Robert Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation

Citations: 115 F.3d 1068; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11710; 1997 WL 321553Docket: 1760

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; May 14, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard the case of Robert Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation, where Warner, the plaintiff, challenged a probation condition mandating attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) meetings. He argued that this requirement forced him into religious activity, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Warner, having pleaded guilty to multiple alcohol-related offenses, was sentenced to three years of probation with several special conditions recommended by the Orange County Department of Probation (OCDP), including A.A. attendance. Warner, an atheist, expressed his objections to the religious aspects of A.A. to his probation officer, who nonetheless required his continued participation and further directed him towards more intensive A.A. involvement. The district court found that the A.A. program had a significant religious component, specifically through its "Twelve Steps," which emphasized reliance on a higher power. The appellate court rejected OCDP's claim of non-liability for the probation condition and upheld the district court's award of nominal damages, a declaratory judgment, and attorney's fees to Warner.

Group prayer was regularly practiced at meetings Warner attended, which began with a religious invocation and concluded with a Christian prayer. The district court noted the program's significant focus on spirituality and prayer. In July 1992, Warner challenged the constitutionality of his assignment to Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) in the Town of Woodbury Justice Court. The Office of Community Development Programs (OCDP) offered him alternative therapy after discussions with the district attorney's office. The judge ruled that nonreligious options should be available, rendering Warner's motion moot. Subsequently, Warner filed a federal lawsuit seeking damages and a declaratory judgment, claiming his First Amendment rights were violated. After a bench trial, the district court concluded that mandating Warner's attendance at A.A. breached the Establishment Clause and held OCDP liable for the constitutional violation, despite the sentencing judge imposing the A.A. condition. However, the court found Warner's claims for financial damages unconvincing, awarding nominal damages of one dollar and attorney's fees.

OCDP contended that the trial court erred by asserting its liability, claiming that under New York law, the sentencing judge alone determines probation conditions. It also disputed the conclusion that its requirement for Warner to attend A.A. violated the Establishment Clause. To establish OCDP's liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Warner needed to show that his injury stemmed from a custom or policy of Orange County. The recommendation for A.A. was part of a standard policy for alcohol-related probation cases. OCDP argued it was not liable since the judge's sentencing decision caused the harm. While the County's argument about superseding cause is valid, the Supreme Court has clarified that tort law principles apply to civil rights actions under § 1983. Tort defendants are responsible for the natural consequences of their actions, including those arising from foreseeable intervening forces.

Warner's involvement in religious exercises at A.A. meetings is examined through two potential factors that could absolve the OCDP of liability for his injury: the judge's sentencing decision and the actions of the A.A. chapter. New York law dictates that setting probation terms is a judicial responsibility that cannot be delegated to probation officers. The OCDP contends its role was merely advisory and thus not the proximate cause of Warner's injury. However, the Supreme Court case Malley v. Briggs illustrates that reliance on judicial judgment is not justified if a reasonable officer would have known their actions lacked legal grounding. The Court emphasized that even in an ideal judicial system, the possibility exists for a judge to overlook critical details due to external pressures. It argued that defendants must be accountable for the repercussions of their actions. In this context, the probation officer, acting as a neutral advisor rather than a partisan advocate, is likely to have their recommendations adopted by the judge without independent verification, especially regarding therapy providers. This reliance on probation department recommendations by judges is common due to their lack of specialized knowledge about various therapy options, making the adoption of such recommendations a foreseeable outcome.

