Paralyzed Veterans of America, Appellees/cross-Appellants v. D.C. Arena L.P., a District of Columbia Limited Partnership, Appellants/cross-Appellees
Docket: 97-7005, 97-7017
Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; July 1, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed a district court decision regarding wheelchair seating sightlines in the MCI Center, an arena under construction. The appellees, representing wheelchair users, sued the appellants, the arena's owners, asserting that wheelchair seating must provide lines of sight over standing spectators to ensure an enjoyable experience during events.
The district court ruled that most, but not all, wheelchair seating must have such sightlines, and the appellate court affirmed this conclusion. The case centers on Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in public accommodations. Specifically, it mandates that newly constructed facilities be accessible and usable for individuals with disabilities.
Key to the case is the regulatory Standard 4.33.3, which requires that wheelchair seating be integrated into fixed seating plans and offer comparable admission prices and sightlines to the general public. The regulation stipulates that at least one companion seat must be adjacent to each wheelchair seating area and that multiple wheelchair spaces must be available in larger venues. The critical issue at hand is whether the requirement for "lines of sight comparable" includes ensuring that wheelchair users can see over standing patrons during events.
The language of Standard 4.33.3 was not drafted by the Department of Justice but by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board), which is tasked by Congress with developing minimum guidelines under Title III of the ADA. The Access Board proposed accessibility guidelines in January 1991 that included a requirement for wheelchair seating to provide comparable lines of sight, but it solicited feedback on whether this should extend to sightlines over standing spectators in venues like sports arenas. In February 1991, the Justice Department issued a notice proposing to adopt the Access Board's guidelines and directed comments to the Board. Despite recommendations for including sightlines over standing spectators, the Access Board's July 1991 guideline omitted this issue, stating it would be addressed in recreational facility guidelines. The Department of Justice subsequently promulgated Standard 4.33.3, mirroring the Board's guideline, without initially clarifying its stance on sightlines over standing spectators. However, by mid-1993, during an investigation into Olympic venue accessibility, the Department shifted its interpretation to include sightlines over standing spectators. In late 1994, the Department formally communicated that 'lines of sight comparable' included this requirement, but earlier technical assistance manuals did not address this issue. Eventually, in December 1994, the Department published a supplement to its manual interpreting 'lines of sight comparable' to require sightlines over standing spectators, emphasizing that wheelchair locations must ensure visibility over spectators who may be standing.
Appellants selected four seating bowls for the MCI Center, including wheelchair seating that met the regulatory requirement of over 1% of total seats and offered varied admission prices. Some of the wheelchair seating provided lines of sight over standing spectators, and appellants were aware of the Justice Department's position that 'lines of sight comparable' includes these sightlines. Appellees, including the Paralyzed Veterans of America, challenged the designs under the ADA's private right of action, arguing that the seating did not meet the integration, dispersal, and sightline requirements as interpreted by the Justice Department.
Appellants contended their designs met the necessary integration and dispersal standards and disputed the sightlines requirement. Despite the Justice Department's enforcement authority, it chose to participate only as an amicus in the case, and the district court limited its involvement. The district judge found the wheelchair seating adequately integrated but not sufficiently dispersed. He agreed with appellees regarding the sightlines but clarified that not every wheelchair seat was required to have a sightline over standing spectators. The judge deemed the appellants' efforts as constituting 'substantial compliance,' ultimately approving a revised plan that provided sightlines over standing spectators for 78% to 88% of wheelchair seating across different configurations.
Both parties contest the district court's ruling: appellants argue that the court incorrectly interpreted the sightline requirement, while appellees assert that all wheelchair seating should have such sightlines.
Appellants do not dispute the Department's interpretation of the regulation as inconsistent with the governing statute, focusing instead on its interpretation. They present three main arguments against the district judge's acceptance of the Department's interpretation. First, appellants argue that the regulation's language does not support the interpretation provided in the Department's manual. Second, they contend that any ambiguity in the regulation warrants a fresh interpretation that favors their reading rather than deference to the Department's view. Third, they assert that the Department's change in interpretation violates the Administrative Procedure Act, as it bypasses the necessary notice and comment process outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 553, and claim that it constitutes a substantive addition requiring similar procedural compliance.
