Jerry Bartlett JONES, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Tana WOOD, Respondent-Appellee

Citations: 114 F.3d 1002; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4459; 97 Daily Journal DAR 7417; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13774; 1997 WL 312584Docket: 96-35499

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; June 12, 1997; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jerry Jones claims innocence in the first-degree murder of his wife, Lee, arguing that compelling evidence points to another suspect and that his attorney failed to investigate this evidence prior to trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's summary judgment that denied Jones's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On December 3, 1988, Jones sought help from his neighbors, claiming Lee was hurt and bleeding. When the neighbor, Graham Smith, arrived at Jones's home, he found Jones with a towel around his hand and learned that Lee had been stabbed. Jones testified that he was preparing for a shower when he heard Lee scream, saw a man with a knife, and was injured while trying to defend himself. 

Upon police arrival, Jones was found with blood-stained jeans and a wrapped hand. His story remained consistent, but the investigation revealed no signs of forced entry into the home, and no usable fingerprints were found on the murder weapon, a fish filleting knife discovered near Lee's body. Jones had multiple cuts on his hand, but the autopsy indicated Lee suffered sixty-three stab wounds. The police could not establish a motive for the attack, leading to Jones's arrest on second-degree murder charges.

Jones's father engaged an attorney to investigate the murder of Lee Jones, specifically targeting Danny Busby, a friend of Jones's daughter Elizabeth, as a suspect. Jones had suspicions about Busby due to prior altercations between him and Lee, and Busby's urgent calls to Elizabeth on the day of the murder raised further concerns. After the murder, Jones asked Elizabeth to determine Busby's whereabouts, but she found conflicting information about his alibi. 

Jones conveyed to his lawyer a prior threat from Busby regarding breaking into their home and noted Busby's attempts to contact Elizabeth. Despite Jones's insistence on examining physical evidence that he believed could exonerate him, his attorney delayed the inspection until just before trial and failed to test critical evidence, such as blood on Jones's jeans. On the eve of trial, the attorney informed Jones that there was no significant physical evidence and dismissed the investigation into Busby, believing he had an unassailable alibi based on police reports.

Jones was convicted of first-degree murder. Following the verdict, his attorney sought a new trial, claiming newly discovered evidence implicating Busby in the crime. An investigator uncovered that Busby had sent inappropriate letters to Elizabeth and had visited the Jones home multiple times while Jones and his wife were out dancing. On the murder day, Elizabeth had informed Busby she would stay home, and Thomas, Elizabeth's brother, reported growling noises similar to those made by Busby on the night of the murder. Keys, including one to the garage that was found open when Lee was murdered, had been stolen from Elizabeth's bag, with suspicion on Busby. Additionally, it was revealed that Busby had been in proximity to the Jones residence shortly before the murder. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, asserting the new evidence could have been discovered earlier and was speculative and immaterial.

Jones appealed his conviction, arguing insufficient evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the new trial motion. The Washington Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, stating that, while circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. The court also concluded that the newly discovered evidence would not have altered the outcome of the trial. The Washington Supreme Court declined to review the case.

Jones then filed a personal restraint petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court. On December 29, 1994, Jones submitted a pro se habeas corpus petition in federal court, claiming insufficient evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. He outlined three specific failures of his trial lawyer: inadequate pretrial investigation of Busby, insufficient examination of physical evidence, and poor advice regarding the plea offer. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge.

On February 24, 1995, Jones filed two motions regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim: a motion for discovery seeking documents related to his trial and a motion for expansion of the record to test physical evidence. Both motions were denied as premature by the magistrate judge on March 22, 1995. On July 17, 1995, Wood moved for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence supported Jones's conviction and that Jones failed to prove his lawyer's ineffectiveness under Strickland v. Washington. Jones opposed the summary judgment and renewed his earlier motions, claiming the judge did not independently review the state court record and that Wood did not contest all aspects of his ineffective assistance claim. On December 12, 1995, the magistrate judge recommended granting Wood's summary judgment motion, addressing both claims and an additional argument regarding inadequate investigation of physical evidence. The district court adopted this recommendation on February 21, 1996, granting summary judgment for Wood, denying Jones's habeas corpus petition, and dismissing his motions as moot. After a denial of his motion for reconsideration, Jones appealed. The review of the summary judgment is conducted de novo, focusing on whether a rational jury could find Jones guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. The court must respect the jury's role in assessing witness credibility and resolving evidentiary conflicts.

In reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court must either conduct an independent examination of the state court findings or hold a hearing to establish its own findings. Failure to do so, particularly if the state court trial transcript is unavailable for review, necessitates a reversal of the district court's denial of the writ. In this case, the magistrate judge did not hold a hearing and lacked access to the trial transcript, indicating a failure to meet the required independent review standards. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for proper examination of the state court record.

Further, the district court's grant of summary judgment to Wood regarding Jones's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was contested because it preceded a ruling on Jones's motions for discovery and record expansion. Wood argued that discovery was only permissible with an already-scheduled evidentiary hearing. However, the court clarified that discovery may be granted at the district court's discretion for good cause, irrespective of an evidentiary hearing. Jones's discovery motion sought specific documents from his trial lawyer, pretrial investigator, and prosecutor, including notes, pretrial interview reports, and information related to plea offers.

Jones filed a motion for expansion of the record, treated as a discovery motion, requesting the court to order the FBI laboratory to test the clothes he wore the night of the murder and blood samples from both himself and the victim, Lee. He asserted that the tests would demonstrate the blood on his clothing originated from his own injury rather than from his wife's wounds. Jones argued that this evidence was crucial for establishing his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as no hearing had been conducted at the state level regarding this claim. The court recognized this as "good cause," referencing the Eighth Circuit's decision in Toney v. Gammon, which permitted a habeas petitioner to conduct DNA tests when he maintained his innocence and believed the results could exonerate him. The court highlighted that denying discovery is an abuse of discretion if it is essential for a fair development of facts, as evident in both Toney and Harris v. Nelson. Consequently, the court determined that Jones requires discovery to substantiate his ineffective assistance claim and reversed the district court's summary judgment, allowing Jones to pursue the requested discovery—except concerning the plea agreement, as he was not entitled to a hearing on that matter. The court also agreed that Jones should be granted an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim, as the necessary criteria for such a hearing were met.

Jones must demonstrate that his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel meets two criteria: (1) his counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) this deficiency prejudiced his defense, as outlined in Strickland v. Washington. A counsel's performance is deemed deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms, and this deficiency exists if the attorney fails to exercise the skill and judgment expected of a competent lawyer. Prejudice occurs when there is a reasonable probability that, had the errors not been made, the outcome would have been different, undermining confidence in the verdict.

In Jones's petition, he raised three specific issues regarding his trial lawyer's performance: (1) inadequate investigation of a suspect, Busby, (2) insufficient investigation of physical evidence, and (3) poor advice regarding a plea offer. Regarding the investigation of Busby, Jones alleges that his lawyer failed to investigate despite Jones's insistence and that the lawyer incorrectly claimed Busby had an "ironclad alibi," which was later proven false. The lawyer defended his inaction as a strategic choice to conserve resources; however, any strategic decision must still be reasonable under the circumstances. The assessment of counsel's decisions, particularly regarding communications with the defendant, is crucial in evaluating the reasonableness of their actions. Accepting Jones's allegations as true indicates that his lawyer's representation was deficient.

The 'prejudice' aspect of the Strickland test is met as questioning Busby's involvement in the murder undermines the prosecution's case against Jones, which was already weak and circumstantial, lacking motive and other suspects. The failure to thoroughly investigate Busby was a significant error. A weakly supported verdict is more susceptible to being influenced by errors than one with strong evidence. Ineffective assistance claims require assessment against the strength of the government's case, and Jones's claims could introduce reasonable doubt regarding his guilt, warranting an evidentiary hearing.

Additionally, Jones asserts ineffective assistance due to his attorney's failure to test physical evidence, including blood on his clothing and hairs on the victim. The magistrate judge suggested that the failure to test might be considered sound trial strategy, despite acknowledging it as outside the range of competent assistance. This reasoning is criticized as contradictory. Jones argues that his lawyer's lack of follow-through on testing, despite intentions to do so, stemmed from distractions from other trials, undermining any presumption of strategic decision-making. The court notes that failing to examine potentially exculpatory evidence cannot be justified as a reasonable strategy, referencing case law that establishes such failures, like not testing evidence that could disprove the State's theory, as constitutive of ineffective assistance.

