John Doe, by and Through His Parents and Next Friends and the Class of All Others Similarly Situated, Jane Doe, Next Friend and Joe Doe, Next Friend, and Counter-Defendants-Appellants v. Board of Education of Oak Park & River Forest High School District 200, Nancy Smiley, Donald Offermann, Stephen C. Bruner, Both in Their Official Capacities and as Individuals, and Counter-Plaintiffs-Appellees
Docket: 96-3014
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; June 23, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
John Doe, a 13-year-old special education student at Oak Park, River Forest High School (OPRF), was accused of possessing a pipe and marijuana during a freshman dance on September 9, 1994. In response, the OPRF Board of Education suspended him for ten days and subsequently expelled him for the remainder of the fall semester, citing its Code of Conduct. The Doe family filed a due process hearing request under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), challenging the Board's assertion that John’s behavior was unrelated to his learning disability. A Level I hearing officer upheld the Board’s actions, but a Level II hearing officer later reversed this decision, finding that the Board had violated John's due process and IDEA rights by not providing alternative educational services.
On October 26, 1994, the Does filed an eight-count complaint in the Northern District of Illinois, claiming that John's expulsion violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, among other legal protections, including a specific count for IDEA violations. The district court granted OPRF's motion for summary judgment on all counts except the IDEA claim on October 11, 1995, determining that the expulsion procedures provided adequate due process to John.
On October 11, 1995, OPRF filed a counterclaim challenging a Level II hearing officer's decision. Subsequently, both parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment regarding Count 8 of the Does' complaint and OPRF's counterclaim. On July 10, 1996, the district court granted summary judgment to OPRF, concluding that the IDEA did not obligate OPRF to continue educational services for a student expelled for reasons unrelated to a disability. The court found that John forfeited his right to a "free appropriate public education" under the IDEA through his actions and that OPRF was not required to maintain John's placement during due process hearings without a connection between his misconduct and his disability. Additionally, the court determined that the Level II hearing officer had misapplied certain facts, affirming that OPRF had reasonably protected John's rights and correctly identified that his misconduct was unrelated to his learning disability.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decisions, which were affirmed. Despite having a learning disability, John had been integrated into mainstream classes since the 1991-1992 school year. In a Multidisciplinary Conference (MDC) on February 16, 1994, OPRF recommended learning disability support services for John, which his mother later requested to eliminate, allowing him to enroll in biology. John and his parents acknowledged receiving OPRF's regulations regarding illegal substances. On September 9, 1994, the rules were reviewed in a homeroom, and John was present when the policies were explained before he was found with marijuana at a school dance that night.
On September 19, 1994, another MDC evaluated whether John's marijuana possession was related to his learning disability, concluding there was no connection. The MDC team, with limited representation, reinstated the previously suggested resource room services that had been declined at the earlier conference. A separate expulsion hearing on the same day lasted five hours, with John's attorney presenting a mitigation case. The Administrative Review Committee (ARC) recommended expulsion, which was accepted by the Board on September 22, 1994, despite the Does not being allowed to amend the Summary of Evidence from the hearing.
The standard of review for whether a school district has complied with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewed de novo by the court. If there is no legal error, the district court's findings are reviewed for clear error. The Does contend that the IDEA mandates that OPRF provide alternative educational services to John during his due process hearing, citing the Office of Special Education Programs' (OSEP) interpretation that such services must continue for expelled students with disabilities, irrespective of the misconduct's relation to the disability. They argue that OSEP's interpretation is binding and should be given deference based on the IDEA and relevant case law.
The IDEA requires states to ensure that all children with disabilities have a right to a free appropriate public education, emphasizing the term "all." The Does argue this means OPRF must continue services during John's expulsion, while OPRF and the district court focus on the term "right," suggesting it can be forfeited, which they believe occurred in this case.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Honig v. Doe is noted as not being conclusive on this matter because it only addresses the prohibition against unilateral expulsion of students with disabilities for misconduct related to their disabilities. Additionally, a prior ruling from the Ninth Circuit supports the idea that if a student’s misconduct is found not to stem from their handicap, they can be expelled without the continuation of educational services during that expulsion.
When a child's misbehavior is unrelated to their handicapping condition, they are not exempt from disciplinary rules, including expulsion. Consequently, if a handicapped child is expelled appropriately, the school district is not required to continue providing educational services. This principle aligns with the understanding that not all actions of a handicapped child can be attributed to their disability. The Ninth Circuit's opinion on this matter was upheld by the Supreme Court in Honig v. Doe.