The determination of whether the sentencing judge would likely adopt the OCDP's recommendation for Warner to attend Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) is a factual question. The district judge concluded there was a high likelihood that the judge would follow the probation department's advice, a finding that was not deemed to have clear error upon review. The dissent contended that Warner's prior attendance at A.A. sessions, under his attorney's guidance, and his lack of objection to their religious content negated the idea that the probation department's recommendation was a proximate cause of any injury. It also argued that Warner's conduct implied consent. However, these arguments hinge on factual issues regarding Warner's awareness of the religious aspects of A.A. prior to sentencing. The judge did not find that Warner had sufficient knowledge of the program's religious content, and evidence presented at trial offered little to suggest he was aware of its extent. Warner's attendance at a few meetings only indicated some awareness of religious components, such as prayers and discussions of the Twelve Steps, but did not imply he understood the depth of the program's religious nature. The dissent's assertion of consent lacked support from factual findings. If Warner had actively suggested A.A. as a condition of probation or communicated agreement, the situation would differ; however, his brief attendance aimed at demonstrating his commitment to rehabilitation did not equate to consent to a religiously conditioned sentence. Furthermore, Warner's injury stemmed from the actions of A.A. meeting leaders rather than the judge's decision to send him to a rehabilitation program. Whether these actions interrupted the causal link between the OCDP's recommendation and Warner's injury depends on the foreseeability of those actions by the OCDP at the time of recommendation. The district court did not make findings on this point, although the probation department was expected to exercise reasonable care in evaluating therapy programs it recommended, especially given its awareness of A.A.'s religious character prior to trial.

OCDP's recommendation for Warner to attend Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) had a clear religious dimension, which OCDP acknowledged. A.A.'s practices, including prayer and a focus on spirituality, constituted a significant religious component, making the sessions religious events. Warner was coerced into attending A.A. due to his probation sentence, which offered no alternative therapy options devoid of religious content. The court highlighted that had Warner been provided with reasonable choices among therapy programs, the situation might have been different. The ruling is grounded in the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government from coercing individuals into religious participation. This principle is supported by precedent, including the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Griffin v. Coughlin, where coercive conditions tied to religious program participation violated the Establishment Clause. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Kerr v. Farrey found that requiring inmates to attend a religiously oriented substance abuse program under threat of increased security risk also constituted unconstitutional coercion. Orange County countered that Warner was not mandated to engage in the religious exercises; however, the court distinguished his adult maturity from the context of coercive pressure experienced by children in school prayer scenarios.

Orange County's argument is deemed unpersuasive in light of the coercive nature of Warner's participation in a long-term group therapy program that incorporated religious motivation, contrasting sharply with the brief prayer experience in Lee. Warner's involvement included mandatory attendance at "Step meetings" to enhance his commitment to the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) and was subject to pairing with another member for further indoctrination. The potential for incarceration if he failed to comply underscored the coercion, regardless of Warner's ability to resist indoctrination. 

Additionally, the County's assertion that the non-sectarian elements of A.A. exempt it from Establishment Clause scrutiny is misleading, as evidence indicated that meetings contained explicit Christian prayers. Previous Supreme Court rulings have consistently rejected the notion that non-sectarian religious practices evade First Amendment review. The comparison to Marsh v. Chambers is flawed, as the context of a legislative session differs fundamentally from the compulsory nature of Warner's A.A. involvement, where emotional compulsion is significant.

Despite concluding that Warner's First Amendment rights were violated, concerns arise regarding damage awards for such violations. At the time of Warner's referral to A.A., no legal precedents indicated a constitutional breach, and the Probation Department's intent was to assist alcoholics rather than promote religion. This context bolsters arguments for good faith immunity for officials. Although the OCDP's actions were unconstitutional, the minimal harm suffered by Warner does not warrant substantial damages, making the district court's assessment of one dollar appropriate. Any significant damages awarded would have prompted consideration of remittitur.

Orange County's claims are dismissed as meritless, and the district court's judgment is upheld. Judge Winter dissents, arguing that Warner's circumstances regarding his plea and sentencing are clear and uncontested. Warner, who pled guilty to a third alcohol-related offense, voluntarily began attending Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) meetings upon his lawyer’s advice, aiming to present this as evidence of rehabilitation to the sentencing judge. The probation officer recommended continued attendance at A.A. as a probation condition, which the judge imposed without objection from Warner, who later sought and was granted a nonreligious counseling alternative. 

