Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; July 20, 2017; New Jersey; State Supreme Court
The Court, led by Justice Timpone, addressed the appeal regarding whether a church-associated youth ministry qualifies as a "youth serving organization" under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-22 of Megan's Law. The defendant, S.B., has two prior sexual assault convictions involving teenagers, making him subject to Megan's Law requirements, including registration and restrictions on supervising children. He was indicted for participating as a supervisor in the No Limits Youth Ministry (NLYM) of the Eternal Life Christian Center (ELCC).
The trial court dismissed the indictment, concluding that NLYM was not a youth serving organization, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. The trial court's reasoning highlighted vagueness in the statute regarding the inclusion of religious institutions and drew a distinction from a previous case (State v. J.B.W.) where a school-related activity was found to violate Megan's Law. The Appellate Division agreed, asserting that the legislative intent did not include religious organizations within the definition of youth serving organizations, especially since other sections of the law explicitly mention religious entities.
The State appealed this decision, arguing that the youth ministry should be classified as a youth serving organization under the law, that religious organizations do not have blanket exemptions, and that determining the status of such organizations is a factual matter for jury determination. The Court reversed the Appellate Division's decision, concluding that the statute's plain language does not exempt church-associated youth ministries and reinstated the indictment for further trial proceedings.
Children in religious settings should receive the same protections under Megan's Law as those in secular environments, according to the State. The Defendant argues that the NLYM, being part of the ELCC, does not qualify as a “youth serving organization” under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-22 and claims exemptions for religious organizations based on the statute's plain language, legislative intent, and relevant case law, specifically citing the Appellate Division’s decision in J.B.W. III. The core issue is whether a church-associated youth ministry fits the definition of a "youth serving organization." Legal interpretation of statutes is the focus, with courts reviewing such interpretations de novo, without deference to lower court rulings.
The primary aim of statutory interpretation is to discern and uphold the Legislature's intent, starting with the statute’s clear language and ordinary meanings of terms. If the intent is evident, the interpretative process concludes. If ambiguity arises, courts may reference legislative history. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-23(a) prohibits excluded sex offenders from participating in youth serving organizations, defined under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-22 as entities providing activities or services to individuals under 18, excluding schools. The language of this statute is deemed clear, with “any other corporation, association, or organization” indicating a non-exhaustive list. Consequently, churches are included within the statute's scope.
The statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-22, explicitly exempts only "public and nonpublic schools" from certain provisions, with no mention of religious organizations. Courts cannot add language to statutes, as established in State v. Munafo and DiProspero. The definition of a youth-serving organization is clear, and no ambiguity necessitates examining other parts of the statute. The legislative intent behind Megan’s Law focuses on enhancing law enforcement's ability to prevent child sexual abuse, as outlined in the law's findings. The 2009 amendment aimed to broadly prohibit sex offenders from engaging in youth-serving organizations to protect children. Consequently, a youth ministry affiliated with a religious institution does not fall outside the definition of a youth-serving organization. Although the defendant attempted to comply with reporting requirements by informing his religious institution of his convictions, this does not affect the classification of the NLYM as a youth-serving organization, leaving that determination to the jury. Additionally, the defendant's argument referencing the Appellate Division's decision in J.B.W. is dismissed. In that case, a defendant was indicted for participating in a youth-serving organization while working on a school band’s pit crew, which was deemed separate from the school itself, thus violating Megan’s Law. The court affirmed that the definition of youth-serving organization includes such separate entities.
The defendant contends that the NLYM lacks its own governance structure and is part of the ELCC, which is a religious organization. Consequently, the defendant argues that the NLYM does not qualify as a youth-serving organization as defined by statute, thus he is not subject to related restrictions. The J.B.W. panel had determined that the pit crew of a marching band was a youth-serving organization due to its structural separation from the affiliated school, which is not applicable to organizations connected to religious institutions. The Legislature specifically excluded public and nonpublic schools from the youth-serving organization definition but did not extend this exclusion to religious entities. Therefore, churches and religious organizations are included within the statute's definition. Whether the NLYM qualifies as a youth-serving organization is a matter for the jury to decide. The court also notes that a constitutional question regarding N.J.S.A. 2C:7-22 and the Free Exercise Clause, which was not raised by the parties, will not be addressed, as the case primarily involves statutory interpretation. The Appellate Division's decision is reversed, the indictment is reinstated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings to determine the NLYM's status as a youth-serving organization. The opinion is supported by the Chief Justice and other justices.