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed a similar issue in Virginia v. Riley, where the U.S. Department of Education threatened to withhold IDEA funding unless Virginia changed its policy on educational services for expelled disabled students. Virginia contended that Congress must explicitly indicate such conditions in the statute, which the Fourth Circuit agreed with, asserting that the IDEA does not condition funding on providing services to students expelled for misconduct unrelated to their disabilities. The court highlighted that the IDEA only requires States to provide access to free appropriate public education to handicapped children and that this access can be forfeited due to serious misconduct.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that neither the text, legislative history, nor the purpose of the IDEA implies a requirement for states to continue educational services after such expulsions. Thus, it deemed the Department of Education's position as exceeding its authority.
This Court concurs with the analyses from both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, finding their conclusions more persuasive than the plaintiffs' cited cases, which lacked thorough examination. Therefore, it determined that OPRF did not violate the IDEA by not providing alternative services to John during his expulsion. Additionally, the Does claimed that OPRF's refusal to maintain John's special education placement during due process hearings violated the "stay-put" provision of the IDEA, which mandates that a child remains in their current educational placement unless agreed otherwise by the State or local educational agency and the parents.
The Does assert that the Supreme Court's ruling in Honig v. Doe, which addressed the expulsion of special education students, governs their case. However, the court finds a critical distinction: in Honig, the expulsion was linked to the students' disabilities, while the current case concerns whether OPRF must maintain a student's placement when his misconduct is not related to his learning disability. The Supreme Court did not establish a "dangerousness" exception to the "stay-put" provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which prevents expulsion during due process. OPRF argues against a rigid application of this provision, suggesting that decisions regarding expulsion should be made on a case-by-case basis, as illustrated in Rodiriecus L. v. Waukegan School District No. 60. In Rodiriecus, the court indicated that automatically applying the "stay-put" provision to all special education evaluations could enable disruptive students to evade disciplinary actions. Instead, the court emphasized evaluating the situation based on four factors relevant to granting a preliminary injunction and clarified that the "stay-put" provision applies only if school officials are aware or should reasonably be aware of the student's disability.
OPRF contends that the reasoning in the Rodiriecus case applies here, asserting that allowing students with disabilities to file due process requests under the IDEA to avoid expulsion could lead to misuse of the law. OPRF highlights that the Does claim John's misbehavior is linked to an undiagnosed disability, ADHD, but believes this argument is unnecessary to address directly since the district court correctly concluded that the IDEA's "stay-put" provision does not apply. The court noted that if a student's misconduct is unrelated to their disability, the IDEA does not protect them from appropriate disciplinary actions.
The MDC team unanimously determined that John's misbehavior was not related to his learning disability, having followed IDEA procedures properly. Consequently, the "stay-put" provision was not applicable. The Does also allege that OPRF failed to meet IDEA's due process requirements regarding John's expulsion, specifically claiming inadequate notification about the MDC meeting and insufficient time to prepare. They argue that this lack of timely notice violated state regulations, preventing them from obtaining an independent evaluation to argue that John's behavior was related to his alleged ADHD.
OPRF, supported by the district court, argues that the Does' assertion of John's ADHD is unconvincing, stating that the evidence presented did not substantiate a link between his alleged condition and his misconduct. For instance, Dr. Meade's testimony indicated no signs of impulsivity or inhibition issues in John.
John's classroom inattention is attributed to either avoidance behavior stemming from anxiety about performance or primary ADHD, with no clear distinction between the two. Testimonies indicate that John understood the rules prohibiting marijuana at school functions and that his decision to bring marijuana to a school dance was calculated rather than impulsive. Consequently, the likelihood that an ADHD evaluation would alter the outcome of the misconduct determination is minimal, as misconduct is considered related to a disability only if the disability significantly impairs behavioral control. This aligns with the Ninth Circuit's precedent, which suggests that behavior driven by low self-esteem does not invoke protections under the IDEA.
Both expert testimonies noted that John's learning disability contributed to low self-esteem, leading him to misbehave for peer approval. This type of behavior does not qualify for IDEA protections. The process afforded to the Does in relation to John's expulsion was deemed adequate, and the claim that they were prejudiced by the limited time to obtain an ADHD evaluation was rejected.
Additionally, the Does contested the district court's summary judgment in favor of OPRF regarding due process claims, arguing that material facts about the meaningfulness of the process were overlooked. They claimed that the Board only received a summary and reports, not the complete hearing tape, which they argued precluded a fair consideration of mitigating factors. However, the court found that the essential elements of the Does' defense were included in the summary provided to the Board, affirming the district court's decision.
