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Peabody Coal Company and Old Republic Insurance Company v. Clarence Abner and Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor
Citation: 118 F.3d 1106Docket: 96-3662
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; October 15, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Peabody Coal Company appealed a decision awarding benefits to Clarence Abner under the Black Lung Benefits Act. Abner, a coal miner for 44 years who experienced significant health issues, filed for benefits in 1979. Initially, the Department of Labor found him eligible, naming Peabody as the responsible operator, which Peabody contested. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing in 1986, ultimately awarding benefits in 1987 after determining Abner was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, a finding that Peabody failed to rebut. Peabody's subsequent appeal to the Board resulted in affirmance of the ALJ’s decision in January 1993. Despite filing a timely motion for reconsideration, this was denied in July 1995; however, the Board clarified that the ALJ had applied the correct standards in evaluating the evidence. Instead of appealing this decision, Peabody submitted a second motion for reconsideration in August 1995, which Abner claimed was untimely. The Board rejected Abner's argument, stating that it had the discretion to review all motions for reconsideration. On April 24, 1996, the Board denied Peabody's second motion on its merits, again indicating that further review could be sought via the appropriate Circuit Court. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review. Peabody's motion for reconsideration was summarily denied by the Board, prompting Peabody to file a petition for review on June 17, 1996, which fell within sixty days of the Board's April 24, 1996 order but not the earlier July 21, 1995 order. Abner contends that the court lacks jurisdiction as Peabody's petition was not timely filed in relation to the initial order. The key issue is whether a second motion for reconsideration extends the time limit for filing a review petition under 33 U.S.C. 921(c) until the outcome of that motion is decided. Under 33 U.S.C. 921(c), any adversely affected party must file a petition within sixty days of the Board's order, and this timeline is jurisdictional. If a timely motion for reconsideration is made, the sixty-day period for filing a review petition commences upon the Board’s decision on that motion. Peabody's failure to file within sixty days of the July 21, 1995 order means jurisdiction is not established, despite filing a second motion for reconsideration within thirty days of the first denial. Although there is no direct case law on this matter, the document suggests that analogies to Rule 59(e) jurisprudence may apply, which indicates that a successive motion for reconsideration does not extend the appeal period if the initial motion is denied. A rule is established to prevent parties from indefinitely filing new motions that would obstruct the finality of a judgment. A successive motion regarding the same judgment is considered ineffective, but a new judgment restarts the appeal timeline, allowing for a new motion under Rule 59. In this case, Peabody's petition for review was deemed untimely as it was filed over sixty days after the Board's denial of Peabody's first motion for reconsideration. This aligns with precedent where courts lacked jurisdiction for late petitions. Consequently, the petition is dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. Additionally, 20 C.F.R. 727.203 provides an "interim presumption" of total disability due to pneumoconiosis for miners with at least ten years of employment under certain medical conditions, but this presumption can be rebutted. There is no indication that Peabody caused any delays. The case Dailey v. Director, OWCP, which allowed the Board discretion to consider an untimely motion for reconsideration, does not apply here as it involved only a single motion.