Regarding the regulation's requirement for "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public," appellants argue this phrase implies that wheelchair-accessible seating should be dispersed throughout the facility. In contrast, appellees maintain that since the regulation already mandates wheelchair seating in multiple locations and offers various admission prices, "lines of sight comparable" must imply unobstructed views. The court agrees with this interpretation, noting that it refers to the ability of wheelchair users to see performances without obstruction.
Appellants further claim that "lines of sight comparable" had acquired a specific meaning by the regulation's adoption, which does not encompass temporary obstructions caused by standing spectators. This phrase originated from guidance by the American National Standards Institute in 1980, but appellants argue there is no evidence that it was intended to address issues with standing spectators. Although there is no clear understanding of the phrase's meaning prior to its adoption by the Board and the Department, the court notes that it remains uncertain whether it was meant to address only permanent obstructions. This ambiguity impacts discussions on whether deference should be granted to the Department’s interpretation and whether it constitutes a modification of the regulation.
The phrase "lines of sight comparable" is interpreted to mean a view that is not more obstructed than what non-wheelchair users would experience. However, it remains unclear whether this pertains solely to permanent obstructions or also includes temporary ones caused by standing spectators, which may particularly affect wheelchair users. This ambiguity raises a question about the deference owed to the agency's interpretation of its regulation. Federal courts traditionally grant deference to agency interpretations unless they are "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with the regulation. This standard is comparable to that established under Chevron, which affirms permissible interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Recent discussions suggest that such deference may encourage agencies to draft vague regulations, leading to inadequate guidance. While the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its deference doctrine, there are limits imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring regulations to be sufficiently clear to allow for meaningful agency lawmaking. However, the appellants do not contest the clarity of the regulation in question.
Appellants contend that deference to the Department of Justice is unwarranted because the Access Board, not the Department, drafted the regulation as a proposed guideline. The Justice Department's notice indicated its intention to adopt the Board's standards and directed responses to the Board, implying the Board's control over the regulatory process. However, deference is not based solely on an agency's drafting role but on its statutory authority as the regulation's sponsor. Under Chevron, an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory language receives deference due to its delegated authority to administer the statute, which similarly applies to interpretations of its own regulations. Once the Access Board's language was adopted by the Department, it became solely the Justice Department's responsibility, distinguishing this case from others where multiple agencies are involved. Although the Department lacks administrative adjudicatory authority to interpret its regulation, Congress has delegated significant legal and policymaking powers to the Department, allowing it to develop the statutory framework through regulations. The requirement for a published technical manual further suggests a continuous regulatory administration akin to adjudicatory authority in other statutory contexts.
The interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 by the Department of Justice is deemed acceptable under the statutory framework, which allows for deference to reasonable interpretations within the technical manual. However, the appellants argue that the current interpretation represents a fundamental shift from prior understandings, asserting that any change requires a formal modification through notice and comment rulemaking, as mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The government contends that agencies can modify their interpretations of ambiguous regulations, akin to their latitude under the Chevron doctrine, which allows for reconciliation of statutory ambiguities. The court, however, disagrees with the government, emphasizing that while agencies may adjust interpretations, significant changes that conflict with existing regulations necessitate adherence to notice and comment procedures to comply with the APA. This requirement is underscored by the Supreme Court's indication that altering an interpretation to adopt a position inconsistent with existing regulations warrants formal rulemaking.
The court rejects the government's analogy to the Chevron case and examines whether the Department effectively 'amended' its regulation without the required notice and comment, violating section 553. The government and appellees argue that until the 1994 manual supplement, there was no authoritative interpretation of 'lines of sight comparable.' The Board acknowledged potential inadequacies of its guidelines for sports arenas and solicited comments on whether lines of sight over standing spectators should be mandated, indicating awareness of concerns raised by many commenters. However, when Justice issued the regulation, it did not reference the Board's concerns or imply its regulation addressed them, which complicates the argument that an amendment occurred. While it is plausible that Justice intended for its regulation to align with the Board's guidelines, such intent is not necessary. Congress allowed Justice to impose stricter standards than those of the Board.
Appellants attempt to identify a prior inconsistent departmental interpretation based on a speech by a mid-level official stating there was no requirement for lines of sight over standing spectators. However, this speech lacks the formal authority to represent the Department’s position and cannot be equated with the technical assistance manual, which constituted formal agency action. The timing of the speech relative to the issuance of the supplement diminishes its significance, as appellants cannot claim reasonable reliance on it to their detriment. The court concludes that appellants were aware of Justice's interpretation and that an agency must provide full notice if it intends to use an interpretation to deny a party's rights.
