Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey; February 27, 2012; New Jersey; State Supreme Court
Judge WEFING delivered the Court's opinion regarding the defendant, indicted for second-degree robbery and second-degree burglary, who had two trials resulting in a hung jury and subsequent conviction. The defendant did not testify in either trial, receiving a six-year prison sentence for robbery, governed by the No Early Release Act, and a concurrent four-year sentence for burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, prompting the defendant to seek certification to review the trial court's decision on the admissibility of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling that his prior convictions, which included two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled substance from 1994, were not too remote despite subsequent disorderly persons offenses.
The incident involved Cynthia Davies, who was attacked in her home by an intruder demanding money. After escaping to her bedroom and calling 9-1-1, she provided a description of the attacker but could not identify him in an initial photo array. Later, she identified the defendant from a second array after a brief glance. A pre-trial hearing determined the admissibility of the defendant's prior convictions for possible impeachment if he chose to testify. The trial court noted the prior convictions occurred thirteen years prior to the current offenses, but ultimately deemed them admissible. The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions.
The prosecution highlighted the defendant's numerous disorderly persons convictions, including four shoplifting offenses and other convictions for possession of burglar tools, defiant trespass, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Although these convictions were deemed inadmissible, the trial court permitted their use to connect the defendant's earlier convictions to the current trial, addressing the remoteness factor in the Sands analysis. If the defendant chose to testify, prior convictions would be sanitized, allowing only limited references, such as indictment numbers and sentencing details, while excluding mention of the offenses' nature and any probation violations.
The defendant argued against the admissibility of his over-ten-year-old convictions, claiming they were too remote and lacked seriousness, contending that the trial court improperly relied on the disorderly persons convictions. He sought a new Sands hearing, asserting the trial court failed to consider the risk of undue prejudice under N.J.R.E. 403. The defendant also requested a reevaluation of the Sands precedent, advocating for a standard similar to federal rules, where older convictions are generally excluded unless the proponent can demonstrate their relevance. The State emphasized the trial court's discretion in evidentiary rulings and cited cases where older convictions were admitted. The Attorney General's amicus brief supported the trial court's decision, arguing that a pattern of disorderly persons offenses is relevant to assessing a defendant's respect for the law, influencing the remoteness of other convictions.
Amicus requests clarification that the trial court's evaluation of a defendant's prior convictions for admissibility should start from the date the defendant was released from incarceration, rather than the date of the convictions themselves. The offenses in question occurred approximately nine years post-release. Amicus argues that allowing the defendant to present himself as law-abiding would mislead the jury. It also urges the rejection of the defendant’s proposal to overrule existing precedent (Sands) and adopt a federal standard for this evidential issue, noting past rejections of similar suggestions and the necessity for changes to align with the Evidence Act of 1960.
The document outlines foundational principles guiding the analysis, emphasizing that New Jersey's Evidence Rules favor the admissibility of all relevant evidence (N.J.R.E. 402) and grant trial judges broad discretion in evidentiary rulings. Such rulings are entitled to deference unless there’s clear evidence of an abuse of discretion. Historical context is provided regarding the evolution of evidence law in New Jersey, referencing State v. Hawthorne, where prior law had prohibited certain convicted individuals from testifying unless pardoned. This changed in 1874, allowing defendants to testify while making their prior convictions admissible to assess credibility. The Hawthorne case highlighted that the court had discretion to exclude evidence to prevent undue prejudice, but the ruling established that prior convictions, regardless of age, could be considered to impact credibility.
The New Jersey Legislature did not amend the statute following a court ruling, maintaining the existing language of N.J.S.A 2A:81-12 regarding the impeachment of witness credibility through prior convictions. In 1967, New Jersey adopted new evidence rules largely based on the Uniform Rules of Evidence but did not incorporate Rule 21 concerning conviction use for impeachment. Instead, the court revisited this issue in 1978, particularly in the case of Sands, where it determined that the admissibility of prior convictions for impeaching a witness's credibility is at the trial judge's discretion, which is extensive. Generally, such evidence should be admitted unless the defendant can prove otherwise.
The court highlighted that the remoteness of a conviction is pivotal, but it should not be determined solely by the time elapsed; the nature of the crime is also critical. Serious crimes related to dishonesty carry more weight than less severe offenses. A trial court must consider both the time since the conviction and the nature of the crime to assess whether its relevance outweighs potential prejudice. Additionally, intervening convictions can impact the trial court's decision. A defendant with a significant criminal history faces a heavier burden to exclude evidence of prior convictions, as jurors may perceive repeated legal transgressions as indicative of untrustworthiness.
In State v. Brunson, the court aimed to mitigate prejudice against defendants with prior convictions for similar offenses by allowing the prosecution to introduce limited details about the prior conviction, focusing only on the degree of the crime and the date, thus preventing jurors from considering it as substantive evidence of guilt while acknowledging the challenges juries face in separating credibility assessments from guilt determinations.
The defendant had the option to present evidence regarding prior convictions for strategic reasons. The 1993 revision of New Jersey's evidence rules aligned with the Federal Rules of Evidence but notably diverged in N.J.R.E. 609. This rule establishes that a witness's prior convictions are generally admissible to challenge credibility unless deemed remote or excluded by the judge for other reasons. Such evidence can be introduced through various means, including examination or record production. New Jersey allows the admission of prior convictions for impeachment, despite potential prejudice against criminal defendants. The trial judge has discretion over whether to admit these convictions, with the burden on the defendant to prove exclusion. The court has yet to address whether prior convictions deemed inadmissible can influence the admissibility of otherwise remote convictions for crimes. The document references two Appellate Division cases: in State v. McBride, the defendant did not testify following a ruling that his prior convictions could be used against him, resulting in the Appellate Division affirming the decision despite the remoteness of some convictions. In State v. Irrizary, the defendant contested an extended sentence based on a prior conviction's remoteness, showing the ongoing legal consideration regarding the impact of prior convictions on sentencing and credibility assessments.
The Attorney General’s guidelines indicate that an extended-term sentence should not be pursued if a defendant's prior convictions are very remote. The Appellate Division dismissed the defendant's claim that a 1985 conviction should not trigger a mandatory extended term, citing a subsequent 1994 disorderly persons conviction for failure to deliver a controlled dangerous substance. The panel determined that when assessing the remoteness of prior offenses, sentencing judges must consider intervening convictions. New Jersey's rules (N.J.R.E. 609) differ from federal rules regarding the admissibility of convictions older than ten years, which are presumptively inadmissible if their prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value. The court upheld the trial court's discretion in admitting the defendant's prior convictions due to his intervening disorderly persons offenses and declined to adopt the federal approach. The court rejected the argument that the defendant's narcotics convictions were not serious enough to be admitted, stating that doing so would undermine legislative intent. The court also dismissed a new argument under N.J.R.E. 403 for lack of prior presentation, noting it was not jurisdictional or in the public interest. The suggestion from amicus curiae regarding the computation of time from release rather than conviction was also dismissed, as amicus cannot introduce new issues. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions and referred the question of modifying N.J.R.E. 609 to the Supreme Court Committee on Evidence. Additionally, it noted the existence of further disorderly persons convictions not material to the analysis. The inference was made that the trial court and Appellate Division may have used a six-year-old marijuana conviction as a reference point, with no objection raised by the defendant regarding its admissibility.