The attorney for the Does emphasized the seriousness of the situation concerning John, a 13-year-old freshman with special education learning disabilities (LD), requesting the board to consider his status during their review of his case. It was noted that John posed no threat to others, as there was only an allegation of possession without evidence of intent to sell, and he had cooperated respectfully during the investigation. The document also mentions uncertainty regarding whether the tape from the expulsion hearing was presented to the Board, yet it states there is no evidence to suggest it was unavailable. Both parties acknowledged that the Oak Park and River Forest High School (OPRF) had a duty to provide due process to the Does prior to expelling John, which should not be a mere formality. After reviewing the record, the conclusion was that OPRF acted appropriately, leading to the affirmation of the district court's decision.
Additionally, the document references the signing of H.R. 5 on June 4, 1997, which amended the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to ensure free appropriate public education for all children with disabilities, including those suspended or expelled, effective for ages 3 to 21. The amendment lacks a retroactivity clause, and applying it retroactively would increase liability for past actions, so it was decided not to apply this amendment to the case at hand, following the precedent set in Landgraf v. UST Film Products. Finally, the petition for rehearing filed by the appellants on June 10, 1997, was denied by the judges.
The plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate Decision for Want of Jurisdiction, arguing that the full administrative record was not submitted to the district court, which they claim was required by 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-8.02(k) and 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA. They contend that the absence of the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) as a party meant OPRF's counterclaim should be dismissed, as ISBE is the official custodian of the record and was not served within the one-year period. However, the court found that it had sufficient portions of the administrative record to make its decision and that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate any prejudice from the incomplete record. Additionally, the court ruled that ISBE was not an indispensable party under F.R.C.P. 19(b), which is an equitable doctrine, not jurisdictional. Therefore, the court declined to vacate its decision.
The plaintiffs further argued that OPRF violated the Illinois Administrative Code by not holding a required conference before terminating educational services for John. However, the court noted that the relevant section addresses the termination of services, not a temporary suspension, and that John's return to special education was not in dispute. The court concluded that since John's misbehavior was unrelated to his disability, OPRF was not required to continue providing alternative educational services. The court referenced the Fifth Circuit's position on disciplinary actions under the IDEA but found existing case law unpersuasive, as it lacked substantive discussion on the relationship between a student's misconduct and their disability.
The court finds the argument by the Does regarding the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 (Pub.L. 103-382) unconvincing, as it pertains to the "stay-put" provision of the IDEA. The Act allows for a student who brings a weapon to school to be placed in an interim educational setting for up to 45 days, indicating that while the school district "may" continue services, it is not obligated to do so for misbehavior unrelated to a student's disability. The court emphasizes that the amendment does not influence whether the "stay-put" provision applies in cases of unrelated misconduct. Additionally, the Act clarifies that the IDEA does not override the Gun-Free Schools Act for misconduct unrelated to disabilities, suggesting a legislative intent to treat such cases differently.
Furthermore, the court addresses the Does' assertion that OPRF violated the law by failing to re-evaluate John before his expulsion, referencing 34 C.F.R. 104.35 under the Rehabilitation Act, which mandates a pre-placement evaluation for significant changes in placement. The Does argue that John's expulsion warranted an evaluation, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Honig v. Doe. They allege that OPRF did not provide current evaluative data, failed to evaluate for ADHD, and lacked knowledgeable personnel in the decision-making team. However, the court maintains that no violation occurred as the misconduct leading to expulsion was determined to be unrelated to John's learning disability, reinforcing that neither the IDEA nor the Rehabilitation Act protects him from the consequences of such behavior.
The Does argue that the Level II hearing officer correctly identified John's initial inappropriate placement as a violation of their rights; however, it was Mrs. Doe who decided to cease resource services and enroll John in a biology class. They further assert that OPRF inadequately prepared for John's reintegration into public school, pointing out that OPRF failed to convene a staffing meeting to plan for his return, and only organized an MDC at the Does' insistence to evaluate John's independent assessment and develop an appropriate IEP. The Does contend that OPRF was indisputably unprepared for John’s placement in the spring term post-expulsion, a conclusion they believe the Level II hearing officer's findings supported, which would justify reimbursement for John's continued private placement. However, the district court noted that Mr. Doe acknowledged receiving a letter from OPRF on November 8, 1994, indicating their willingness to conduct a re-evaluation and arrange a staffing meeting for John's return. The delay in the Does’ request for an MDC until January 25, 1995, which led to the meeting being held a month later, does not substantiate their claim for reimbursement for John's private school placement during the Spring 1995 semester.
