in Georgia. Furthermore, the attorneys chose not to call Dr. Johnson as a witness, believing his testimony could detract from Mincey's case and expose his report to prosecution scrutiny. Thus, the decision not to pursue an independent mental health expert was considered tactically sound under the circumstances.
Dr. Johnson's report supported the forensic team's findings, effectively eliminating the possibility of an insanity defense for Mincey, who claimed he was under the influence of acid during the crime spree—a narrative deemed implausible by the court. The district court found no fault with defense counsel's decisions, highlighting their reasonableness and professional diligence. Mincey acknowledged that Dr. Johnson's testimony would not have aided his case in either guilt or penalty phases but argued that a more suitable expert, like Dr. Larson, could have provided mitigating evidence regarding his mental health and drug use, potentially influencing the jury towards a life sentence instead of the death penalty. The document cites relevant case law, stating that in Georgia, juries can consider any evidence presented during trial phases as mitigating factors and are not required to follow a specific standard in balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, while mental illness may not meet the threshold for an insanity defense, it can still be relevant for sentencing mitigation. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate expert testimony, Mincey would need to demonstrate: 1) unreasonable failure to investigate, 2) the extent of investigation a reasonable lawyer would have undertaken, 3) the likelihood that a reasonable investigation would have found a beneficial expert, and 4) that such testimony could have influenced the sentence. Failing to meet any of these criteria would undermine his claim.
Counsel investigated the option of presenting expert testimony but decided against it after a competent assessment. Thus, the Elledge test was deemed unnecessary, and even if applied, Mincey would likely not have demonstrated a reasonable probability that Dr. Larson's testimony would alter the sentencing outcome. The jury was instructed on mitigating circumstances, which are factors that may lessen moral culpability but do not excuse the crime. Mincey claimed mitigating circumstances existed, but the jury had the discretion to determine what constituted mitigating factors.
Assuming counsel's failure to secure an expert like Dr. Larson represented substandard performance, confidence in the jury's verdict remained intact, indicating that addressing potential prejudice first could negate the need to analyze counsel's performance quality. In relation to Mincey's Brady claim, it was concluded that he did not show a reasonable probability that the trial's outcome would differ if the prosecutor's notes had been disclosed or if Dr. Larson's testimony had been available. Since the prejudicial standards under Strickler and Strickland are aligned, Mincey's ineffective assistance claim fails due to lack of demonstrated prejudice. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and denied Mincey’s Rule 59(e) motion to amend the judgment.
