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James Scott Hooper v. Tulsa County Sheriff Department, Sued As: Stanley Glanz, William "Bill" Thompson, Brian Edwards, John Doe "A" and John Doe "B" Tulsa County Board of Commissioners, Oklahoma Stanley Glanz Lewis Harris, Individually John Selph, Individually and in Official Capacity Robert N. Dick, Individually and in Official Capacity Bill Thompson, Sued as William "Bill" Thompson, Individually and in Official Capacity Brian Edwards, Sued as Lt. Brian Edwards, Individually and in Official Capacity Russell Lewis, Sued As: Russell Lewis, Individually and in Official Capacity John Doe
Citations: 113 F.3d 1246; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18490; 1997 WL 295424Docket: 96-5103
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; June 4, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Unpublished opinions can now be cited if they have persuasive value on a material issue and are properly attached to the citing document or provided to the Court and all parties during oral arguments, as per the General Order of November 29, 1993. In the case of James Scott Hooper v. Tulsa County Sheriff Department and other defendants, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Hooper alleged that he contracted dormant tuberculosis during his incarceration at the Tulsa City/County Jail (TCCJ) due to the defendants' deliberate indifference to his health. To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, Hooper needed to demonstrate both that the defendants’ actions led to serious harm and that they exhibited deliberate indifference. The court found that Hooper failed to prove he contracted tuberculosis while at TCCJ, as he had a negative skin test prior to incarceration and a positive test afterward. The evidence showed there were no inmates with active tuberculosis at TCCJ during his stay, and Hooper's assertions were based on speculation rather than concrete evidence. Therefore, summary judgment was deemed appropriate as there was no genuine issue of material fact. Mr. Hooper's claim that he could have contracted tuberculosis from dormant bacilli in the TCCJ ductwork is deemed speculative, lacking evidence of an inmate with active tuberculosis being present prior to his incarceration. As a result, he fails to establish that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference regarding his exposure to the disease. In response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, he has not produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Mr. Hooper contests the district court's procedural decisions, arguing that he was denied the opportunity to depose witnesses, which he believes impeded his ability to present evidence. His omnibus motion for deposition at government expense was denied because the court found no authority for such payment, and he did not renew this request afterward. The court's sole preserved issue for review is whether it should have ordered the waiver or payment of his witness fees and deposition costs under 28 U.S.C. 1915(a). However, established case law from multiple circuits indicates that this statute does not authorize the federal courts to cover witness fees for civil litigants proceeding in forma pauperis. Additionally, Mr. Hooper raises objections regarding the district court's discovery orders, which may limit discovery to prevent annoyance or undue burden. The standard for reviewing these orders is for abuse of discretion. Mr. Hooper contends that the district court incorrectly limited the discovery period to December 1, 1993, through February 11, 1994, arguing he required expert reports from a post-incarceration Department of Justice investigation to demonstrate that structural issues at TCCJ contributed to his tuberculosis exposure. However, the relevance of TCCJ's condition hinges on evidence that an inmate with active tuberculosis was present, which Mr. Hooper has not substantiated. His claim that the reports "might have" indicated such exposure is speculative, particularly as a related Department of Justice letter only referenced possible infectious disease risks without confirming any tuberculosis incidents. Additionally, Mr. Hooper challenged the district court's refusal to compel responses to his interrogatories about TCCJ's ventilation system and his request for redacted medical records of all inmates on the eighth and ninth floors during his incarceration. The court deemed the ventilation information irrelevant and found the medical records request overly broad, justifying its discretion to prevent a fishing expedition. Mr. Hooper further contested the denial of a motion to release state and county health department records regarding his cellmate's tuberculosis status, which the court denied based on Oklahoma law's confidentiality provisions. While such records can be released under court order, they must not identify individuals unless specified by law. Since Mr. Hooper sought records of a specific identifiable inmate not involved in the case, the court acted within its rights to deny the request. Lastly, Mr. Hooper argues that the district court neglected to address the affidavit from sheriff's deputy Robert Mark de Armon submitted before summary judgment. However, he did not provide reasons to believe the court overlooked it, and the court is not required to detail every piece of evidence in its judgment. The affidavit, which generally supports the defendants, was reviewed de novo, and even if the court failed to consider it, Mr. Hooper's assertion that it could have influenced the outcome is unsubstantiated. Mr. Hooper contests the district court's decision not to appoint counsel, asserting he understood the fundamental issues and could present his case effectively. The court found the legal issues straightforward and determined that Mr. Hooper was unlikely to succeed with or without an attorney, concluding that it did not abuse its discretion in refusing counsel. Additionally, the court upheld its choice not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Hooper's state law claims. It ruled that Mr. Hooper's other procedural arguments would not affect the case's outcome, thus declining to address them. The district court's judgment is affirmed, with the mandate issued immediately. The order serves as non-binding precedent except under specific legal doctrines. Mr. Hooper's case involved tuberculosis, distinguished between dormant and active forms, with only active tuberculosis being contagious. The Prison Litigation Reform Act's amendments to Section 1915(a) are noted, but the former version applies to Mr. Hooper since his filing predates the amendments. Lastly, the court rejects Mr. Hooper's attempt to incorporate arguments from extensive attachments and a prior appeal brief due to exceeding the page limit for opening briefs.