Winter contends that Warner waived his claim under Section 1983 for violating the Establishment Clause by consenting to the probation condition he himself had initiated. He argues that Warner’s voluntary attendance at A.A. to mitigate his sentence undermines any claim against the probation officer’s recommendation. Furthermore, he believes invoking the Establishment Clause could lead to unnecessary changes in the penal system. Winter asserts that Warner's actions amounted to a waiver of objections, and thus his claim for damages should be dismissed.

Warner's negligence claim fails because he voluntarily chose to attend Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) meetings and did not inform the court of his concerns regarding this requirement, which contributed to any constitutional harm he experienced. His successful petition for state collateral review under N.Y.Crim. Proc. L. § 440.20(1) and the New York Court of Appeals decision in Griffin v. Coughlin show that he had the option to seek relief. The assertion that the sentencing judge did not exercise independent judgment, as required by state law, is rejected; the presumption of correctness in such proceedings remains strong unless an error is identified. Contrary to the view of some colleagues and the district judge, the acceptance of probation officer recommendations is not merely "rubberstamping," as judges often reject such recommendations. The record indicates that, had Warner expressed his concerns about the religious nature of A.A. earlier, the judge would have likely modified the condition. Following Warner's complaint to the probation officer about A.A., the judge allowed Warner to attend a non-religious alcohol counseling program instead. Thus, the claim that the probation officer's recommendation was the sole cause of Warner's injuries lacks support. Additionally, any assumption that a potential appeal would have been fruitless due to deference to the probation officer's recommendation is incorrect, as it is now evident that relief was possible. The precedent set in Malley v. Briggs also suggests that the nature of sentencing, which includes constitutional rights, differs significantly from non-adversarial proceedings like obtaining a search warrant.

A magistrate's decision to issue a warrant does not absolve an officer from unreasonable conduct, as adversary arguments that expose flaws in the application are not presented to the magistrate. The discussion shifts to the Establishment Clause's applicability in a probation condition requiring attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) meetings. It is assumed that A.A.'s religious elements could violate either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses if other claim requirements are satisfied. However, it is argued that the Establishment Clause does not provide grounds for relief in this case. The reliance on coercion due to the absence of alternative programs overlooks the fact that participation in A.A. was a voluntary choice. While coercion can factor into Establishment Clause claims, it is not essential, and the availability of options does not remedy valid claims. Established precedent prohibits government endorsement of religion, necessitating neutrality among religions and between religion and non-religion. Therefore, if requiring A.A. attendance is deemed a violation of the Establishment Clause, it stems from governmental support of a religious program over secular alternatives. This lack of neutrality is illustrated in cases like Grumet and Lee, where governmental actions were struck down for failing to maintain neutrality. Additionally, the argument suggests that following this reasoning could jeopardize various permissible penal programs, such as state-supported chaplaincy services in prisons, which provide religious counseling and are managed by state officials.

Sentences involving community service, such as assignments at soup kitchens operated by churches, do not violate the Establishment Clause according to the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman. These programs serve a secular purpose of rehabilitation, do not primarily advance or inhibit religion, and do not result in excessive government entanglement with religion. The state has the authority to provide religious programs to prisoners and must offer some congregate sectarian options. The distinction between penal programs and sentences like Warner's relates to the Establishment Clause, while colleagues agree that attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) meetings can be a probation condition, provided individuals have a choice between religious and secular programs. The author expresses concern over any compulsory religious activities in sentencing, particularly when effective secular alternatives exist, as this raises issues under the Free Exercise Clause. Warner, however, does not assert a Free Exercise claim. The decision has significant implications, potentially importing negligence law principles into judicial processes and affecting the capabilities of judges and advocates, while also exposing probation authorities to legal actions if A.A. attendance is recommended without alternative options offered.

Liability for unconstitutional recommendations under Section 1983 persists regardless of whether the defendant raised the constitutional issue during sentencing. The district court ruled that Orange County violated Warner's First Amendment rights by mandating attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) as a probation condition, without determining if Warner's failure to object or appeal constituted consent or waiver regarding the program's religious aspects. The dissenting opinion contended that Warner's prior attendance at A.A. indicated sufficient awareness of its religious nature, implying that his inaction should be viewed as consent or waiver.

