Rodney Brown v. Matthew T. Boettigheimer

Citation: Not availableDocket: 21-2460

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 27, 2022; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Rodney Brown was removed from a political rally for allegedly violating a St. Louis ordinance against disturbing the peace. Following his acquittal on the charge, Brown sued three St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) officers—Matthew Boettigheimer, Steven Korte, and Joseph Steiger—claiming misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers, which Brown appealed. 

The incident occurred on March 11, 2016, during a Donald Trump rally at the Peabody Opera House, attended by over 1,000 people with significant police presence. Officers were deployed for various security roles, including crowd control and coordination with the Secret Service. A video presented by the officers shows that after Brown laughed loudly during Trump's speech, rally attendees and Trump himself called for his removal. 

Brown contends he was merely expressing political opposition and did not act violently, while Officer Boettigheimer testified that Brown's laughter escalated into a larger disturbance, prompting their intervention to prevent further chaos. Boettigheimer stated he would not have approached Brown had he only laughed, but felt compelled to act as Brown continued to disrupt the rally. The court affirmed the officers' summary judgment, concluding they acted within their authority to maintain order.

Mark Comfort testified that he witnessed Brown standing face-to-face with another rallygoer. Officers Boettigheimer and Korte then approached Brown and escorted him from the auditorium, with Officer Boettigheimer claiming that Brown resisted, yelled, and gestured at others. Although the video ends before Brown's arrest, it is documented that he was arrested outside the auditorium by Officer Boettigheimer. Detective Steiger, who was not present during the arrest, prepared the incident report for Brown's arrest and others at the rally. On April 6, 2016, the City of St. Louis charged Brown with disturbing the peace under Section 15.46.030, but he was acquitted after a bench trial. Subsequently, Brown filed a lawsuit with eight claims against Officers Boettigheimer, Korte, Detective Steiger, Trump, unnamed defendants, and the City of St. Louis. After dismissals and stipulations, five claims remained, including three under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: unlawful seizure (Claim 1), malicious prosecution (Claim 2), and First Amendment retaliation (Claim 3), alongside two Missouri law claims: false arrest (Claim 5) and malicious prosecution (Claim 6). All claims were against the officers in their individual capacities. The officers successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, leading to this appeal. Trump had been dismissed before the second amended complaint, but Brown still named him as a defendant. The 'John Does' were also initially included but omitted in the second amended complaint. The court reviews the summary judgment grant de novo, considering the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, but will not accept blatantly contradicted accounts when determining the facts.

A district court assessing a law enforcement officer's entitlement to qualified immunity at summary judgment must thoroughly examine the record, identify genuinely disputed facts, and view those facts favorably to the non-moving party unless they are blatantly contradicted by the record. Video evidence may be used to challenge the non-moving party's account when it clearly contradicts their claims. Qualified immunity protects officers unless (1) the facts, viewed in favor of the plaintiff, show a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. A right is clearly established if every reasonable official would recognize the conduct as unlawful based on existing law. This requires either case law that definitively clarifies the lawfulness of the arrest or, in rare instances, an obvious violation evident without precedent. The inquiry can be conducted in any order, and appellate courts review qualified immunity determinations de novo.

Qualified immunity allows officials to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, shielding them from liability except for the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. A warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe a crime has occurred. Summary judgment is warranted in malicious prosecution claims where probable cause supports the arrest. Similarly, a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim fails if probable cause is established. Probable cause is determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances at the time of arrest, leading a reasonable person to believe an offense was committed. The assessment of probable cause is based on the facts known to the officer at the time and requires reasonable grounds for belief in the suspect's guilt under state law.

An objective standard governs the assessment of probable cause in this context, allowing law enforcement officers substantial latitude in interpreting factual circumstances. Mistaken beliefs about probable cause can lead to arguable probable cause if the mistake is deemed objectively reasonable. Officers acting on such reasonable mistakes should not face personal liability, distinguishing between "probable cause" and "arguable probable cause" in the qualified immunity analysis. The latter is relevant to whether an officer should have known their actions violated a clearly established right. 

In this case, the district court ruled that Officers Boettigheimer and Korte had probable cause to arrest Brown, as did Detective Steiger for initiating charges, thereby determining there was no violation of Brown’s constitutional rights related to unlawful seizure or malicious prosecution. The ordinance under which Brown was charged, Section 15.46.030, criminalizes conduct that incites violence or provokes others to violence. The Missouri Supreme Court clarified that analysis of such conduct must consider its context and potential effects. Thus, the key question was whether it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that Brown's actions could incite violence at the time of his arrest. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances known to the officers, the conclusion was that their belief was indeed reasonable.

The SLMPD deployed numerous officers to a rally attended by approximately 1,000 individuals, with assignments ranging from basic security to tactical units for emergency response. Officer Boettigheimer, stationed close to an attendee named Brown, noted prior violent incidents at other Trump rallies. During the event, Brown exhibited disruptive behavior, including loud laughter, aggressive confrontation with another attendee, and yelling at both the crowd and Trump, prompting Boettigheimer to believe immediate action was necessary to quell the disturbance. As Brown was escorted out, he continued to resist and provoke the audience.

The officers, including Boettigheimer and Korte, were found to have had arguable probable cause to arrest Brown based on the perception that his actions could incite violence, despite the state court later acquitting Brown on the grounds that he did not use fighting words as required under Tinker. In evaluating qualified immunity, the court determined that it was reasonable for the officers to act as they did, meaning they did not violate Brown's rights under the Fourth Amendment or under Missouri law.

Detective Steiger, who was not present at the rally but documented the incident, was also granted qualified immunity for any role in prosecuting Brown, as there was probable cause supporting the arrest and subsequent prosecution. Consequently, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers and Detective Steiger was affirmed, as the presence of probable cause negated Brown's malicious prosecution claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.