If Jones's assertion that the blood on his jeans is his own rather than Lee's is validated, it would significantly weaken the prosecution's argument, which posits that the murderer must have been covered in Lee's blood and could not have left the scene without leaving traces. This would challenge the notion of an intruder being responsible for Lee's death. Additionally, if forensic tests reveal that the hair found on Lee does not belong to either Lee or Jones, it would bolster Jones's claim of an intruder's involvement. At this preliminary stage, Jones is not required to provide corroborative evidence for his claims; the focus is solely on whether his assertions, if substantiated, warrant relief. The combination of these potential test results and the fact that the garage door was ajar could create reasonable doubt regarding Jones's guilt, thus justifying an evidentiary hearing.

Jones also contends that his trial attorney did not inform him of a plea bargain offer before he rejected it. Although this could indicate ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones has not demonstrated prejudice. To prove prejudice in this context, he must show a reasonable likelihood he would have accepted the plea offer. His claim that he would have accepted the plea deal if he believed it was available is deemed implausible given his attorney's correct assessment of the prosecution's weak case. Even if informed, it appears unlikely that Jones would have agreed to a ten-year sentence for a crime he maintains he did not commit, especially considering his claims of innocence.

Consequently, Jones cannot establish the necessary prejudice related to his counsel's failure to communicate the plea offer, disqualifying him from relief on this ineffective assistance claim and from an evidentiary hearing on the matter.

Wood argues that Jones is not entitled to a hearing because he did not develop the relevant facts at the state level. However, Jones did not have the opportunity to do so, as the Washington Court of Appeals dismissed his personal restraint petition without a hearing. The state courts would not allow him to use extra-record materials to support his ineffective assistance claim, which typically requires such materials for a thorough evaluation. As ineffective assistance claims are generally better addressed in collateral proceedings due to the need for additional factual development beyond the original record, Jones could only present new material through a personal restraint petition.

Jones has established the "cause" required for his ineffective assistance claim under the Keeney 'cause and prejudice' test, having unsuccessfully attempted to develop relevant facts at the state-court level without fault. He is entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his attorney's failure to investigate a key witness, Busby, and the failure to test evidence, but not regarding the alleged failure to inform him about a potential plea agreement. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) does not apply to Jones's habeas petition since it was filed on December 24, 1994, prior to the AEDPA's effective date. Nevertheless, the court finds it necessary to consider the potential implications of the AEDPA to fully resolve the issues at hand, particularly in light of a pending Supreme Court decision. The application of the AEDPA will not affect the need for an evidentiary hearing nor impede Jones's ability to seek habeas relief. The court clarifies that Jones did not fail to develop the factual basis for his claims; rather, the state courts denied him the opportunity to do so. Consequently, the AEDPA does not prevent a federal evidentiary hearing on his claims. The findings from this hearing will assist the district court in assessing whether Jones qualifies for habeas relief based on the state courts’ failure to provide effective counsel, as established by Strickland. Additionally, the district court must conduct a thorough review of the entire state court record to determine if the state court's decision constituted an "unreasonable application" of federal law or an "unreasonable determination" of fact.

The court has reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to allow for an independent review of the state court record, particularly the trial transcript, regarding Jones's insufficiency claim. This remand also permits Jones to pursue his requested discovery and present his ineffective assistance claim at an evidentiary hearing. The court emphasizes that it does not prejudge the outcome of this hearing but notes that Jones's issues are sufficient to overcome summary judgment. The record indicates that the trial transcript is not included in the district court's materials, despite defense counsel's assertion of submission. The district court may order the availability of evidence for discovery and, if necessary, appoint counsel to assist Jones. The court finds it unnecessary to address the district court's failure to inform Jones of the requirements for summary judgment or his claims regarding the de novo review of the magistrate judge's report, as these matters are rendered moot by the current decision.