Earl v. Mervyns Inc.

Citation: 207 F.3d 1361Docket: 99-4264

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; March 29, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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Debra K. Earl, the appellant, challenges the district court's summary judgment favoring Mervyns, Inc., the appellee, regarding her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court found that Earl could not perform essential job functions and did not propose reasonable accommodations to support her work performance. Additionally, the court ruled that her termination was not linked to any protected activity. Earl was employed as a Store Area Coordinator starting in April 1992, with responsibilities including preparing the store for opening. Mervyns had a punctuality policy allowing 15 infractions per year before disciplinary action, which escalated through documented warnings to potential discharge. Earl's tardiness began in November 1992, leading to a documented warning in August 1993 and a subsequent warning in January 1995 after exceeding the allowed infractions. After disclosing her Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) as a cause for her tardiness, she received further warnings and was placed on probation in September 1995. Mervyns offered Earl a modified clock-in option, which she found unacceptable, and her doctor confirmed that no other accommodations would resolve her tardiness issue. The court affirmed the summary judgment based on these findings.

In late 1995, Appellee offered Appellant shifts per her request, but Appellant accrued multiple punctuality infractions, which could have led to her dismissal under company policy. On December 7, 1995, despite these infractions, Appellee issued a second probationary warning instead of terminating her. After continued tardiness, Appellant was suspended on February 16, 1996, and subsequently terminated for tardiness on February 19, 1996. Appellant's husband attended an exit interview on February 22, 1996, to request disability leave on her behalf. On the same day, Appellant filed a lawsuit against Appellee under the ADA and FMLA. Appellee moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on January 25, 1999, favoring Appellee. Appellant appealed.

In the analysis of the ADA claim, it is established that an employer cannot discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability regarding employment terms. To prove discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she is disabled, qualified, and subjected to discrimination due to her disability. There is consensus that Appellant has a disability; however, the key issue is whether she is "qualified," meaning she can perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation. Employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations unless it causes undue hardship. Determining essential functions involves considering the employer's judgment and any written job descriptions. The analysis will focus on whether punctuality is an essential function of Appellant’s position as Store Area Coordinator to assess her qualification under the ADA.

Appellant acknowledges that she cannot consistently arrive at work on time without an accommodation, which raises the issue of whether punctuality is an essential function of her role as Store Area Coordinator. Appellant contends that the Appellee has not demonstrated any negative impact on her job performance due to her tardiness, such as lost sales or disruptions in store operations. However, it is determined that punctuality is indeed an essential function of her job, supported by Appellee's strict punctuality policies outlined in the employee handbook and the consequences for violations. Unlike roles that can be performed off-site or deferred, Appellant's tasks require her physical presence at specific times to prepare the store and relieve the prior shift's Area Coordinator, underscoring the necessity of her timely attendance. 

Given the critical nature of punctuality in her position, Appellant cannot fulfill her job responsibilities without an accommodation. The inquiry then shifts to whether a reasonable accommodation could enable her to perform her essential job functions. Appellant argues that Appellee did not engage in an "interactive process" to discuss potential accommodations and did not demonstrate undue hardship. However, it is noted that the responsibility to identify a suitable accommodation lies with the employee, along with the burden of proving its reasonableness.

A plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable accommodation to succeed in an ADA claim; if not, the employer's failure to investigate such accommodation is irrelevant (Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286). An employer's duty to show undue hardship only arises after the plaintiff identifies a reasonable accommodation. In this case, the plaintiff's psychiatrist stated that no action by the employer could assist the plaintiff in arriving on time, and the plaintiff herself admitted to being unable to arrive punctually for any shift. The only accommodation proposed was to allow flexible clock-in times without reprimand, which would essentially alter the job's essential functions. Therefore, this request does not qualify as reasonable accommodation, relieving the employer from engaging in the interactive process or demonstrating undue hardship. Consequently, the plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof required for her ADA claim, as she could not be considered a "qualified individual."

For the FMLA claim, a plaintiff must prove they exercised a protected right, suffered an adverse employment action, and establish a causal connection between the two (Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1283). Although the plaintiff availed herself of FMLA rights and faced adverse action, there was no genuine dispute regarding the cause of her termination. The record showed that the plaintiff was placed on probation for punctuality issues and continued to incur infractions, leading to her suspension and subsequent termination, which followed her notification of an FMLA request. The employer's actions aligned with its established punctuality policy, indicating that the termination was not due to the FMLA leave. Thus, the FMLA claim also could not withstand summary judgment.

In conclusion, the plaintiff did not qualify as an individual under the ADA and was not terminated due to her FMLA rights, leading to the affirmation of the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the employer on both claims.