The court has remanded the case to the district court to investigate two key questions: 1) whether the County argued that Warner's lack of objection at sentencing or appeal constituted consent or waiver regarding the A.A. program's religious content; and 2) whether Warner was aware of the religious practices at the time of sentencing, making his inaction a consent or waiver of his claim. The district court must conduct a hearing to allow both parties to present evidence on these issues before making findings.

The previous opinions of the court are vacated, and the district court's new findings may or may not lead to a modification of its judgment. Should the judgment remain unchanged, either party can restore the case to the appellate court within twenty days of the district court's findings. If the judgment is modified, the parties must follow proper procedures for appealing the new judgment. Judge Winter dissents, indicating he sees no need for a remand.

Orange County raised the issue of potential immunity from liability for its probation officer for the first time in a reply brief on appeal. However, the record shows that this defense was never presented to the district court, and the County's failure to address it in its initial appeal brief denied Warner the chance to contest the matter and the court the benefit of comprehensive argumentation from both sides. Consequently, the court ruled that issues introduced for the first time on appeal are not properly before it and therefore will not be considered, citing relevant case law. 

Additionally, the excerpt discusses the principles of liability concerning intervening causes, stating that a negligent defendant remains liable unless an "unforeseen and abnormal" intervention breaks the chain of causality. New York law is outlined, emphasizing the requirement for a court to consider a probation department's pre-sentence report (PSR) before sentencing, with PSRs becoming confidential documents once written. The excerpt clarifies that while the probation department plays a crucial role in the sentencing process, the claim that judges merely "rubber stamped" recommendations is not supported. The court acknowledges the importance of judicial discretion in determining appropriate sentencing, particularly regarding therapy provider selection for alcohol abuse, which relies significantly on the probation department’s recommendations.

The court's approval of alcohol abuse programs requires consultation with the local probation department or another appropriate agency, indicating reliance on their expertise in program selection. The Supreme Court ruling in Heck v. Humphrey does not preclude Warner's § 1983 claim, as it pertains to the legality of mandated alcohol therapy in a religious context, which is separate from the validity of his conviction. Warner's previous sentence, which included this mandate, was invalidated before his lawsuit, allowing him to pursue his claim without conflict. 

The district court found the Office of Community Development Programs (OCDP) liable for violating the Establishment Clause, despite no explicit finding of their awareness regarding the religious nature of Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.)'s Twelve Steps. The court based its decision on the stipulation that OCDP was aware of A.A.'s religious aspects, including its prayers, although this knowledge was not directly established. Additional legal precedents, such as O'Connor v. California, emphasize the absence of an Establishment Clause violation when probationers have a choice between A.A. and secular programs.

Further analysis references the Lemon v. Kurtzman framework, highlighting ongoing debates regarding its application. The court concluded that requiring Warner to attend A.A. without alternative options constituted coerced participation in a religious practice, thus violating the Establishment Clause. Additionally, the case notes that municipalities do not enjoy the qualified immunity of their officials, as established in Owen v. City of Independence.

Qualified immunity may extend to municipalities for the executive acts of their officers, even if the officers themselves are granted absolute immunity, as established in Reed v. Village of Shorewood. Under Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, U.S. appellate courts can review a district court's denial of remittitur for abuse of discretion, provided the proper legal standard for jury awards is applied. A constitutional challenge to a probation authority's actions may not hold merit without prior judicial consideration, and an appeal could be warranted instead of a Section 1983 action if state law prohibits delegating sentencing authority to probation officers. References to New York Penal Law indicate that consultation with probation authorities does not necessarily confer them with special status over other agencies. Concerns are raised about state judges' inability to defend their actions in federal court without testifying. Warner's initial claim suggested that the discretion granted to probation officers regarding attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.) could lead to liability, but the focus should be on the original recommendation, which only allowed for exemption under specific rehabilitation conditions. The immunity of probation officers is generally linked to judicial immunity. The County raised the issue of collateral estoppel, arguing that Warner's prior state court motion regarding his sentence may bar his current Section 1983 claim.