The document addresses the interpretation of a regulation by the Department, noting that while the appellants nearly demonstrate a significant change in interpretation with the 1994 technical manual, the Department did not formally adopt a contrary position, allowing the interpretation to stand as a permissible construction of the regulation. The discussion raises the question of whether this interpretation qualifies as a 'substantive rule' with legal force, which would necessitate notice and comment under 5 U.S.C. § 553. The distinction between substantive and interpretative rules is complex, often hinging on whether the agency intends to create new rights or duties. Previous cases indicate that merely labeling a rule as interpretative does not exempt it from notice and comment requirements if it carries the force of law.
The document further explains that the consequences of the Department's interpretation can be significant, yet agencies typically have the right to interpret ambiguous statutes or rules without notice and comment. The tightness of the agency's language in relation to the statute is crucial in determining the classification of the rule. In this case, the Department's interpretation of "lines of sight comparable" is rooted in the actual regulatory language, suggesting the regulation itself provides sufficient enforcement authority without the manual interpretation. Consequently, the manual interpretation does not require notice and comment due to its lack of distinctiveness from the regulation.
In a cross-appeal, the appellees argue against the district judge's finding that only 'substantial' compliance is sufficient for arena builders, asserting that the Department requires 100% compliance with the regulation. They argue that the district judge should have deferred to the Department's interpretation regarding compliance expectations, similar to the interpretation of "lines of sight comparable."
The government did not specify in its manual that every wheelchair location must have a view over standing spectators, leading the district judge to recognize a conflict between the requirement for sightlines and the regulation mandating that wheelchair seating be dispersed and integrated throughout the venue. The Department stated in communications that unobstructed sightlines are only required at "all or substantially all" wheelchair locations. In a prior settlement with the Atlanta Olympics, the Department insisted on "at least a reasonable number" of wheelchair seats having unobstructed views. Appellees claim the district judge misinterpreted the Department's position by not allowing a second amicus brief that clarified the Department's stance on substantial compliance, which allows for non-compliance only under specific circumstances. They argue the district court's reliance on the Atlanta settlement is unfounded as it lacks precedential value. Although a federal court may consider an agency's interpretation expressed in an amicus brief, it is uncertain whether the Department can further clarify its interpretation during litigation. The district judge was within his rights to reject the second amicus brief, given that he had previously urged the government to intervene in the case. Without this brief, appellees' arguments were weakened, and they could not enhance their position by referencing the government's brief on appeal. The case does not involve "agency action," as it concerns private parties seeking equitable relief. The district judge had discretion to interpret the regulation's compliance requirements and appropriately crafted the remedial order.
Appellees and the government argue that affirming the district court's ruling would lead to inconsistent interpretations of the regulation. However, this perspective fails to consider the Department of Justice's capability to amend the manual for clarity. The government appears to desire flexibility, as evidenced by its choice not to intervene; yet, it cannot simultaneously seek uniformity while avoiding the legal mechanisms to achieve it. The district court's judgment is upheld.
The Olympic Stadium investigation concluded in May 1996, recognizing it as "the most accessible stadium in the world," notably due to its wheelchair seating design that ensures a comparable line of sight for wheelchair users. Professor Manning's view that agencies should prefer adjudication to rulemaking, which may deter uniformity, is noted, but the Department must enforce its regulations in federal court. Manning's proposal that ambiguities in agency regulations be interpreted against the drafter does not adequately reflect the multi-party nature of regulatory processes.
The excerpt indicates that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) imposes stricter requirements than the non-delegation doctrine regarding legislation. Appellants claim that the current interpretation contradicts section 553 by reversing previous agency positions, a point addressed later. They incorrectly reference Kelley to argue that the Department lacks deference in private ADA actions, which contrasts with prior rulings regarding EPA authority.
Testimony from the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (who oversaw Title III enforcement) indicated that from 1991 to 1993, the Department did not maintain that wheelchair seating required lines of sight above standing spectators. This testimony, akin to post-enactment congressional testimony, lacks probative value. The manual suggests that lines of sight can be established at the cost of integration, proposing solutions such as positioning wheelchair spaces at the front or elevating them at the back of seating sections. The district court acknowledged that the appellees argued for more integration, which might have negatively impacted the lines of sight for wheelchair users.
